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INTRODUCTION 
The philosophical analysis of historical knowledge has 
been characterized since its beg1nn1ngs by the practice of 
comparing history with science. That th1s is the r1ght approach 
seems now so self-evident that a well-known writer can declare 
that 'the raison d'~tre of cr1t1cal ph1losophy of history is very 
closely bound up with the question whether h1storical inquiry is, 
or 1s not, "sc1entific", 1n a sense in which physics, b1ology, 
psychology or even applied sc1ences l1ke engineering are 1 • 1 ) 
Ph1losophical schools come and go, ph1losophical fash1ons and 
term1nolog1es change, but the question whether history is a 
science has so far surv1ved all transformat1ons. What 1s more, it 
seems to suggest a simple and straightforward answer. 
Consequently, there has always been a strong tendency amongst 
ph1losophers (and amongst some h1stor1ans, too) of divid1ng on 
clear l1nes, and although the more c1rcumspect writers have never 
repl1ed with an unqual1f1ed 'yes' or an unqualified 1 no 1 , in on~ 
way or other they have usually been counted among the sheep or 
the goats. 
The present ph1losoph1cal scene in Br1ta1n and America 
is no exception. On the one hand there are the 'humanists' who 
are convinced that what distinguishes history from science is more 
important thab what both have in common. On the other hand there 
l) W.H. Dray, Ph1losophy £f H1story, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 
1964, p. 2. 
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are the 'naturalists' according to whom such differences are, if 
not negligible, at least of m1nor significance philosophically. 
The argument between both usually follows very predictable lines. 
The humanist looks at historical practice and finds again and 
again that there are great differences between what h1storians 
and scientists are doing. The concept of fact, the concept of 
relevance, most of all the concept of explanation are compared in 
both f1elds and the humanist comes to the conclusion that in 
these and other respects there are cruc1al differences. The 
naturalist starts his reply by conceding half the case to his 
opponent ('true, 1n history the pos1tion is indeed such and 
such') but then goes on to show that the humanist has 
misunderstood or m1sconstrued the activ1ties of the scientist and 
that the differences are after all only minor ones, d1fferences 
1n the techn1ques and purposes of enquiry, not d1fferences in 
methodology ('but 1n science, too, it is true that ••• 1 ). 
Whatever the mer1ts of each of the two cases, the important 
point 1s that both, humanist and naturalist, are hypnotized by 
this topic of similarity or dissimilarity and are incapable of 
avert1ng their eyes from sc1ence for more than a short t~me. 
From these remarks it will be seen that we are out of 
sympathy not only w1th the human1st and natural1st pos1tions but 
with the whole approach which is common to both. In fact, we do 
not care a jot whether history is a science or not and regard 
this as a question which is more likely to impede a fruitful 
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d1scussion of historical knowledge than to further it (although 
we do not w1sh to deny that an occasional look at other f1elds, 
such as sc1ence or art, may be helpful). What matters is 
whether, and in how far, history can be viewed as a branch of 
rat1onal knowledge, not whether it is a branch o~ scientific 
knowledge; and by 'rat1onal knowledge' we understand knowledge 
which is capable of being supported by evidence or reasons, 
reasons which are not private to one individual but which, at 
least in principle, can be checked or shared by other people. 
It 1s one of the main errors of both, humanist and natural1st, 
that they tend to equate scient1f1c knowledge with rational 
knowledge whereas 1n fact the former 1s only ~ specific 
kind of rational knowledge. The humanist often creates the 
impression that the rules and canons of rational thinking can be, 
or must be, dispensed with 1n the case of history and that 
h1story is hardly more than a k1nd of poetry, a poetry which has 
the advantage of being true. He and the naturalist agree that 
anything which follows these rules must be scient±ftc, that 
science is the only field in which man can acquire reliable and 
intersubjectively testable knowledge. 
To make our posit1on still clearer let us declare once 
and for all that h1stnry 1s not a science, cannot be a science 
and should not be a science {whereby we mean by 1 sc1ence 1 what 
is usually meant by 1t in present-day English), for the s1mple 
reason that if 1t were it would no longer be h1story. 
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However far the social sciences may advance, they w1ll never 
absorb history for h1story 1n the tradit1onal sense will always 
be necessary. But this history lacks most of the paraphernal1a 
of a science. It lacks, for example, a spec1al term1nology 
d1stinct from the terminology of everyday language, and although 
1t may borrow here and there a term from psychology, anthropology 
or soc1ology, heaven forb1d the systemat1c adopt1on of scientific 
language by the h1stor1an which can only result 1n a bastard 
which 1s neither science nor history. 
But although 1n this respect we 1ncl1ne to the side of 
the humanist, he w1ll not be pleased. For now we go on to declare 
that all this does not 1mply that there are no means for decid1ng 
on the truth of historical statements or on the adequacy of whole 
h1storical reconstructions. It is not only scientific knowledge 
that is objective; 1t is a terr1ble s1mplification to say that 
whatever is not sc1ent1fic 1s subjective, that science has a 
monopoly on intersubJectivlty, and that e1ther the historian 1s 
iy 
a scientist or he(a superior story-teller. History is a branch 
of discursive and rat1onal knowledge. It is not knowledge based 
on 1ntuttion or feeling (although both come into the picture) but 
on lntersubJective testabil1ty. It is knowledge of this sort only 
1n so far as it can be substantiated, 2 ~ and a very large part of 
2) Th1s has been expressed more str1kingly in German by V.Kraft, 
1 Intu1t1ves Verstehen in der Geschichtswissenschaft 1 , 
M1tte1lungen des Inst1tuts fur Osterre1chische Geschlchts-
forschung, Erg.bd. 11, 1929:-p.28, when he says that 'Wissen 
ist an der Geschichte eben nur das Erweisbare 1 • The German 
term 'Wissenschaft' 1s more comprehensive than the Engl1sh 
term 'sdence 1 and comes very near to what we have called 
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what h1storians write can indeed be substantiated (although 
maybe 1n a way wh1ch is different from the way in which this 
is possible 1n science). 
To forestall m1sunderstand1ng, it 1s not that there is 
no room in h1story for improvement in respect to a greater 
prec1seness of terms and a greater awareness of methodological 
presupposit1ons. But it is one thing to demand that the 
historian develop a greater theoretical and methodological 
consciousness, that he ask himself more often 'what exactly 
do I mean by this' (for example, 'what exactly do I mean when I 
say that the French Revolution was a revolution of the 
bourgeo1sie? 1 ) or '1s it possible to find good reasons for 
assert1ng the opposite of what I have just said?', and it is 
another thing to demand that he become more science-conscious 
(which usually means more social science-conscious} and adopt 
the latest fashion and the latest jargon from sociology or 
psychology. 
There are other w1despread opinionswhich we do not 
share. There 1s the belief that the most important problem of 
histor1cal knowledge 1s the problem of h1storical explanat1on 
(or that all other important problems can somehow be reduced 
to th1s one). But 'how do (or how should) historians explain?' 
is just one among many points of interest, and although it is 
true that some of the others, such as the role of generali~ations 
'rational knowledge'. Consequently, one may very well say that 
history is not a sc1ence w1thout denying that it is a 
W1ssenschaft. 
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1n history, can be discussed with1n the context of explanation, 
it is doubtful whether this 1s the best way of discuss1ng 
them. There is further a belief wh1ch has gained great 
currency within the last few years, the belief that the true 
form of historical organization is narration. While more and 
more histor1ans write non-narrative history, more and more 
philosophers boldly declare that the proper or most typical 
task of historians consists in the telling of stories. (Some 
writers even try to spin a whole theory of historical knowledge 
out of this dogma by regard1ng what it is to tell and to follow 
a story as the central question.) Although it may be true that 
h1story has developed from epic poetry this says nothing about 
1ts true character and does not entail that it is essentially 
narrative. The description of past situations and states of 
af~airs 1s as much part of history as the narration of past 
events in a time-series. Closel~y related to this l1m1tation 
~ 
of history to story-telling is the opinion that history is 
always history of human actions. Again, this is an illicit 
conf1nement for history is also history of human suffering and, 
more general, of human situations. In pr1nc1ple, act1ons can 
be as little divorced from s1tuations as situat1ons can be from 
actions, but 1n any work of history the one or the other may be 
dom1nant. 
Our concept of history is free from these and similar 
restrictions. Its only lim1tations are that by 'history' we 
will usually mean history as knowledge, not history as reality, 
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and that we shall refer by this term only to the history of men 
and their creations, not to the history of nature or any part of 
nature. Our concept is permissive also in that we will count as 
history what is usually counted as history, i.e. what is called 
by this name in the department of our universities and in the 
catalogues of our great libraries. Th1s means that we do not 
confine ourselves to pol1tical history and do not exclude other 
special branches such as econom1c history or social history 
(and even such narrow fields as the history of 1nventions or the 
h1story of costume). But what we w1ll usually have 1n mind 1s 
general history, 1.e. the portrayal of a stretch of the human 
past in all its parts and all its aspects, as far as th1s is ever 
possible. 
As w1ll have become clear by now, the basic po1nt of 
view from which this work is wr1tten is that of evidence, evidence 
in a rather wide sense which not only 1ncludes remains and records 
but also something which we will call 'general experience'. In 
other words, whenever we meet either with an 1ndiv1dual 
histor1cal statement or with a whole h1storical account, the 
quest1ons we are interested in are 'Is this adequate? Is this 
more adequate than another statement or another account? And 
what are the reasons why 1t is adequate or more adequate?' One 
might think that there is no need to d1stinguish between the 
adequacy of s1ngle statements and the adequacy of whole accounts 
for the latter after all consist of single statements and if 
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every statement within an account is adequate, the whole account 
is adequate. This, however, would be a mistake for while the 
adequacy of a statement by itself cons1sts in 1ts truth, the 
adequacy of a whole account cons1sts in something more than truth. 
Individual histor1cal statements may be divided into 
those wh1ch only assert that something 1s or was the case 
(statements of fact) and those wh1ch not only assert this but 
which relate or connect two or more facts w1th each other 
(statements of connexions between facts), e.g. by stat1ng that 
one fact is in some way or other dependent on another fact. 
S1nce any satisfactory treatment of tne cr1ter1a of adequacy of 
statements of connexions would require a book on its own (the 
whole complex of causality in history, for 1nstance, would come 
1n here) we shall leave them out of account altogether (although 
when we speak about the adequacy of whole historical accounts we 
have in m1nd accounts wh1ch conta1n both k1nds of statements). 
Our first chapter w1ll be devoted to a short 
investigation of what can be regarded as the basic ent1ties 
histor1ans are concerned w1th. Here we shall analyse the concept 
of fact on the one hand and the concepts of event, th1ng and 
s1tuation on the other, a task whKh is necessary to prov1de a 
general background for what follows. In the second chapter we 
shall take a close look at the problem of how historical facts 
can be established or supported: how can individual statements of 
historical facts be substantiated by evidence, or, what amounts 
- 9 -
to the same th1ng, what are the criteria of the1r adequacy? 
The last chapter will deal w1th the adequacy of whole h1storical 
reconstruct1ons, and th1s will involve us in an investigat1on of 
the criteria of select1on 1n history and in an analysis of the 
notions of relevance, importance and representat1veness. We do 
not cla1m that our treatment of all these po1nts is complete or 
comprehensive. Th1s is not a systematic account of h~rorical 
knowledge but just one amongst many contr1but1ons to such an 
account, and our object1ve 1s achieved if we succeed in 
clarify1ng some points and 1n answer1ng some questions.J) 
J) As far as the l1terature we have consulted is concerned, 
the bulk of this cons1sts in works written by British and 
American philosophers and publ1shed after the end of the 
Second World War. S1nce 1t 1s not possible to read 
everything and to take everyth1ng into account, this seemed 
to be a princ1ple of selection as good as any. But we 
have not adhered slav1shly to th1s self-1mposed 
restrict1on but have broken 1t whenever we found something 
which we could use for our purposes. Therefore, we shall also 
refer to books and articles by authors who are neither 
Brit1sh nor American(or who are not philosophers but 
historians or social sc1entists) and to work publ1shed not 
after but before, maybe even a long time before, the year 
1945. 
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CHAPTER I: FACTS AND EVENTS 
1. Facts 
For more than fifty years facts have not enJoyed a high 
reputation amongst those ph1losophers and histor1ans who write 
about the foundat1ons of h1story. Facts in themselves, 'dry' or 
1 raw 1 facts, we are given to understand, are of no higher interest, 
and the naive preoccupation of some nineteenth century 
posit1v1sts with these philist1ne entities is recalled with horror 
or r1dicule. True, one agrees that 1t 1 is not poss1ble to get away 
from facts altogether but the1r proper place is supposed to be 
more in those disciplines which are somewhat contemptuously 
referred to as 'ancillary' to history. It 1s the antiquarian, not 
the histor1an, who is mainly interested in facts. 
From this one gets the impression that facts are 
regarded as someth1ng 1n the nature of a necessary ev1l. 
Understandable as th1s att1tude may be in the light of certain 
developments 1n twentieth century ph1losophy and sc1ence, 1t goes 
too far. For after all, where would we be, where would history 
be without facts? A l1st of dry facts may be neither pleasing nor 
useful but 1t 1s at least possible to compile such a list wh1le 
any historical 'interpretation' without at least some facts is 
more than useless, it 1s impossible. 
What, however, are facts? Unfortunately, the attack on 
the preoccupat1on with facts is rarely accompanied by a 
sat1sfactory analysis of this concept. Facts, evidence, truth, 
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events, situations, obJects are all thrown together, are all 
regarded as more or less the same th1ng and are all contrasted 
with 'synthesis' or 'theory'. So our first task must be to make 
some basic distinct1ons. 
Although historians 1n particular are rather fond of 
this confus1on, facts are not the same as evidence (where evidence 
itself can mean at least two th1ngs, the good reasons somebody has 
for making an assertion and the objects, physical or otherw1se, 
which he thinks provide h1m with good reasons). 'You cannot 
ignore the facts' means as much as 'you cannot ignore the evidence 
for the facts'; 'he has discovered a new fact' very often stands 
for 'he has discovered new evidence which strongly suggests a 
fact that was not known before'; 'he has collected all the facts' 
is used instead of 'he has collected all the ev1dencer. Uses of 
'fact' such as these may be unobJection~in ordinary discourse 
but when it comes to intellectual activit1es of a higher order 
we should be aware of the d1fference between 'x is the case' 
and 'there is evidence that xis the case•. 1 ) 
The mistake involved 1n making no d1stinction between 
facts and evidence 1s a special case of the confusion of facts with 
physical or non-physical obJects, i.e. things usually referred to 
by nouns. But a thing or object is not a fact; Robespierre, the 
French Revolution, the idea of 'Liberty, Equal1ty, Fraternity' 
1) The same po1nt 1s made by P. Gardiner, The Nature of 
H1stor1cal Explanat1on, London, 19521 pp:-7J/74, 78-= 80. 
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are not facts, but that there existed a man called Robespierre, 
that there happened an event 'French Revolution' and that there 
was such an idea, all those are facts, and h1stor1cal facts at 
that. 
Closely related to the equat1on of facts with evidence 
(or good evidence) is the equation of facts with what we know 
on the bas1s of evidence or good evidence. People somet1mes 
contrast facts with 'mere theory' or 'mere interpretation' 
where 'fact' means something for wh1ch we have sufficient 
evidence and 'theory' or '1nterpretation' something for which 
our evidence is not sufficient or not quite sufficient. 'What 
you are saying is just theory but what I am saying is fact' is 
here the usual context. Again, th1s is not a correct usage 
of 'fact' (and for that matter not of 'theory' either). Purely 
speculative statements for which we have no shred of evidence 
may be true and so express facts while statements for wh1ch we 
have masses of evidence may after all be false and not express 
facts. 'There are men on Mars' may for all we know express a 
fact while 'there are men in the Easter Islands' may not. 
From this 1t would seem that 'fact' is equ1valent 
to 'truth' but this is also not the case. Truth, at least 
according to the most common 1nterpretation, is a relation 
between a statement and a fact. Therefore, 1t cannot be fact 
1tself. A statement 1s true if it corresponds to the fact 
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with which 1t purports to deal. 2 ) 'Grass 1s green' 1s true if it 
1s a fact that grass is green but the statement or its truth is 
not the fact itself. If truth were the same as fact then any 
correspondence theory of truth would be 1mpossible. 
The most common equation, however, as far as 
histor1ans and ph1losophers of history are concerned, 1s of facts 
w1th events. More often than not, when a writer speaks of 
histor1cal facts what he has in mind are historical events. But 
aga1n, facts and events are by no means the same. An event is 
someth1ng that happens, occurs, takes place (whether in the past, 
present or future) whereas a fact is something that is the case 
(or - if we nhink of negative facts - that is not the case). We 
cannot say that a fact happens or that an event is the case. A 
t t t t t t a fact 2a) rue s a emen s a es or expresses (and, let us hope, 
a historical statement expresses a h1storical fact) but it does 
not express an event. It m1ght report it or describe it but it 
does not express 1t. (we also can say that it represents a fact 
if we do not forget that 'represents' here 1s d1fferent from 
'represents' in 1 Mr. Sm1th represents the Ministry of 
Agriculture•.) 3 ) The battle of Waterloo 1s an event but that the 
battle of Waterloo took place is a fact. 
2) See C.D.Broad, Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy, 
Vol,~Cambridge, 1933, p. 77. 
2a) We are, of course, aware that the phrase 'expresses a fact\ 
raises many philosophical problems but for our purposes here 
(and on our level of analysis) 1t is not necessary to say 
anything about them. 
3) See Gardiner, The Nature ••• , p. 74/5. 
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One might agree with th1s formal distinction but might 
say that every statement must be about an event, must refer to an 
event. Th1s, however, is also a m1stake. It is a fact that two 
and two make four, that copper is a good electrical conductor, 
that Lou1s XIV was vain, that all officers in the pre-
revolutiona~ French navy were noblemen, but these statements do 
not describe or report events, i.e. something that happened, 
happens or will happen. 
Events are conf1ned in space and time, facts are not. 
If a statement expresses a fact at one t1me 1t expresses the same 
fact at any other time {forgett1ng now certa1n d1fficult1es 
brought out by tense-logic). Events, on the other hand, do have 
spat1o-temporal coordinates. By 1ts very nature an event must 
happen at a time {or during a time-span) and at a place {or in a 
locality). Otherwise the notion of event would not make sense. 
This spatia-temporal character entails the 
individuality or particularity of events. It 1s true, we can 
make statements about classes of events but the members of those 
classes are individuals, not other classes. Therefore, we cannot 
speak of general events. But we can very well speak of general 
facts. 'All past revolutions in Europe were followed by 
d1ctatorships' {assume this to be true) expresses a general fact 
but 1t does not report or describe what could be called a general 
event. It is not about an event at all; 1t is about a class of 
events. And this is by no means the same. 
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Another point related to the spatio-temporal character 
of events is that events have size, i.e. cover a larger or smaller 
time-span or locality. Consequently, we could speak of 'large' 
and 'small' events (and a small event may be much more 
s1gnificant than a large one) but 1t does not make sense to speak 
of large or small facts (unless we do so in a purely 
metaphorical way where 1 large 1 means 'important' or 'very 
general' and 'small' means 1 un1mportant' or 'not very general'). 
Finally, we can speak of negative facts but what 
meaning could be attached to 'negative events'? If we say that 
someth1ng 1s not the case we st1ll state a fact. But if we say 
that someth1ng d1d not happen, for example, that Hann1bal did 
not attack the city of Rome in 216 B.C., we do not describe or 
report a negative event although we do state a negative fact. 
We cannot describe something that did not exist or occur although 
we can describe what did exist or occur in negative terms. One 
could obJect here by saying that for every negative description 
there exists an equivalent affirmative one, and vice versa, and 
that whether we use the one or the other 1s a matter ofchoice. 
In other words, one could maintain that every non-existence or 
non-occurrence of someth1ng 1s, or can be viewed as, equivalent 
to the existence or occurrence of something else and that, 
consequently, every event is, or can be viewed as, a 1 non-event 1 , 
that the event of Napoleon's losing the battle of Waterloo is 
equ1valent to the non-event of h1s w1nn1ng 1t. But from this 
example it can already be seen that the objection is not 
JUStified. For tnot winning' is not equivalent to 'losing' 
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Hitler's dec1s1on not to 1nvade Britain is not equivalent to his 
1 non-decis1on' to 1nvade it. If there were such equivalences it 
would be possible to write history adequately in exclusively 
negative terms, as an account of all that did not take place or 
did not exist. But such history is impossible. It is true 
that historians do sometimes use negat1ve descriptions, for 
1nstance when they do not know what happened but are fairly sure 
that something d1d not happen, but they can only do so within 
the framework of what they know did happen. They also use 
negative facts when they attribute causes; that something did 
not occur can be a necessary condition for the fact that 
something else d1d occur, and vice versa. There are negat1ve 
causes but there are no negative events. 4 ) 
2. Events, Situations, Th1ngs 
So whatever position one wishes to defend in the 
philosophy of history, facts are not events and events are 
not facts. 5) History has to do with facts only in the sense 
4) This 1s one of the reasons why A.J. Ayer, Man~~ Subject 
f2E Science, London, 1964, p. 17, mainta1ns that causal 
relations must hold between facts and not between events. 
5) Some writers who make this distinction do so in rather queer 
ways. C.L. Becker, for example,maintains that a histor1cal 
event 1s what happened in the past which is why the historian 
cannot deal with it (whereas Becker apparently thinks it 
possible to 1 deal w1th' events that are present) but only 
Wltht{affirmations about the event', and it is an 
affirmation of this sort which 'constitutes for us the 
h1storical fact' (i.e. Becker confuses the affirmat1on of a 
fact w1th the fact itself). S1nce a historical event is 1n 
the past the question then arises where the corresponding 
h1storical fact is, and according to Becker it is 'in someone's 
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that any knowledge has to do with facts, i.e. in the sense that 
it is concerned with the formulation of true statements, 
statements that express facts. Therefore, whoever attacks or 
ridicules historical facts attacks or ridicules the status of 
history dS a branch of knowledge. 
There is a clear distinction between an event that in 
fact happened at a certain t1me and in a certain place and the 
fact that this event happened at that time and in that place. 6 ) 
All true statements reporting or describ1ng events express facts. 
But not all true statements expressing facts report or descr1be 
events. For there are general facts, there are noR-empirical 
6a) facts and there are negative facts, and statements 
express1ng any of these are not about events at all. 
6) 
m1nd or 1t is nowhere•. What is implied here is that present 
events are facts, only past events are not. Facts turn out 
to be really events after all, only ~ha~ the h1storianis in 
a position different from that of a contemporary observer. 
For the latter a fact can be next door, for the historian it 
can only be in the mind. The mistake here is that facts, and 
for that matter events too, are seen in analogy w1th, or on 
the same level as, chairs and apples and motor cars. 
See C.L. Becker 'What are Historical Fact~?', H.Meyerhoff 
(Ed.), The Philosolhy of History !g Our Time, Garden City 
N.Y., 1959, P• 124 25. 
! Sim1larfBroad, An Examination •••• , p. 58. 
6a) Many writers use 'fact' exclusively in the sense of 
'empirical fact' and distinguish 1 formal 1 and 'factual' 
knowledge. Our concept, however, is wider and allows us 
to speak of logical and mathematical facts. 
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But there are also individual, empirical and 'positive' 
facts expressed in statements which do not refer to events. Not 
all 1nd1vidual emp1rical phenomena are events. In everyday 
language we distinguish between things (or objects), 
s1tuations (or conditions or states of affair~s) and events 
~ 
(or occurrenc&s or happenings). Things and situations are or 
exist; events happen, occur or take place. 'Smith was at 
home when he heard the news': Smith is the thing, being at 
home the situation and hearing the news the event. That which 
is or exists is not an event (or - as we shall see later - is 
1n the context in question not regarded as an event). A 
c1v1lization does not happen, it exists, while a war or 
revolution does not exist, it happens. Being sixty years of age 
is a situation but reaching the sixty-first year is an event. 
The birthday changes the situation of the person concerned into 
a new situation. In other words, an event is something that 
is viewed as introducing a change into an existing situation. 
Up to a certain time the situation was such and such; then 
something happened; and afterwards the situation was different. 
An event that leaves the situation, i.e. any situation, 
unchanged is not an event at all whatever it may be. 
What is in a situation at a certain time, and whose 
situation is changed by an event, is the thing or object 
in question. (We do not need to think here only of physical 
objects or human beings; other th1ngs, for instance< ideas, too 
are in situations.) Smith is ill, i.e. a thing R is in a 
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He takes the medicine prescribed by his 
doctor, i.e. an event~ happens toR in s 1 • He feels better, 
7) i.e. R's situation s 1 is changed into a new situation s 2 • 
(But what if the taking of the medicine has no effect? Then 
we can still regard it as an event, only now in respect to some 
other situation.) 
However, the new situation cannot be completely new. 
It must have at least something in common with the old 
situation. There must be something that remains constant, that 
keeps its identity, 8 ) and this can only be the thing concerned, 
7) 
8) 
W.H. R1ker, 'Events and S1tuations', The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 54, 1957, p. 61, speaks of 1 init~l' and 
'terminal' situat1ons, a very happy coinage. (But he adds 
some restrictions wh1ch make his concept of event too narrow.) 
See also G.A. Birks, 'Towards a Sc1ence of Social Relat1ons 1 , 
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol.7, 
1956/57, p. 207, who, however,confines himself to one 
particular kind of event, to actions. 
So already Kant in the Critique of~ Reason,Transcendental 
Analytic, (Book II, Ch.2, Sect. III, 3, A: First Analogy 
of Experience): 'Change is but a mode of existence, which 
follows on another mode of existence of the same object; hence 
all that changes is permanent, and only the condition 
thereof changes.' See also M.R. Cohen The Meaning of Human 
History, La Salle, Ill., 1947, p. 107, and A.C. Danto, 
Analytical Philosophy £! HiatDry, Cambridge, 1965, p. 235. 
F.J. Teggart, Theory and Process of History, 3rd printing, 
Berkeley & Los Angele;:-1962, p. 146, on the other hand 
emphasizes that there must be something that changes if we 
want to speak of an event. This is quite correct, for what 
changes is the situation and what remains constant is the 
thing. To say, however, with G.J. Renier, History. Its 
Purpose and Method, London, 1950, p. 104, that 'all is motion' 
and tn~therefore, facts, states, conditions, in short 1 all 
things are occurrences or events' is to forget that we can only 
speak of motion if something does not move. F.H. Bradley: 
'The Presuppositions of Critical History',Collected Essays, 
Vol. 1, Oxford, 1935, p. 13, is more correct when he describes 
events as containing motion and passage, transition and 
connex~ion between elements. 
'/ -
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i.e. that whose situation is subject to change. Smith is the same 
Sm1th in illness or in health, at home or in his office. The 
Russ1a before the October Revolution is identical with the Russia 
after the Revolution. Of course, we can say 1t 1s a new Russia 
but the fact that we still use the name 'Russia' indicates our 
belief 1n some identity and continu1ty of the same thing. Without 
th1s belief we could not grasp or understand at all what has 
happened. 
So events cannot be described or reported without 
taking account of things and situations. On the other hand, it 
is very well possible to describe a s1tuation without tak1ng 
account of events. If we assume that over a stretch of t1me 
noth1ng changes 1n the situation of a thing, or if we willingly 
and consciously d1sregard all changes, then there is no need to 
refer in our description to events at all. Reference to the thing 
in question is, however, still necessary for we cannot imag1ne 
a situation as such, i.e. a situation which is not a situation of 
something. 
From this it follows that it 1s m1sleading or false to 
say or to 1mply, as many wr1ters do, that history 1s exclusively 
concerned with events (or, what is worse, w1th one kind of event, 
with human actions). The description of a situation is possible 
without reference to events, and there is nothing which prevents 
a h1storian from supplying such a descr1ption. 
are eventless works of history. 
In fact, there 
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Although what counts as an event, thing or situation 
depends on the context 1n question, within a given context these 
three elements are not shifting and can be clearly 1dentified 
and distingu1shed from each other. It is true that 1n a purely 
physlcal sense lt may be po&sible tu 'reduce' things c~.nu 
situat1ons to events, and if th1s is so then all s1ngular 
statements are 1ndeed about events. 9 ) This, however, 1s of no 
great 1mportance on the level of everyday or histor1cal 
discourse. 10 ) Here the dist1nction between events, situations 
and th1ngs must be upheld if we want to communicate at all in an 
1ntell1gent way with each other. 
~ One ~ould think that the distinction between the 
three elements 1s so elementary for historians and ph1losophers 
of history that no one would fail to make it. Actually, 
however, there are a number of wr1ters who do not make it or who 
draw the line 1n very strange ways. One, for example, sees in 
Napoleon an event11 ) while another defines a h1storical event as 
9) So e.g. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enem1es, 
4th ed. (rev.), Vol. ~London, 1962, p:-3~who def1nes an 
event as •the common designatum of a class of mutually 
translatable singular statements'. 
lO)This point is made by A. Hofstadter, 'Generality and 
Singularity in Historical Judgment', The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 42, 1945, p. 57, whi~the disti~t1on 
between things and events is also emphasized by P. Gard1ner, 
'The "Objects" of Histor1cal Knowledge', Philosophy, 
Vol. 27, 195~· 212. 
ll)C. Frankel, 'Explanation and Interpretation in History', 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 24, 1957. 
ls) B. Waters, 'The Past and tbe Historical Past',~ Journal 
~ PhilosophY• Vol. 52, 1955, P• 256. 
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a 'continuant', i.e. as something, for instance~ a man, that 
'continues to exist while its states or relations are changing' 12 ) 
which corresponds exactly to what is normally understood by a 
thing or obJect. From the fact that both things ru1d events can 
have durat1on it does not follow that both are the same. A 
further view of equating th1ngs w1th events is that of the 
Dutch historian G.J. Renier13 ) who, following certa1n 
pragmatists, holds that the historian's material ev1dence 
constitutes events. A pyramid, e.g., is said to be 'an event 
that has become concrete' and 'continues to be percept1ble in the 
present'. But, one may ask, is there no difference between the 
pyramid and the building of the pyram1d, between the pyramid and 
the bur1al that took place in it, etc.? At the bottom of this 
1s, of course, the confusion of ev1dence with that for wh1ch it 
1s evidence. 
The equat1on of situat1on and event is perhaps not 
quite as common as that of thing and event but it st1ll occurs. 
M. Mandelbaum, 14 ) for example, thinks tnat econom1c cond1tions 
and interests can be events or - to be more prec1se - subevents 
which form part of a larger event, the enactment of a bill. 
Since the enactment is of shorter durat1on than the econom1c 
conditions and interests in question Mandelbaum is driven to the 
13) Renier, H1stoEX)PP• 98, 156 - 58. 
" 14) M.Mandelbaum, The Problem of Historial Knowledge, 
New York, 1938:-pp. 257/58-.- ~ 
- 23 -
strange view that a subevent can be larger than its superevent 
which is very much like say1ng that the part can be greater than 
the whole. 
3. Events and Time 
It has been indicated before that whether something is 
regarded as an event, thing or situation is in a certa1n sense 
relative, i.e. depends on the context in question. This has to be 
explicated in greater detail but before we do so some prelim1nary 
remarks are necessary. As many authors, historians and 
philosophers alike, have pointed out real1ty is continuous; there 
is a continuous stream of •something going on'l5) and only by 
mental activity do we isolate and distinguish - and so emphasize -
certain po1nts within th1s process. It is the mind wh1ch cuts up 
the cont1nuum, and this 1s the only way to come to grips with 
empir1cal reality at all. In order to experience the world we 
have to distinguish individual phenomena from each other. 
Differentiat1on and segmentation are inevitable. 16 ) But it is 
15) Th1s phrase 1s used by W.R. Matthews 'What is an H1storical 
Event?t, Proceedings of the Aristotel1an Society, N.s., 
Vol. 38, 1937/38, p. 2l0 1 who adds that th1s 'something going 
on' is all that 1s d1stinguished in orig1nal primitive 
consciousness. But is there such a thing as original 
pr1mitive cons~iousness? It 1s very doubtful whether anybody 
or anything, even a very small ch1ld or an animal, does 
experience reality as an ~ndifferentiated process. To have 
memory, for example 1 probably already presupposes some 
differentiat1on. 
16) To say that empirical reality is a cont1nuum does not entail 
the doctrine that Nature makes no jumps which'is as obsolete 
as Nature abhors a Vacuum' (M.R. Cohen, Reason and Nature, 
2nd ed., New York & London, 1964, p. 139). It only entails 
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JUst as well to remember that mental actiYity is indeed involved 
here, that h1story is not 'a series of atomic occurrences 
separated from each other by empty time-space intervals'l7) and 
that th1ngs and situations are never completely static but that 
there is change all the time. 
Two features must be distinguished in this respect. 
F1rstly, the cont1nuum is not linear in character. More than one 
event, thing or situation happens or exists at any one time. Not 
all of them are known to us and of those which are known we only 
take some into account in any one context and ignore the others. 
We behave as if the rest d1d not exist for we cannot deal with all 
elements at once, not even with all known ones. Secondly, how 
we del1m1t our elements, where we make the cuts in the continuum 
is also dec1ded by us and not imposed upon us by real1ty. Two 
events which are separate for some purpose may form one single 
event for another purpose18 ) and the same holds for things and 
situations. 
From this relativity of what constitutes an event, 
thing or situat1on some wr1ters have drawn idealist conclusions. 
Since only certa1n elements are picked out and since the 
delim1tation of these elements is relative to context and purpose 
the view that someth1ng 1s go1ng on all the t1me, that there 
are no per1ods and places where noth1ng happens. 
17) Cohen, The Mean1ng .... , p. 107. 
18) ~., p.l08. 
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it is tempting to see in them altogether mental constructions 
·-- - - 19) 
or even ~alsifications Of reality with no existence outside 
the mind. I:r to this is added the constructional features in 
the building up Of historical ~acts ~rom evidence a fUlly groWD 
historical idealism seems unavoidable. 
However, these conclusions are not justified. pirst Of 
all, the argument is not an argument in :ravour Of historical 
idealism but o~ idealism scalechtbin. It applies not only to the 
past but also to the Present and the ruture, and it applies not 
only to human Bf~airs but to the affairs Of nature as well. The 
man in the street and the scientist, too, break up the continuum 
in manageable elements. :8ut 11 more :rundamental, what sense cez;$ it 
have to say that events, things and situations do not 'really' 
exist? And does their non-existence in any sense fOllow from the 
~act that the delimitation is selective and relative to some 
context? One can divide an apple in two, three, :rour parts 
depending on how many people are going to share it. Does this 
19) So, :ror example, Matthews, 'What is ••• ', PP• 213/14, in respect 
o~ historical events. On the other hand, views such as those 
Of R. AroB, Introducfion .:t.g .:tl1§ P;Qilogoph.v 2g Riston, 2nd impr., 
London, 1961, P• 4lthe pure event exists only :ror a conscious-
ness), R. Aron, 'Evidence and Inference in HistorY , D. Lerner (Bd.J, Eyidence .An£ Ipee;renoe, 2nd printing, New York, 1962, 
p. 36 (the unity Of an event is constructed. not experiencea), 
or Riker, 'Events ••• ', pp. i.,.. 59, 69 (the separation Of events 
is a subjective sttillcturing Of reality)1 can be construed in a 
non-idealist sense, the sense in which Bradley, 'The Presuppo-
sitions ••• ', p. 13, writes that events 'though the OffSPring 
Of the mind, ••• are still independent and real'. 
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mean that the halfs, th1rds or quarters do not really exist, 
that they are constructions of the m1nd, or that they did not 
ex1st before the divisions were made, when the apple was st1ll 
1ntact? Pos1ng these quest1ons is to answer them. From the 
fact that we have to categor1ze reality and that we categor1ze 
select1vely and 1n different ways no idealist conclusions can 
be drawn. 
Events happen at certain times. What 1s more, they 
must happen at certa1n times if they are to happen at all. So 
without time no events. But the converse 1s also true: 
w1thout events no t1me. For if there were no events there could 
be no sense Of t . 20) 1me. In a world in which noth1ng happened 
there would be no change and, consequently, no time. But some 
people do not think that change is tied to events in th1s way, 
and if they are right then t1me would only presuppose change but 
not events. Change, according to R.M. Maciver, 21 ) 'need not 
man1fest 1tself in any event or ser1es of events'. Now this 
may be true (depending on what we mean by 'man1fest'), 
especially in the light of what we said before about reality as 
a cont1nous process. But the point 1s that change can only be 
apprehended in terms of events. A plant grows so gradually that 
I cannot see it growing. At some specific po1nt or other, 
20) See L.S. Stebbing, 'Some Ambiguities 1n Discussions 
Concerning Time', R. Klibansky & H.J. Paton (Eds.), 
Ph1losophy & History, Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, 
New York, 1963, p. 115. 
21) R.M. Maciver, Social Causation, New York ••• , 1964, p. 125. 
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however, I must notice the difference 1n size if I am to notice 
the change at all, a point already made by Le1bniz. In other 
words, I apprehend the change as a d1fference between two 
s1tuations, s1 at time ! 1 and ~ 2 at time 12 , and this 1s 
exactly "\vhat constitutes an event. The fact that I know that 
there was no b1g bang when the plant changed its size suddenly 
but that the growth took place gradually does not affect the 
fact that I can only apprehend the change in the form of an 
event (or of a ser1es of events). 
So change, or the apprehension of change, presupposes 
events and events presuppose t1me. But the concept of time also 
presupposes events. Therefore, the question as to what 1s more 
bas1c, events or time, is a question of the hen and egg sort. 
There is, however, another question wh1ch is more fert1le. 
Do events have extension in time~ We have seen that they must 
mppen in t1me, but must they have duration, must they be 
•time-extended•?22 ) Some authors mainta1n that by definition an 
event must have durat1on23 ) whereas according to others it 
cannot have duration. 24 ) The posit1on wh1ch will be defended 
here is that some events have duration, that others have none 
22) This expression 1s used by Danto, Analytical Philosophy ..•. , 
p. 115. 
23) So, for example, Mandelbaum, The Problem ••• , pp. 222, 255, 
who quot1ng C.D. Broad defines an event as 'anything that 
arlures at all' and as 'pervaded by a special unity and 
continuity'. Similar Matthews, 'What is ••• ', p. 213, 
accord1ng to whom every event must have a beginning, middle 
and end. 
24) An event is defined by Aron, Introduction ••• , p.41, as that 
'which passes through existence at the imperceptible 
boundary separating two instants•. 
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and that in some cases we can view an event as hav1ng or as not 
hav1ng duration. 
G. Ryle 25 ) has drawn attent1on to certain words which 
ind1cate 'achievements', i.e. which refer to the successful or 
unsuccessful outcome of an activity. The success is realized 
at the unextended point when the activity 1s completed, not a 
moment before and not a moment after. Since statements about 
achievements are statements about events it follows that here we 
have events which are not time-extended, and, what is more, 
cannot be time-extended because of their logical character. In 
'Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo' the event in question is 
Napoleon's losing or defeat, and it does not make sense to 
allocate a certain time-span to the losing. Agreed, in ord1nary 
discourse we do not always st1ck to this. Napoleon when asked 
towards the last stages of the fighting what he was doing might 
very well have replied 'I am losing a battle'. But it is 
possible to construe this as a shorthand vers1on of something l1ke 
'I am fight1ng a battle and it very much seems that I shall lose 1 • 
In th1s way the thesis that los1ng is not time-extended can be 
upheld. 
On the other hand, in 'Napoleon fought the battle of 
Waterloo' we can only regard the event, the fighting, as taking 
time. Now, in order to lose a battle one has to fight one. In 
s 25) G. Ryle, The Concept of M1nd, Harmon~worth, 1963, pp.l25/26, 
143-47, 2SJ-86. 
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other words, the los1ng, the outcome of an act1vity, entails 
the fight1ng, the act1v1ty of which 1t is an outcome, but not 
v1ce versa. One can very well fight a battle w1thout los1ng it. 
Therefore, events with no duration presuppose events w1th 
duration. Th1s, however, may be d1sputed for, as again shown by 
Ryle, there seem to be achievements wh1ch do not follow certain 
activities. A man may find a treasure without hav1ng looked for 
it, a sea capta1n may discover an island by chance. But the 
question 1s whether achievements of this type do not after all 
take some t1me. Ryle does not think so because we cannot, for 
instance, see something slowly or rap1dly, systemat1cally or 
haphazardly. 26) This argument, however, is not qu1te 
conv1nc1ng. The fact that we do not use 'see' etc. 1n th1s way 
is consistent w1th the assumption that the durat1on involved 1s 
here so minute that we do not take 1t 1nto account, 1n a way 
s1m1lar to that in w~h we would not take into account the t1me 
which elapses before the light rays com1ng from a source reach 
our eyes 1f sc1ence had not told us that there 1s a t1me 
interval. There 1s noth1ng illog1cal 1n the supposition that 
one person sees things more quickly than another person but 
there 1s someth1ng illog1cal in the supposition that it takes 
time to lose a battle in contrad1stinction to the t1me 1t takes 
to fight it. 
To find, to d1scover, to see something, even if one 
26) Ibid, p.l45. 
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has not looked for it, may after all be viewed as something that 
does not~ppen instantaneously in that perception can be seen 
as a process with several stages, from l1ght rays meeting the eye 
to the point where we become conscious of 'something there•. It 
1s, however, not recognizing the uuject in question as what it is 
which matters here. One may find a treasure without being aware 
that it is a treasure one has found. But finding it does entail 
one's awareness of having found something, and it is this 
awareness which can be v1ewed as taking time, however little. 
Therefore, we can stick to our thesis that events which are not 
time-extended presuppose events that are. 
In any case, there are events with duration and there 
are events w1thout duration. But there are also events that can 
be viewed as of either kind. In 'Smith died yesterday at 7 p.m. 
exactly' the event of Smith's death is seen as having taken place 
at one unextended point in the time-scale, while in 'Smith died a 
slow and agonizing death' the event of Smith's death 1s time-
extended. Death is not an ach1evement; it is not the successful 
or unsuccessful outcome of anyth1ng ( it would be odd to see 1n 
death the unsuccessful outcome of life) 1n the way in which 
losing a battle is the unsuccessful outcome of fighting a battle. 
The difference between the two views of the same event, Smith's 
death, 1s a difference of del1mitation or def1n1tion. A 
phys1cian may pinpo1nt death to a precise time according to 
certa1n precise criteria, for example, when the heart stops 
beat1ng, while the layman 1s more perm1ssive and thinks of 
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something in the nature of a process which may have a definite 
terminat1on but has no definite beginning (unless one sees in the 
1point of no return' the beginning, i.e. the point at which death 
becomes a certainty, e.g. because certain organs have decomposed 
too far). Other examples can be found in the legal sphere. 'I 
bought a house' may mean for the lawyer signing the deeds (to 
be more exact, the last stroke of the pen wh1ch completes the 
sale), 1.e. the event is not time-extended, but for me it means 
an event w1th duration which includes viewing, paying, signing 
etc. The beginning of a war may be pinpointed in internat1onal 
law to the moment when the declaration of war takes effect but 1t 
may also be seen as an unfolding process. 
A further point in respect of the difference between 
events with and without duration is that the former may be 
cont1nuous or d1scontinous while for the latter the question of 
continuity does not arise. An event is discontinous27 ) 1n that 
it does not go on all the time but has its stops and starts. 
Revolutions are usually d1scontinous 1n this sense. The people 
concerned do not revolutionize all the t1me in a revolution; 
they have other things to do in between. A war may be viewed as 
27) The term 1s used by Danto, Analyt1cal Ph1losophy ... , pp.l65/66 
It may be that a d1scontinous event (as d1scont1nuous as 
the wr1ting of a book) can after all be viewed as cont1nuous 
because it may be that even then something goes on all the 
time (e.g. the 1ntention to continue w1th and to fin1sh 
the book). Nevertheless, there undoubtedly is a difference 
between events of this k1nd and events (such as a wheel 
roll1ng down a hill) wn1ch are continuous in a literal 
sense. 
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continuous if we adopt the pos1tion of international law 
accord1ng to which the state of war lasts without interruption 
from its declaration to the s1gning of an armistice or peace 
treaty. But for the normal man, including the historian, a 
war, too, is usually discontinuous (and there are times and places 
where in any case wars are not governed by internat1onal law 
which makes all legal criteria of cont1nuity 1napplicable). The 
arm1es in the affected countr1es did not wage war without 
interruption for thirty years, from 1618 to 1648. 28 ) 
It has been said that events w1thout duration cannot be 
described but only reported. 29) This, however, cannot be taken 
to mean that such a report can take one and only one form. 
Instead of saying 'Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo' I may 
express the same fact d1fferently by saying 'Napoleon's army 
was beaten at Waterloo' or even 'Napoleon's quest for European 
28) Danto th1nks that the d~fference between continous and 
discont1nuous events may be a difference of degree. I.e., a 
cuntinous event, 1f analysed m1nutely, may be found to be 
d1scontinous after all wh1ch 1n turn would mean that all 
t1me-extended events are d1scontinuous. This, however, 
depends on the point of view adopted. For a lawyer a certain 
war is conti1ous no matter what are the results of any 
detailed analysis. 
29) W. Fales, 'H1stor1cal Facts', The Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 48, 1951, p. 87 - There is also the other possibility 
of regarding a statement which simply assexts that a 
phenomenon E happened or existed as a report, while a 
statement which asserts that E had a certain feature or 
property is called a description. But then one could say 
that a description is a report of the existence of such 
a feature, and so one would not have gained much. 
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supremacy was defeated on the battlefield of Waterloo'. In 
respect to different possibilit1es of this kind there is no 
d1fference between reports and descr1ptions. Further, a 
dichotomy of reporting and describing is only possible if a 
rather narrow concept of description is adopted, one according 
to which a descript1on must consist of more than one statement. 
But commonly the term is used in a much w1der sense in that 
any true empirical statement can be said to describe something, 
and if so reports are at the most a spec1al kind of description. 
Another d1st1nction wh1ch might be mentioned here is 
that between events characterized by statements and events 
characterized by individual names or definite descriptions. 
According to C.G. Hempel only the former are capable of being 
explained whereas the latter, events such as the Children's 
Crusade, the October Revolution, the assassination of Caesar, 
are not susceptible of explanation, ' indeed it is unclear 
what could be meant by explaining such an event 1 • 30 ) The 
reason for this, in the opinion of Hempel, is that any such 
event has 1nfinitely many aspects which make a full descr1pt1on 
and, therefore, an explanat1on 1mpossible. 'Caesar's 
30) C.G. Hempel, 'Reasons and Cover1ng Laws 1n H1stor1cal 
Explanation', S. Hook (Ed.), Philosophy and History. 
A Symposium, New York, 1963 1 p. 150. A sim1lar opinion is 
expressed by M. Levich, (Rev1ew of) '~hilosophy and 
History: A Symposium', History ~Theory, Vol.4, 1964/65, 
pp. 340/411 who, however, th1nks that such events can be 
interpreted. 
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assass1nat1on' includes the facts that it was plotted by Brutus 
and Cassius, that both these men were in certain political 
positions, etc., up to such facts that with every breath we inhale 
some molecules exhaled by Caesar in his dying breath. 
This argument is not sat1sfactory for two reasons. The 
first is that an event characterized by a statement has infinitely 
many aspects too. To cite Hempel's own example for such an event, 
1 the particular rolling i of the four dice yielded a total of 
more than four dots facing up' does not tell us anything about the 
part1cular shapes of the dots as seen under the microscope, about 
the precise movements the dice took 1n i, etc. If it is objected 
that the statement concerned was not about those aspects and 
that, therefore, their inclusion would be irrelevant, then we can 
reply that the expression 'Caesar's assassination' too does not 
refer to who plotted 1t but only to the fact that Caesar was 
assassinated (and d1d not die, for example, 1n his bed of 
pneumonia) which means that the plotting 1s equally 1rrelevant. 
The second and more fundamental criticism is that there 
1s nothing which prevents historians from reformulating an 
ind1vidual name or definite descript1on characterizing an event 
into a statement character1zing the same event, and vice versa. 
'Caesar was assassinated, and this led to the establishment of 
the Imperium' can be expressed without loss or change of meaning 
as 'Caesar's assass1nat1on led to the establishment of the 
Imperium'. This has to do w1th the fact that historical terms 
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which refer to events, things or situations have 'ex~stential 
import•. Using the name 'Caesar' implies for a historian that 
there was such a man, and by speaking of Caesar's assassination 
he commits himself to the view that this assassination did ~n 
fact take place. Of course, statements such as 'Caesar did not 
exist' or 'Caesar was not assassinated' are not meaningless. 
They only amount to an explic~t denial that 'Caesar' or 
'Caesar's assass~nation' have existential import. In other words, 
they amount to a denial that these terms are historical terms, a 
denial which, so to speak, puts them outside history. But if a 
term is historical in character then it can be replaced by a 
statement in which a verb such as 1 occurred', 'happened', 
'took place', 'was', 'existed' appears. 
Although it may not be poss~ble to explain the 
existence of Caesar but only the existence of certain of h~s 
characteristics it is perfectly possible to explain Caesar's 
assassination, i.e. to explain why this event happened and not 
only why it had such and such features. In fact, in some cases 
it may be possible to explain the occurrence or existence of 
someth~ng but impossible to explain certain of its characteristics 
(and here we must also not forget that the explanation of a 
spec~fic fe~re or characteristic can be construed as an 
explanation of ex~stence or occurrence, for what is explained in 
this case can be regarded as the existence or occurrence of just 
this feature). All this must lead to the conclusion that whether 
we can explain something or not does not depend on the form of 
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the linguistic expression which 1s used to characterize the 
explanandum, at least not 1n the sense in which Hempel thinks 1t 
does. 
4. Events and Subevents 
It 1s easy to see that as far as h1story 1s concerned 
time-extended events are far more common than events without 
durat1on. Indeed, the latter can be regarded as the exception. 
But when an event has durat1on there may be other events which 
are part of 1t. Following M. Mandelbaum31 ) let us call these 
smaller ones subevents of the larger event of which they are 
parts. These subevents, in as far as they are themselves time-
extended, may be found to have further subevents, and so on, wh1le 
on the other hand one will most probably also f1nd one or more 
other events of which the larger event 1tself is a subevent, etc. 
If the event we start with is Smith's going to his bank, then 
this - a time-extended event - can be seen as 'consisting' of 
other events, such as the events of leaving the house, crossing 
31) Mandelbaum, The Problem ... , p. 222. It must be pointed out, 
however, that Mandelbaum's concept of a subevent is d1fferent 
from ours in that he seems to have in mind a horizontal 
d1v1S10n of an event while our d1v1s1on is vertical. 
'Horizontal' is here appl1ed to strands of an event wh1ch go 
through its whole length or durat1on (and, according to 
Mandelbaum, may even start before and end after the event; 
see text to note l~above) while 'vertical' refers to sections 
which are not co-terminous with the event in question but 
are of shorter durat1on. The history of an 1ndividual 
soldier throughout a battle is coterminous with the battle 
and, therefore, a horizontal subevent while a particular 
engagement w1thin the battle would bea vertical subevent. 
We are concerned here only w1th the latter. 
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the road, etc. Crossing the road, then, is a subevent of going 
to the bank, but it has subevents itself, for example, the events 
of stepp1ng off the pavement, look1ng to the r1ght towards an 
approaching veh1cle, etc. The whole event we started with, Sm1th's 
going to the bank, can itself be seen as a subevent of a still 
larger event, e.g. of Smith's spend1ng a whole day 1n town. 
Th1s d1st1nction between events and subevents is very 
obvious to the historian. The killing of de Launay, governor of 
the Bastille, is a subevent of the storming of this fortress which 
itself is a subevent of the overthrow of the French monarchy 
wh1ch in turn is a subevent of the French Revolut1on. It may be 
the case that eveEY time-extended event has subevents and that 
it is itself a subevent of at least one other event. 32 ) What 1s 
oerta1n is that the durat1on of a subevent must be shorter than 
that of the event of which 1t is a part. 33 ) 
However, this picture of a 1 h1erarchy' 34 ) of events and 
subevents is as yet much too t1dy. It is more in the nature of 
a model than of an adequate descr1ption of real1ty. First of all, 
not everything that happens during the duration of anevent is one 
of 1ts subevents. Events 1n America during the time of the French 
Revolut1on are not subevents of the French Revolution nor even are 
32) So Cohen, The Mean1ng .... , p. 107. 
33) This seems self-evident but, as we pointed out bef6re, 
Mandelbaum holds that a subevent may be of longer duration. 
34) Th1s term is used by P. Meadows, 'The Scientif1c Use of 
Historical Data', Ph1losophy of Sc1ence, Vol. 11, 1944, p.54. 
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all events in France itself subevents. Th1s is obvious and 
follows from what was sa1d before about the discontinu1ty of 
events. There can be 'holes' in an event E which are filled 
with other events, events that themselves cannot be viewed as 
subevents of E although they may be subevents of some other 
event. If someone falls in love during a revolution, then this 
is not a subevent of the revolution. 
Another complicat1on is related to the existence of 
'pr~cts 1 and the use of lkproject verbs'. 35) Sm1th may have 
written a book and courted a widow all during June. Both events 
concern the same 1ndividual, both are contemporaneous with each 
other, but neither 1s a subevent of the other. Both may be 
subevents of a third event (which shows that subevents can be 
contemporaneous but need not be) but equally well each may be a 
subevent of a completely different event. What is more, these 
two possibilities are not mutually exclusive for one and the 
same event may be a subevent of each of two other events which 
in turn are not subevents of each other. There are even cases 
where of two contemporaneous events E1 and E2 the event E1 is a 
subevent of another event E3 while E2 1s not, and E 3 in turn 
1s a subevent of a further event E4 of which E2 itself is a 
subevent. In brief, many kinds of multiple relations, shortcuts 
and cross connexions are possible here so that in the end we do 
not get tidy h1erarch1cal or classificatory systems but much 
more complex structures. We must beware of p1cturing the real 
35) See Danto, Analyt1cal Philosophy .•.. , p. 165. 
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state of affairs as too orderly and regular. 
This explication in terms of events and subevents g1ves 
rise to an interesting point respecting the use of the word 
'present'. A present event (and we are now speaking only about 
t~xtended events) is an event that, so to speak, has not 
finished yet. It stretches from the past into the future3 6 ) and 
connects both with each other3 7) in that the past conta1ns some 
of 1ts subevents and the future contains others. We use the word 
'present' in connexion with any event further subevents of which 
we st1ll expect to happen, 1rrespect1ve~how long ago the event 
~ 
started. The durat1on of the present is thus relat1ve to the 
event we have 1n mind.38 ) In 'the present quarrel between 
Britain and Rhodesia' the present started in November 1965 while 
1n 'the present decline of relig1ous faith' 1t started 1n the 
nineteenth or eighteenth century, depending on taste. A present 
event has subevents some of which are in the past while others 
are 1n the future. Therefore, 1 E is present' does not entail 
that all of its subevents are present. What holds for the whole 
does not necessarily hold for its parts. 
We have to d1stinguish between the relat1ons of events 
and subevents on the one hand and the relat1ons between subevents 
36) lbld., p.l47. 
37) Cohen, The Meaning .... , pp. 63/64. 
38) A s1m1lar v1ew is expressed by L. von M1ses, Theory & 
H1story, London, 1958, fP· 1Dl/~ 
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themselves on the other. The subevents of an event are by 
necessity related in that they are all subevents of the same 
event. But apart from this they may be related in many other 
ways. 39 ) They, i.e. the complete set of subevents of an event 
~ or part of the set, may also be subevents of another event 
d1fferent from E and perhaps not related to E as event or 
subevent. They also may be caUBally related although 1t is 
doubtful whether all subevents of E can be causally related 
w1th each other. 
As to the relations between events and subevents, 
however, we have to dist1ngu1sh these very sharply from causal 
relations. They are conceptual 1n character and have no causal 
features whatsoever. Indeed, a relation of this kind can be 
said to be analytic (1n some sense of th1s protean word) in that 
an event is defined by its subevents. To say that the storm1ng 
of the Bastille is a subevent of the French Revolut1on enta1ls 
that the meaning of the term 'French Revolution' includes 
amongst other things the storming of the Bastille. However, if 
this view is rigorously upheld it impl1es that whenever a new 
subevent of an event E 1s discovered the name of E changes its 
meaning. It 1mplies further that no two historians ever use the 
name of an event, for instance, the name 'French Revolution', 
in the same sense for it is most 1mprobable that they have in 
~39) Mandelbaum, The Problem ... , p. 276, 
cannot be related in any other way. 
seems to think that they 
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mind exactly the same subevents when they speak of the 
French Revolution. This seems an extremely narrow view and, 
therefore, it is preferable not to make all subevents part of 
the definition of an event but only the more obv1ous ones 
which are generally known or can be assumed to be generally 
known. This saves us from the embarrassment of assuming that 
we change the meaning of our terms all the time. Otherwise, if 
1t turned out that some soldier who was believed to have stayed 
alive 1n the F1rst World War was actually killed, then this 
new subevent would change the mean1ng of the expression 'F1rst 
World War', a rather odd result. 
To return to the distinction between causal 
connexions and event-subevent relations. An event the 
occurrence of wh1ch is regarded as a causal condition of an 
event E cannot be a subevent of E. For accord1ng to our normal 
understand1ng a cause must be temporally prior to its effect 
(prior at least 1n part) but no subevent of E can occur prior 
toE if, by definit1on, it occurs during the duration of ~. 40 ) 
The difference can also be expressed in the following terms. 
The more subevents we know of an event E the better we know E 
itself, i.e. the better we know what E 'is or was. But this 
does not mean that we also know E better in the sense of 
40) Mandelbaum 1s of exactly the oppos1te op1n1on (1b1d. ,p.225). 
For h1m the complete set of subevents of E is the cause of 
E. This view can only be defended if the meanings of 
'cause' and 'effect' are changed beyond recognition. 
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41) knowing better why E happened although knowledge of E in the 
first sense may be a necessary precond1tion of knowledge of E 
in the second sense. 
Similar considerations apply when the relationship 
goes in the other direct1on. We can say that an event E is 
better known 1f we know other events E17 ! 2,En of which E is a 
subevent. It may be objected that 1f we have any knowledge of 
E at all we know ipso facto at least some of its superevents. 
This is true in some but not 1n all cases. The battle of 
Verdun is, of course, a subevent of the First World War and 
there was no time after the beg1nning of the battle when we did 
not know this. But when it comes to more remote periods it may 
be very enl1ghtening to discover that a certain battle was part 
of a certain war which had not previously been associated with 
it. Our knowledge of the battle (and our knowledge of the war 
as well) is increased by our knowledge that the battle was a 
subevent of the war. 
The procedure which is descr1bed by W.H. Walsh under 
the name 'coll1gation' seems to be in all essentials a way of 
increasing our knowledge of an event by finding that it is a 
subevent of one or more larger events. At least this 
interpretation is suggested when Walsh refers to colligation 
41) So also Fales, 1 Histor1al Facts', pp.89/90. A similar view 
is expressed by H. Gomperz, Interpretation, The Hague & 
Chicago, 1939, p.7, who speaks here of two different kinds 
of interpretation. 
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as 1 the procedure of explaining an event by tracing its intrinsic 
relations to other events and locating 1t in its h1storical 
42) 
context.• Whatever 'intrinsic relations' may be, the bit 
about the location in context f1ts our analysis in terms of events 
and subevents very wello But Walsh thinks that his colligation 
only works where the events 1nvolved are human actions and 
that, therefore, the procedure is spec1fic to the historian. 
We do not make any such restric~ons. The historian 1s not 
only concerned with events that are actions (nor is the 
historian the only one who is concerned with such events) and 
events that are not actions can be subjected to the same 
procedure. 43 ) 
Some historians have descr1bed the process of arriving 
at a large-scale event (or at the concept of a large-scale 
event), an event such as the French Revolution, as a process of 
42) 
43) 
W.H. Walsh, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 
7th impr., London, 1964, p.59: 
W .¢-~1 Dr~y, '"Explaining What" 1n History', P. Gardiner (Ed. h 
Theor1es pf H1story, 5th printing, New York, 1964, 
pp. 276 ~ 285, describes a procedure similar to Walsh's 
coll1gation but with similar limitations. There is also 
the question whether colligat1on amounts to an explanation 
of the event concerned as is claimed both by Dray and 
Walsh (although Walsh sees in it an incomplete explanation 
which has to be supplemented by other procedures). It is> 
of course, a matter of choice how wide we want to make our 
concept of explanation but perhaps 1t leads to less 
confusion if we reserve th1s title for relations not between 
events and their subevents (or subevents and their 
superevents) but between events that are not subevents of 
each other. 
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generalizing subevents into larger wholes. 44 ) However, to use 
the words 1 general~ng' or 'generalization' in this context is 
mlslead1ng. Not only is the relation between event and subevents 
not a relation, and not analogous to a relation, between classes 
and class members, but also the word 'generalizat1on' 
commonly fefers to statements and not to terms. Terms may be 
general but they are not generalizations. And terms referring 
to events (in contradistinction to terms referring to classes 
of events) are not general 1n the sense that they refer to move 
than one 1ndividual. 'French Revolution' 1s an individual 
term or proper name, not a general term. Of course, 1f 'general' 
means 'wide', 'large-scale', 'cover1ng a large temporal or 
spat1al area', then 'French Revolution' is general, or at least 
more general than, say, the death of Robespierre. But one should 
be careful not to confuse these two different usages of the word. 
Even if we avoid 'generalize' and its derivatives and 
use some other expression, e.g. 'summarizer, 45 ) there remain 
some d1fficult1es. It may be true to say that subevents are 
summar1zed into an event, but only as far as the origin of the 
concept of the event 1n quest1on is concerned. Nobody could 
have had the concept of the Thirty Years War in 1618. Only after 
44) So, for example, S.H. Beer, 'Causal Explanation and 
Imaginative Re-Enactment', History~ Theory, Vol.J, 
1963/64, p.l9. 
45) So, e.g., Renier, History, p.2J. 
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the end of this war a number of events on a smaller scale were 
summarized or united into one event, the Thirty Years War. But 
this does not mean that any historian today proceeds 1n this 
manner. He comes upon the event ready-made when he starts his 
studies, and only gradually, by learn1ng more and more about 
1ts subevents, does he give it flesh and blood. Therefore, 
to say that such an event, or the concept of it, is the summary 
of its subevents is misleading in that it might be understood to 
mean that we cannot use the name of an event unless we know 
whi~h subevents are going into it. 
Closely associated w1th the view just discussed, or a 
further development of th1s view, is the opinion that large-
scale events do not 'really' exist but that only their subevents 
have existence. This 1s sometimes called 1 h1storical pluralism' 
and it asserts 1n essence that if there are differen~ things 
A, B, C and we refer to them together as 'G', then although 
'G' has meaning G has no existence. 46 ) This raises a whole host 
of well-known philosophical problems but here we only need to 
~~) Th1s v1ew 1s adopted, albeit w1th qual1fications, by 
H.J. Phillips, 'Historical Skept1c1sm 1 , The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 44, 1947, pp. 452/53. E.J. Tapp, 'Knowing 
the Past', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 55, 1958, 
p. 466, too, sees 1n the 1 generalizat1on 1 of subevents into 
events a 'falsification'. -Incidentally, the view discussed 
here is not identical, and should not be mixed up, with 
the thesis that only individuals have existence while 
concepts of social collectives or social 'wholes' are 
theoretical constructs. 
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say the following. If on those reasons the existence or reality 
of a rather large-scale event is den1ed then the existence or 
reality of 1ts subevents must be denied as well. Why should the 
French Revolution be a mental construction while the storm1ng 
of the Bast1lle is not? The latter event, too, has subevents 
which in turn have subevents themselves, etc. Even directly 
observable actions of individuals cannot be taken as the last, 
the 'reaV elements. Indeed, there are no last elements in this 
series although there are boundaries as far as our power of 
analys1s is concerned. If a large-scale event is a construction 
of the m1nd then any time-extended event is a construction of 
the m1nd. In th1s respect there are no first and second class 
c1tizens in the republ1c of events. 
On the other hand, the seemingly opposite view that a 
histor1cal event is a whole, a un1ty, which cannot be 'reduced' 
to 'atomic units' 4?) is likew1se misleading. True, in this case 
reality is not denied to subevents as it 1s denied to large-scale 
events by historical plural1sm. But what does it mean to say 
that an event 1s an irreducible whole? Obviously, it cannot mean 
that it is not definable or identifiable by reference to all or 
some of its subevents for it can be so defined or identified. 
But if it does not mean this then we are left w1th the rather 
triv1al point that an event has oroperties which are not shared 
by any of 1ts subevents. The point is trivial 1n that as a 
matter of course whenever we form the concept of an ind1v1dual 
47) Mandelbaum, The Problem ••• , p. 279. 
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(and for that matter of a class as well) then that individual 
must have some property or predicate (or at least we must think 
that 1t has such a property or predicate). Otherwise we simply 
would and could not form the concept. 48) Therefore, to say that 
every event must have unity can be regarded as making an 
analytic statement. The only interesting point is whether we 
can choose ourselves which events we wish to br1ng under the 
comprehensive heading of another event - how we split up and 
del1m1t the continuum of reality - or whether we are forced to 
do this in one way rather than 1n another by the character of 
the material we deal with. The view here defended is that 
we are not so forced. 
S1nce every subevent is itself an event what has been 
~~d of the relations between events, situat1ons and things 
holds also for subevents. But we can go a step further than 
this and po1nt out that the two situations (initial and terminal) 
relative to an event are different from the two situations 
relative to any of its subevents. The French Revolution changed 
the ancien reg1me but a subevent of the French Revolution, e.g. 
the storming of the Bastille, alone does not change the anc1en 
reglme but a different situation, the revolutiona~ state of 
France prior to the storming. 
I 
More general~ an event cannot 
share both its in1tial and terminal situations with any of its 
48) Phill1ps, 'Historical Skepticism', p. 455, expresses this by 
saying that for any event there must be something that is 
true of it, i.e. true of all of it. 
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subevents (although 1t may share one of them, if we think of a 
subevent which comes right at the beginning - or is the beginning 
of the event in question or which comes right at its end - or is 
its end). 
The matter is different, however, in respect of the 
thing whose situation is changed. Here it depends solely on 
the po1nt of view adopted whether the thing relative to an event 
is identical w1th the thing relative to one of its subevents. If 
Smith suffers an injury to his knee we can refer to this event as 
an 1njury to Smith's knee, an injury to Smith's leg, an injury to 
Sm1th himself. I.e., the thing whose situation is changed by the 
1nJury can be seen as the knee, the leg or the whole person, 
to select some out of many possibil1ties. Similarly, the storm1ng 
of the Bast1lle changed a s1tuation but it is possible to view 
this situat1on as being the situation of revolutionary France, 
of France itself or of Europe, to ment1on again only some of many 
possible choices. In short, as far as things are concerned, we 
are always free to 'jump levels', to conceive the 1tem whose 
situation changes widely or narrowly, and there is noth1ng which 
forces us to do the one or the other or to select just one subject 
of a s1tuation out of many possible ones. 
5. The Relativity of Events 
We sa1d that an event 1s bounded by an 1n1tial and a 
term1nal s1tuat1on. A S1tuat1on sl preva11S, somethlng happens 
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and thereby s1 is changed into a new situation s 2 • But if an 
event changes a s1tuation and if there are events and subevents, 
i.e. events of different levels, then what is viewed in a 
spec1fic case as the situation which changes depends on what is 
viewed as the event that changes it, and viue versa. The French 
Revolution changed the situation called 'ancien regime' into a 
new situation called, for example, the ~ge of nat;onalism' 
(or 1 liber~l1sm 1 or 'democracy', etc.), while the fall of Danton, 
a subevent of the French Revolution, also changed a situation, 
a situation that could be described as 1 say1 'the distribution of 
power amongst the Jacobins before Danton's fall'. This means 
that there are situations within events, i.e. situations that are 
of shorter duration than events 1which is one of the reasons why 
wemnnot adopt the length of duration as a criter1on for 
distinguishing events from situations. 49) 
What is more important, however, is that an event 
itself (and we are still speaking only about time-extended 
events) can be viewed as a situation. Smith going to his bank 1s 
an event relative to two situations ~l (Smith being at home) and 
s 2 (Smith being at another place away from home) but it is 
itself a situat1on s1 relative to some other event, e.g. the 
event of meeting a friend on the way which changes the original 
situation of going to the bank 1nto a new situation ~2 , e.g. 
49)~.G. Wh1te, 'The Log1c of Historical Narration', S. Hook 
(Ed.), Philosophy and History, New York, 1963, p.6, 
seems inclined to do. 
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going to a cafe. In history the position is quite the same. 
The French Revolution 1tself can be viewed as a situat1on which 
was changed into a new situation, e.g. by the events of the 
format1on of the Directory or of Napoleon becoming First Consul. 
But it can likewise be viewed as an event which changed the 
situat1on of France or Europe. 
Why, however, distinguish situations and events at all; 
why not say simply that one situation changes into another 
situation or (if we prefer to speak in terms of events) that one 
event is followed by another event? In short, why not v1ew all 
historical phenomena as events or all of them as situations? The 
reason why we cannot do this is that the terms 'event' and 
'situation' are complementary, i.e. using the wor~ 'event' 1s 
presupposing the existence of different situations, and vice 
versa. And this in turn has to do with the fact that we can 
exper1ence real1ty only if we distinguish that which changes and 
loses its 1dent1ty from that which does not change but remains 
the same and both from that which introduces, or is responsible 
for, the change. But the important point is that one and the 
same 1tem can play each of these roles 1n different contexts. 
The French Revolut1on can be seen as that which inaugurates a 
change, a change in the social and political situation of 
eighteenth century France or Europe, and if seen in this way it 
1s an event. It can also be seen as that which changes in the 
sense that it becomes something else. A revolutionary cond1tion 
changes 1nto a cond1tion in which law and order reign once more, 
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although now law and order of a different kind. If viewed 
1n th1s way the Revolut1on 1s a s1tuat1on. F1nally, it can 
be seen as someth1ng which 1s not a s1tuation but 1s 1n a 
situat1on, 1.e. as something that does not change in the 
sense of los1ng its 1dent1ty but whose s1tuation changes. 
For 1nstance, the const1tut1onal phase of the Revolution can 
be d1stinguished from the leg1slat1ve phase. Both are 
pass1ng situat1ons offue same thing, the French Revolut1on, 
rt 
and hereAis the Revolut1on that rema1ns the same. What changes 
is 1ts situat1on. 
A remark is here necessary on our usage of the word 
'change'. 1 Change 1 1s ambiguous 1n the sense that 1 x 
changed' can mean e1ther (a) 'x has become ~ and is no 
longer ~' or (!?.) tx 1s no longer in state s 1 but 1s now 
in state S 2 I. In other words, change can mean change of 
1dent1ty (identity in some loose sense) or change of state 
(situation). 'Ulysses' companions were changed into pigs' 
means that they lost the1r old 1dent1t1es and acquired new 
ones. 'He has changed very much s1nce I saw him last' (he 
then was a young man and now he 1s old) means that the state 
he is in now 1s different from the state he was in before. 
When we speak of change here 1n the context of th1ngs, 
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events and sltuatlons we have in m1nd change 1n sense 
So our three elements are relatlve to each 
other. They all have duration; they are •tempor~al 
~/ 
structures'. 50) In the expresslon 'the history of xt 
~ must be a temporal structure for only temporal structures 
can have histories. Usuallr ~ will be a temporal structure 
w1th thl~character, 1.e. lt 1s seen under the 'th1ng-
aspect•. In a book called The H1story of England we expect 
to be told something about a th1ng, England, someth1ng that 
throughout its hlstory keeps lts 1dentity although it 
changes lts s1tuations. The same holds for The History 
£f the Prlnt1ng Press, The History of the German Middle 
Class, The Hlstory of Portrait Engraving~ Italy, etc., 
but 1t also holds for The H1story of the French Revolution 
The History of the Flrst World War or The History of the 
Fall of Sevastopol. In the latter cases, however, it is 
50) Th1s term 1s adopted from Danto, Analyt1cal 
Philosophy ... , p.167. 
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l1kely that at least 1n the f1rst part of the book the 
subject lS treated not as a th1ng but as an event, as 
something which interfered with and changed an existing 
situation. The h1storian of the First W~ld War will 
probably first give a picture of the s1tuation before 
the outbreak of the war, i.e. he will treat the war as 
an event wh1ch changed tnis situation. But then he w1ll 
treat the war no longer as sometning that changes 
something else but as something whose situat1ons change 
themselves. He will treat it as a th1ng. 
Not all h1stor1cal works, however, are 
h1stories of someth1ng. There are books about historical 
subjects written by h1storians which are not histor1es 
of those subjects. Daily L1fe ~ Anc1ent Rome, 
England ~ ~ Fifteenth Century, The Culture of 
-the Renaissance in Italy, 1h£ State of French Art 
under Louis XIV, all these are or may be titles of 
works which treat their subjects ne1ther as th1ngs 
nor as events but as s1tuat1ons. They may be 
descriptions of a variety of features within a state 
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of affa1rs which is by and large viewed as static, as not 
undergoing change. Usually 1t is events wh1ch are supposed 
to be the only or the proper subject matter of history. But 
histories or h1stor1cal works are wr1tten of nearly everyth1ng 
under the sun; countr1es, c1vil1zat1ons, epochs, art styles, 
1deas, words, etc.; and adopting this view means to regard all 
those 4nt1ties as events. 51 ) The po1nt, however, is that they are 
events, situat1ons or th1ngs at the same time, or rather not at 
the same t1me but at d1fferent times depend1ng from which po1nt of 
view and 1n which context they are treated. But, one might say, 
1f an epoch or era can be v1ewed as an event why not go further 
and regard the whole course of h1story as an event? For, if our 
analys1s is correct, there seems to be no lim1t to the size of 
events, and events can become larger and larger until 1n the end we 
reach a stage where we are forced to see 1n history as a whole one 
big event. The answer to th1s is that to speak of an event makes 
sense only if the event is bounded by, and d1stinguished from,two 
s1tuations and if there is something further which 1s ~ those 
s1tuations. But what could be the s1tuations in the case where 
history in 1ts most comprehens1ve sense 1s v1ewed as an event? 
Adopt1ng a metaphys1cal pos1t1on one could argue that here the ~i~ 
ial s1tuat1on would be a state of affa1rs where nothing exists at 
all. But if so, the terminal situation, too, could only be a 
state of nothingness which would mean that 1n1t1al and term1nal 
situat1ons are the same, and th1s in turn entails that 'history' 
51) For Mandelbaum (The Problem ••• , p.282) an epoch 1s a long-
endur1ng event, and H.D.Oakeley, 'How 1s H1story Poss1ble? 1 , 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Soc1ety, N.S., Vol.41,1940/41, 
pp. VII, IX, regards a history of a people and a h1storic 
age as events. 
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which intervenes between the two cannot be an event after all 
for an event must make a difference, must change a situation. 
It also entails that there could be no thing in this case; there 
would be nothing whose s1tuat1on is changed by 'H1story 1 • 
However, if we take a narrower concept of history, 
such as the history of man or mankind, then this history can 
be viewed as an event. For there was a situation s 1 of the 
world when man did not exist and we can assume that there will 
be a situation ~2 in the future when man will not exist any 
longer. Both situations are not the same; the world after the 
ex1stence of man will be different, and will look different, 
fro1n the world before his existence, and we can also safely 
assume that each of the two si+uations is of longer duration 
than the period of man's existence i~ between. (It is 
charactPristic that in this context it does no~ make much 
difference whether we speak of the history of man or of the 
existence of man or of the period of man's existence. Under 
the point of view adopted they all fall together.) 
But there is also nothing which prevents us from 
viewing the existence or history of man as a situation, a 
situat1on of the world which by some event or other, e.g. by a 
thermonuclear war, will one day be changed into another 
situation. F1nally, and this is probably the common and natural 
approach, mankind itself may be seen as a thing which is in 
certa1n s1tuations and whose s1tuations are changed by virtue of 
certa1n events. 
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So 1t is possible, at least in principle, to regard 
the same phenomenon either as an event, a situation or a thing. 
There are, of course, many cases where it is in practice rather 
hard to change one's perspective. A phenomenon of very long 
duration can be viewed as an event only with difficulty while 
it is difficult to v1ew one of very short duration as anything 
else but an event. But in principle it is always possible to 
change the angle or focus of one 1 s view such that what used to be 
an event becomes a thing or situation, or~ versa. (In 
English the change is often indicated by a change of grammar. 
tSmith wrote a book last year', 'Smith was writing a book last 
year' and 'Smith's wr1t1ng of a book last year' can indicate the 
difference between event, situation and thing respectively.) And 
this does not only hold for physical phenomena but also for 
beliefs and ideas, motives and dispositions, etc. 
In summary, we may say that the concept of an event is 
relative in at least four respects. (1) It is relative in that 
from the continuum of empirical reality certain points or stretch~ 
are cut out and isolated. Where the cuts are made depends on 
which parts of the continuum are known and which of those are 
thought to be 1mportant. (2) It is relative in that it is a 
question of conceptualization whether we prefer to speak of a 
series of events or of one single event which has the members of 
the series as its subevents. 1 0nce we recognize that the 
separation or definit1on of events is relative we see that two 
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events wh1ch are separate for some purposes may be parts of a 
s1ngle event for other purposes for which the separat1on 1s 
1rrelevant~ 52 ) (3) It 1s relative in that it only makes 
sense to speak of events in relation to situat1ons and things. 
Something, ~' is an event only if there is something else, a 
situat1on S, which is changed by E, but S in turn cannot exist 
by 1tself but must be a situation of something, of a thing !• 
(4) It is relative in that one and the same phenomena can be 
v1ewed as an event, situat1on or thing depending on the context 
or level 1n or on wh1ch we choose to speak about the su~ct 
matter 1n question. 53) 
6. Facts and 'Interpretation of Facts' 
As we have pointed out before, most contemporary 
philosophy of history is haunted by the spectre of positiv1sm. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that so many writers lean 
over backwards to avoid the impression that they are 
worshippers of 'brute' facts. This 1s why we meet so often 
with the emphasis that facts do not speak for themselves, that 
facts cannot be 1solated, that there is no difference between 
fact and interpretation of fact, between fact and theory. 
52) Cohen, The Meaning ••• ,p. 108. 
53) The role of questions, problems and purposes has been 
emphasized in this respect by E. Grunberg, 'Notes on 
Historical Events and General Laws', The Canadian Journal 
of Economics and Political Science, Vol.l9, l953,p. 513, 
and by F.A. von Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Sc1ence, 
Glencoe, Ill, 1952, p, 70. Th1s is correct her; if we do 
not think of specific questions, problems or purposes but 
have in mind something rather vague and inarticulate. 
- 58 -
These and similar statements sound plausible enough. But what 
exactly do they mean? And are they true? To these questions 
we have to turn now. 
Before we do so a prelim1nary remark is necessary. 
When people speak about facts in this way they have 1n mind 
simple and ind1vidual facts: Caesar crossed the Rubicon, there 
was a French Revolut1on, the battle of waterloo took place in 
1815, etc. They have not in mind facts of a different nature, 
facts, so to speak, of the connexion between facts, e.g. the 
facts that if Caesar had not crossed the Rubicon the Civil War 
would not have happened, that the course of the French 
Revolution was strongly influenced by the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment, that the battle of Waterloo sealed Napoleon's 
fate. And usually they also have not in mind general facts such 
as the fact or supposed fact that in the past all revolut1ons 
1n western Europe were revolutions of social classes. 
Consequently, when we speak of facts in the following we shall 
also only refer to simple and individual facts. 
The view that there is no difference between fact and 
interpretation or that 1t is impossible to d1stinguish between 
the two has often been propounded5 4 ) but if stated in this 
54) So (as one would expect) by M. Oakeshott, Exper1ence and its 
Modes, Cambr1dge, l93~P· 94/95, but also by M. Mandelbaum, 
'Causal Analysis in History', Journal of the H1story of 
Ideas, Vol. 3, 1942, p. 35, according to whom such a 
distinction is senseless, and by c. Blake, 'Can History be 
Objective?', P. Gardiner (Ed.), Thevr1es 2£ History, 5th 
printing, New York, 1964, p. 342, who maintains that the 
need for it only arises because of certain illegitimate 
presuppositions. I. Berlin, Historical Inevitability, 2nd 
1mpr., London, 1955, p.7l, and H. Butterfield, 
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general form it can eas1ly be refuted. For it makes nonsense 
of the logical character of the word 'interpretation'. An 
interpretat1on must be an 1nterpretation of someth1ng and it 1s 
logically not possible that what 1s 1nterpreted is the same as 
the interpretation itself. ('Interpretation' 1s amb1guous 1n 
that 1t can refer to the process of interpreting something or 
to the product of this process. Here we have the latter in m1nd. 
Some ph1losophers, following Vico, have based their notion of 
fact on its etymological orig1n from facere and have so brought 
'fact' too 1nto the vicinity of a process but this 1s obv1ously 
not the usual mean1ng of 'fact' and we shall not adopt it here.) 
The use of the expression 'an interpretation of fact x' 
presupposes a difference between ~ and the 1nterpretat1on of x. 
The diff1culty 1s not avoided 1f the thes1s of the sameness or 
ind1stinguishabil1ty of fact and 1nterpretation 1s varied into a 
thesis asserting that there is no primacy of facts over 
1nterpretation55) or that the dist1nction 1s only a matter of 
degree,56 ) For how can it be possible to give an interpretation 
of x unless x is known first? And in what sense can the 
distinction between fact and 1nterpretation be a matter of degree 
H1story and Human Relat1ons, 2nd impr., London, 1951, 
p. 236, belong to the small group of authorswho explic1tly 
deny that there is no dist1nction between fact and 
interpretat1on. 
55) So E.H. Carr, What is History?, Harmondsworth, 1964, P• 155. 
56) So P.H. Nowell-Smith, 'Are Historical Events Unique', 
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S., Vol. 57, 
1956/57, p.l55. 
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{unless one understands by 'fact' simply that which we know 
with greater and by '1nterpretation' that which we know with less 
certa1nty or conf1dence)? 
The p1cture 1s changed if 'there is no difference 
between fact and 1nterpretation' does not mean 'there is no 
difference between a fact x and the interpretation of x' but 
'there is no difference between a fact x and the interpretation 
of z' where 'z' denotes a fact different from x. In this case 
there is no logical 1ncompatibility 1nvolved but now the 
statement 1s s1mply false. There may be cases where stating 
a fact amounts at the same time to interpreting another fact 
but this need not always be so. In a tr1vial sense 1t 1s, 
of course, true that even 'basic propositions', e.g. 'here is a 
coin struck by Vespasian', 'embody an element of interpretatio~i) 
in that to identify the object in question as a coin and as 
struck by Vespasian can be said to be an '1nterpretation' of 
the object. The idea behind this usage 1s to emphasize that 
even physical objects are not simply 'given' but that mental 
activ1ty is needed for the1r grasp or comprehension. This is 
doubtlessly a laudable motive but to use the word 
'interpretation' in this context can only be confus1ng. 
Identification, class1fication, descr1ption, all these 
presuppose mental act1vity and previous knowledge, not only in 
history but everywhere, but they are not interpretation if 
that word is to keep at least some of its usefulness. 
}57) Walsh, An Introduct1on .... , p.84. 
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The thesis of the sameness of fact and 1nterpretation 
can also mean that in order to establish any histor1cal fact 
1t 1s necessary to 1nterpret evidence such as written records 
or material rema1ns. Th1s 1s quite true but it does not enta1l 
the sameness of fact and interpretation. Not only is the 
establishment of a fact not the same as the fact itself, the 
interpretation of evidence is not even identical with the 
establishment of the fact. The latter presupposes the former, 
i.e. a fact cannot be established without prior interpretat1on 
of evidence. 1 In history the 1nterpretation of symbols 
precedes the collection of facts, and w1thout this 
interpretat1on there is no approach to h1storical truth, 158 ) 
and 'what we call historical facts are the results of our 
59) 
1nterpretation of certain fragmentary data or rema1ns'. But 
a result cannot be the same as that from which it is derived, 
and the interpretat1on of evidence (product) cannot be the 
same as the establishment of the fact (product) nor can 
interpreting evidence (process) be the same as establishing the 
fact (process). 
58) E. Cassirer, An Essay~ Man, J•d printing, New Haven, 
1945, p. 196. On the other hand Mandelbaum, The Problem ••. , 
p. 200, 1s one of those who do not restrict interpretation 
here to the 1nterpretat1on of ev1dence but declare roundly 
that any 1d1stinct1on between the historian's d1scovery 
of facts and his 1nterpretat1on of those facts is a wholly 
fallac1ous d1st1nct1on' (ital1~ suppl1ed). 
59) Cohen, The Mean1ng •••• , pp. 4/5 (ital1cs supplied); see 
also Gomperz, Interpretation, p.6, who, however, points 
out that 1n order to interpret a text we must have some 
knowledge of the facts referred to in the text 
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Apart from 1 1nterpretation' 1t is the word 'theory' 
which seems to have attracted attention in connex1on with facts. 
Goethe 1s reported to have pronounced that the facts of today 
are the theories of yesterday and Bradley, too, maintains that 
'that wh1ch is called a fact is in real1ty a theory'. 60) 
Naturally, the meaning of 1 theory 1 here must be qu1te d1fferent 
;~ 
from the mea~ of 'theory' when the word 1s used by scientists or 
ph1losophers of sc1ence (1n th1s case the universal character, 
for example, is 1mpl1cit). To say that there is no difference 
between fact and theory can only mean one or other of two th1ngs: 
(1) It can mean that there is no sharp distinct1on between 
what we know with certa1nty and what we do not thus know. 'x was 
a theory yesterday', 1.e. ~was held tentatively or prov1sionally 
at a certain time; 1 x is a fact today', i.e. at a later t1me our 
confidence has 1ncreased to such an extent that now we regard 
x as certa1n. In this sense it 1s true to say that •there 1s 
only a difference of degree of generality and valid1ty between 
facts and hypotheses and theories• 61 ) but we should not forget 
that not all facts have once been theories and that not all 
theor1es w1ll one day be facts. There are facts wh1ch always 
have been facts and there are theories which always w1ll be 
theories. 
60) Bradley, 'The Presuppos1t1ons ... 1 , p.17. 
61) s. Hook, 'Problems of Terminology 1n Histor1al Writing: 
Illustrat1ons', Theory and Practice in H1storical Study, 
New York, 1946, p.l24; G. Barraclough, H1story in~ 
Changing World, Repr., Oxford, 1956, pp. 14/15 1 too, seems 
to identify factual knowledge with certa1n knowledge. 
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{2) But 'there lS no difference between fact and theory' 
can also be a loose way of saying that mak1ng a statement 
expressing a fact presupposes some theoretical, i.e. general 
knowledge. This is what E. Cassirer seems to have in mind when 
he ma1ntains that 'all factual truth impl1es theoretical 
truth•. 62 ) Even allocat1ng a certain date to a certain event 
presupposes a calendar, i.e. a chronological system. 6 3) All 
this 1s again self-evident. It could even be held that 1t follows 
logically from the notion of discursive knowledge. But to say 
that factual knowledge presupposes theoret1cal knowledge is qu1te 
d1fferent from say1ng that fact and theory are the same thing or 
that we cannot make a d1stinction between the two. •x presupposes 
z' entails that there is a d1fference between x and z. Things 
which are not different cannot presuppose each other. 
The whole complex of fact and interpretat1on and fact 
and theory can also be clar1fied in the following way. A fact 
1s expressed {or rather can be expressed) in a statement. The 
statement contains terms {individual or general but let us 
concentrate on the 1nd1vidual). The terms are based on concepts 
we have formed, e.g. the concept of a certain event. However, 
62) Cass1rer, An Essay •••• , p.l74. It 1s an unjust1fied 
restriction to equate theory with causal theory in th1s 
respect as does Renier, H1story, p.22, and seemingly also 
Berlin, Historical Inevitability, pp. 60/61. {Berlin, 
however, 1nsists on the difference between fact and theory.) 
63) So Hook, 'Problems •••• •, p.l24; but Hook does not distingu1sh 
between 'theory' in this sense and 1 theory 1 1n sense {1). 
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as we have seen before, concepts of events can beformed in 
different ways (and different concepts can be formed) in respect 
of the same stretch or part of real1ty. How we come to form our 
concepts 1n a specific case depends on our interests and purposes. 
These in turn depend on a certain 'picture' we have of the world 
or, if we want to use that term in its popular sen~ on a 
•theory•. In short, theory affects facts v1a the formulation of 
statements express1ng facts {formulation in thought, 1n speaking 
or in writing). But we have to be clear about two points. A 
fact is not ident1cal with any of the statements expressing ±t. 
There are facts which are not expressed in any statement; there 
are facts which are not even known. Facts and known facts are 
not the same and the idea that they are accounts for much 
confus1on in the discussion of the nature of historical facts. 
If all facts were known facts we could never increase our 
knowledge; we could never discover that something is the case 
which we did not know before. Secondly, 1t 1s true that we form 
the concepts which go 1nto our statements on the basis of 
•theory' and that we can form them in one way or another. But 
from this it does not follow 1n the least that the truth of a 
statement {or the fact expressed by 1t) 1s 'relative•. In a 
sense, of course, the truth of a statement 1s relative to the 
terms wh1ch appear in 1t; i.e. the truth-value of the statement 
may change when the meanings of the terms change. But then, 
one can argue, the statement has changed too {it is no longer the 
same 'proposition') and there is noth1ng which prevents the 
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new statement from being false while the old one was true. In 
other words, the fact that we choose our concepts 1n the light 
of some 1 theory 1 or other does not affect the logical truth that 
the statements in which the conc~s appear are either true or 
false. This is elementary but reading some of the things wh1ch 
have been written by historians and ph1losophers of history one 
gets the impression that it is necessary to enlarge on it. 
There is also the v1ew that no difference exists between 
fact and value, at least not in history. 64 ) Obviously, 'fact' 
here can only mean\known fact expressed in a statement'. 
Otherw1se, a fact concerning a past, present or future event which 
was, 1S or will be known to nobody would also be indistinguishable 
from a value, and this could be asserted only on the strength of 
some peculiar metaphysics. But even if 'fact' is l1mited to 
'known fact' it seems a strange v1ew to maintain that facts and 
values are the same. For prima facie there is a great difference 
between factual statements and value Judgements. 'Napoleon lost 
the battle of Waterloo' and t1t is a good thing that he lost it' 
seem to be on two completely d1fferent levels. However, to do 
JUstice to the view under discussion this is probably not what its 
proponents have in m1nd. What they may have in mind is that terms 
used by histor1ans (and not only by historians) are in some way 
evaluatively charged or coloured and that the use of those terms 
64) Berlin, Histor1cal Inevitability, pp. 58-61, denies that 
facts can be distinguished from valuations but affirms their 
d1stinct1on from 1nterpretation or theory. 
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amounts to an evaluation of the fact stated. But even 1f so 
understood the thesis seems questionable unless we extend our 
concept1on of what is a value beyond all reasonable l1m1ts. It 
is s1mply 1mpossible to see what value is involved 1n the fact 
that Napoleon was born in 1769. 
St1ll, one could g1ve the matter a different twist by 
saying that if anybody makes such a statement then he must think 
the fact concerned worth-while or important enough to be stated 
and that th1s amounts to a value judgement. But 1f one argues 
1n this way it becomes analyt1cally true that every statement 
of fact amounts to a value judgement. It 1s then imposs1ble to 
state any fact whatsoever without committ1ng oneself to a value, 
and this is hardly helpful. 
However, we may pursue the problem 1n a different 
d1rect1on and say that although the words actually used may not 
be evaluatively loaded, the way in which we come to use them is 
closely bound up with our evaluation of empirical phenomena. As 
in the case of theory so 1n the case of value: concepts can be 
formed 1n different ways and the way we choose depends on our 
view of the world which 1n turn depends on certain bas1c values 
adopted. In this soph1st1cated 1ndirect sense 1t may be true to 
say that to use a term such as 'the age of Enlightened 
Absolut1sm' is to make a value judgement65 ) but if so it cannot 
65) W. Bauer, E1nfuhrung 1n das Studium der Gesch1chte, 
Tub1ngen, 1921 1 p 88 
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be a value judgement about the fact expressed by a statement in 
which 1 the age of Enlightened Absolutism' occurs. It is true, 
there m1ght be a problem whether there was such an age at all. 
Can any absolute prince be called enlightened, if so in what 
respects, and do these respec~justify our making them into a 
cr1terion for d1st1nguishing one age from another? The answers 
to these questions undoubtedly depend on an evaluation of certain 
historical phenomena, an evaluation which at least in part may 
be of a moral character. In short, forming the concept of 
Enlightened Absolutism and using it as a name or label of an age 
distinguishable from other ages, 1nstead of choos1ng any other 
possibility of 1dentificat1on or delimitation out of a large and 
perhaps 1nfinite number, all this rests amongst other things on 
value judgements. But making this choice and using the 
expression in a statement, e.g. in the statement 1 Catherine the 
Great was a typical representative of the age of Enlightened 
Absolutism', does not entail that the statement itself is a value 
judgement or that the fact expressed by it cannot be distinguished 
from the values on which the formation of the concept was based. 
The statement is true or false, even for somebody who challenges 
the format1on and use of 'age of Enlightened Absolut1sm 1 on the 
grounds that there was no such age or that the criteria on which 
the formation ofthe concept is based are useless, uninteresting 
or misleading. For even then reasoning would still be possible 
on the l1nes 'assumed he 1s just1fied in conceptualizing 1n this 
way - wh1ch actually he is not - then what he assetts is true 
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(or false) and there is evidence 1n favour of its truth (or 
falsity)'. More is not requ1red anywhere to enable us to 
regard a statement as true or false, not even in science or in 
daily life. 
So far we have not touched upon what is perhaps the 
most important point in respect to the relationsh1p between fact 
and interpretation (or theory). When it is said that all facts 
need interpretation or that no facts can speak for themselves 
what is usually meant is that an 1solated fact is of no interest 
to the historian, that is has no 'meaning'. In other words, a 
fact 1s only of interest if it is seen in relat1on to, or in 
context with, other facts, and sometimes 'fact' itself is 
implicitly so defined or understood that only a fact which 1s so 
related or connected can be called a fact or historical fact at 
all. This ra1ses a host of problems of which only a few can be 
treated here. 
Let us, first of all, enter some reservations about the 
applicat1on of the word 'meaning' to facts. Is it meaningful 
to say that a historical fact (or a historical phenomenon) has 
'meaning'? The trouble is that if 'meaning' is used in this way 
it can refer to so many different things at the same time. 
Recently, a book was advertised with the title The Meaning of 
the F1rst World ~' i.e. a book which purports to be about the 
meaning of the event of the First World War or of the fact that 
this war took place (in the present context it does not make much 
difference whether we speak about the meaning of facts or the 
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meaning of events). Knowing the title only it 1s very difficult, 
1f not impossible, to say what the book 1s about. Is it about 
the consequences of the war, about what followed from it which 
still affects us today? Is it about what the war 'means' or 
'meant' to certain people or groups of people, e.g. what the 
attitude of the British working class was to the war at the time 
it was fought or how the war affected the life and attitude of 
this social group? Or is it perhaps that God or History (with a 
capital 'H') used the war as a sign or portent which had a certa1n 
meaning for western man, e.g. the meaning of worse things to come 
if he persisted 1n bE w1cked ways? All this and much more is 
covered by the word 'meaning' if applied to facts. 
The only relatively unambiguous use of the word is to be 
found where it is not applied to facts but to symbols or signs 
(and even there it is wrought w1th logical and philosophical 
problems). It 1s fairly clear what is meant by expressions such 
as •the meaning of the word "omophagous"', 'the meaning of this 
difficult passage in Ar1stotle', 'the meaning of the egg symbol 
in fifteenth century pai~ng', 1 the meaning of this morse signal'. 
All these are cases where 'meaning' means 'referential mean1ng 1 
and is applied to something that can be clarif1ed or explained by 
way of definition or translation into another idiom. But what 
are we to understand by the meaning of a fact or event or thing 
or s1tuation?66 ) 
66) To this quest1on see also R. Gruner 'Understanding in the 
Social Sciences and H1story 1 , Inquiry, Vol.lO~.~~~ar 
considerations apply in respect of 'interpretation'. Is it 
possible to interpret a fact at all, in contradistinction to, 
say, the interpretation of a text?) There is, of course,no 
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What is usually meant by the mean1ng of a fact is 
much the same as significance, relevance or importance. All 
these are terms which can denote relat1ons so that it is 
necessary to specify 'sign1ficant 1n respect to~·, 'relevant 
to X', 'important in v1ew of z 1 • But 1t can also mean 
1nd1cation. 1 A fact x means a fact X' is then another way of 
say1ng that a fact x ind1cates a fact X· There is, however, a 
difference between meaning and indication which is not always 
recognized. 67 ) If a friend says to me 'you are a fool' then 
this expression has a certain meaning but it is also an 
indicat1on of h1s state of mind towards me at the time the 
statement is made. Both are not the same, and to say that 1 you 
are a fool' means that my fr1end th1nks I am one, while the same 
statement made by someone else at another occasion means 
someth1ng else, is m1staken. If a parrot greets me with the 
words 'you are a fool' the expression has still a meaning and 1ts 
meaning is exactly the same as when my fr1end or any other person 
uses it. But it is not an ind1cation of the parrot's mental 
state alihough 1t may be an ind1cation of someth1ng else. 
S1milarly, we have to dist1ngu1sh between 
understanding a statement that expresses a fact x and 
object1on to us1ng 1 mean1ng 1 1n any of a number of non-
referent1al senses as long as it is made clear in what 
sense exad1y is ~ used. 
67) The distinct1on between meaning and indication is not very 
frequent. V. Kraft, Erkenntnislehre, Wien, 1960, pp.4J/44, 
d1st1ngu1shes s1gns from symptoms but follow1ng Pe1rce 
(who used '1ndex' 1nstead of 'symptom') he regards symptoms 
as causal indicators only. 
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understanding~ itself. Both are 1ndependent from each other in 
that we may understand~' i.e. relate it correctly to other 
facts, without being able to understand a statement (or to 
understand the meaning of a statement) expressing~· 
Conversely, we may be able to understand such a &tatement, and 
so come to know the fact concerned, without being able to 
understand the fact 1tself. 
To say that a fact has meaning or is meaningful, in 
contradistinction to the meaning of the statement that expresses 
it, can only mean that if the fact is related to other facts 
(individual or general) it is possible to draw certain 
conclus1ons from it such that we enrich our knowledge over and 
above the knowledge of the fact itself. In short, there can be 
no doubt that a fact acquires significance and intellectual 
interest only in relat1on to other facts, and if so construed 
it is analytically true that an isolated fact is a meaningless 
fact. 68 ) If one goes a step further and includes the meaning of 
68)~ .• the mean1ng of an event denotes its reLations to other 
events connected with it ••• ', Cohen, The Meaning ••• , p.49 
(but what is the difference here between relations and 
connexions?).. SG also c.B. Joynt and N. Rescher, 'The 
Problem of Uniqueness 1n History', History~ Theory, 
Vol. l, 1960/61 p. 153, according to whom understanding is 
achieved by grasping causal and conceptual interrelations. 
When R. Wittram, 'Das Faktum und der Mensch', 
Historische Zeitschrift, Bd. 185, 1958, p. 57, maintains 
that all understanding of facts is dependent on 
understanding of context, the analyt1c character is 
concealed. Understanding is not dependent on understanding 
of context but is understanding of context. 
- 72 -
a fact 1n this sense into the definition of 'fact' or of 
~istorical fact 1 then 1t is also analytically true that facts 
without meaning are not facts, or are not historical facts, at 
This, however, leads to confusion for now the 
dist1nction between knowing a fact and understanding 1t becomes 
blurred and the impression is created that we can never know a 
fact without understanding it or, what is worse, that we cannot 
make a true factual statement if we do not understand the fact 
1n question. This goes strongly against the ordinary usage of 
the word 'fact' according to which a fact is a fact independent 
of its meaning to anybody. Some illiterate person m1ght know 
that there was a battle of Waterloo without having the slightest 
idea what it was about and what it 'means' in this or that 
context, nay, in any context. And when it comes to very remote 
and badly documented periods the most sophisticated historian 
may not be in a much better position. He, too, may know that 
a certain event happened without being able to make sense of it, 
to relate it to any other known event. 
It is true that speaking about an event presupposes a 
situation that is changed by it which in turn presupposes 
69) Becker, 'What are ••• •, p.l2J, holds that Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon 'is not an historical fact properly speaking at all' 
and only becomes one if it is taken as a 1 symbol 1 which 
stands 'for a long series of events', i.e. for the 'relation 
between Caesar and the millions of people of the Roman 
world'. The use of 'symbol' here is a good example for the 
corruption of a perfectly good term in the hands of some 
philosophizing historians (and not only historians). 
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something which is in this situation. But we may know that an 
event happened without knowing what situation was changed by it 
and what thing was in that s1tuation. The point is only that 1f 
we speak about an event we have to assume that there was such a 
situat1on and such a thing without necessarily knowing what they 
are. 
To come to know a fact, to establ1sh it, presupposes 
the possession of other knowledge but this need not be knowledge 
which provides an understanding of the fact in question. To 
establ1sh the fact that a certain battle was fought in the remote 
past we have to find and to 1nterpret certain material evidence, 
e.g. we have to read documents, and this involves a whole galaxy 
of formal and factual knowledge, includ1ng the knowledge of general 
facts. 70 ) But this knowledge does not help us to understand the 
fact that such a battle occurred in the sense that 1t relates the 
historical fact to other historical facts.7l) 
70) Walsh, An Introduction ••• , p.83, expresses this somewhat 
m1sleadingly by saying that the fact that evidence needs 
interpretation implies that no statement about the past can be 
true in isolation. It is even more misleading to say with 
Renier, History, p.l75, that there cWQ~e no knowledge of any 
event w1thout the knowledge of other events. 
71) Therefore, Cohen, The Meaning ••• , p.33, is wrong when he 
ma1ntains that no fact can be establ1shed unless it is 
already related to other facts or is part of a larger system. 
1 Is already related' is ambiguous in that it can mean 
(l) related by the historian or (2) object1vely related. If 
taken in sense (1) Cohen's assertion is false for we can only 
relate what we know, i.e. have established already. If taken 
in sense (2) 1t is trivial for there is no fact which is not 
related in some way to other facts. 
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But to return to the view that a fact only acquires 
1 mean1ngt if it is related to other facts. This relatedness can 
be made 1nto a defining characteristic of what constitutes a 
historical fact. According to E.H. Carr, for example, 'any 
fact may, so to speak, be promoted to the status of a historical 
fact once its significance and relevance are discerned~.72 ) 
This view leads to the strange consequence that what today is a 
1 mere 1 fact will be a historical fact tomorrow provided someone 
relates it to some other fact, e.g. if it is so related in a 
history book.7J) Conversely, 1f at a later time those relations 
w1th other facts are forgotten or ignored the fact ceases to be 
histor1cal. In short, according to this view x is a historical 
fact at time t if it is mentioned in a text written by a 
historian (or in a majority of such texts on the subject in 
question). Th1s means in the end that a fact is historical if 
historians think 1t is historical, or in Carr's own words, 1 it 
is the historian who has decided for his own reasons that 
Caesar's crossing of the ••• Rubicon is a fact of history 1 , 74 ) 
hardly a very enlightening result. It is far more useful to view 
every fact of the human past, even the most trivial one, as a 
historical fact75) but to make distinctions as to relevance or 
72) Carr, What is ... , p.lOJ. 
73) Carr himself(~., p.l2) draws this conolusion although, 
not quite consistently, he makes the historical status of a 
fact dependent on whether many historians regard it as 
sign1ficant. 
74) ~., p.ll. 
75) So von Mises, Theory •.. , p. 195, in respectto past human 
actions. 
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s~gn~f1cance. But relevance or s~gnificance in what respects? 
In other words, what are those relat~ons wh~ch make a fact 
1 mean~ngful 2 7 The usual answer ~s that they are relations of 
consequences i.e. causal relations. A fact is sign~ficant if it 
has consequences later on, if it leads to something else which in 
turn is viewed as important.76 ) This, however, is too narrow. 
It is not only relations of a causal nature whose knowledge makes 
a fact intelligible or more intelligible. There are other 
relations which are ~mportant here, e.g. the relations between 
events and subevents. The fact that an event E took place is 
better understood if we find out which were the subevents of E 
and of which other events E ~tself was a subevent. It is also 
better understood if we find out what initial situation was 
changed by ~ and what terminal s1tuation resulted from E • 
(Although the latter may be regarded as a causal analysis it ~s 
not an invest~gation into the causes of E nor is it an investig-
at~on into the consequences of E in the sense of further events 
caused by E). There are st~ll other relations, not mentioned 
by us so far, e.g. relations of analogy or s~milar~ty. If 
we f~nd that a historical phenomenon is in certain respects 
sim~lar and in other respects diss~milar to another historical 
phenomenon of a d~fferent time but of the same or similar kind we 
76) According to Mandelbaum, The Problem ... , p.l01 only those 
facts are h1stor1cal wh1ch are seen in the l~ght of their 
consequences for the social structure. A sim~lar opin1on 
is expressed by Z. Barbu, Problems of H~storical 
Psychology, London, 1960, p.ll. Berlin, Historical 
Inevitability, pp. 60/61, also seems to have only causal 
imputation in mind when he speaks of the interpretation 
of facts. 
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also can rightly claim that we have better understood the fact 
of the existence or occurrence of this phenomenon (although 
analog1es are a r1sky business in h1story, and not only in 
history). In short, causal relations are not the only kind of 
relations which are important for the understanding of historical 
facts. 
Finally, we have to mention the view according to wh1ch 
the 1nterpretat1on of a fact 1s closely connected with the 
formulation of a hypothesis. 'Facts', so we are told, 'never 
speak for themselves but only to someone who has a hypothesis 
wh1ch he wishes to test.,77 ) Now 1t 1s true, and we have 
empha~~zed it ourselves, that we need someth1ng in the nature of 
a 'theory' or world-picture (and 1f we w1sh we can also say here 
hypothesis) in order to be able to conceptualize h1storical 
phenomena. But this is not 'testing' a hypothesis or the attempt 
to solve any spec1fic factual problem. Such a problem can only 
be posed with the help of concepts already formed. Nor can we 
speak of a 'construction' of facts' by the kind of questions 
which the invest1gator asks of the phenomena before him'.7S) 
For how can a question construct a fact?. 
77) Hook, 'Problems'···', pp. 123/24. See also J.H. Randall, Jr., 
Nature and Historical Experience, Jrd printing, New York 
& London, 1962, p.J4: '··· events become "facts" only in 
the light of their relation to some hypothesis ••• ' 
78) H.V. Wh1te, 'The Burden of History', History and Theory, 
Vol. 5, 1966/67, p.l27. 
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Actually, to speak about the testing of hypotheses in 
history in this context is misleading in that 1t suggests too 
close an analogy between the procedures of historians and 
scientists. A scientist does indeed test general hypotheses 
while individual facts are only of intere~t to him in as far as 
they can serve in such a test. A histor1an, however, 1s not 
interested 1n confirm1ng or disconfirm1ng any general hypothes1s 
(unless we stretch the notion of hypothesis so far that it 
includes the Weltanschauung someone holds but even then it is 
more than doubtful whether such a world view 1s ever tested in 
any meaningful sense of that word). 
in the individual facts themselves. 
The h1storian is interested 
True, there are general facts in history as well, e.g. 
the fact that all officers in the pre-revolutionary French navy 
were noblemen. But it 1s not true that a historian formulates 
such a statement as a hypothesis and then tries to test it by 
looking for confirmatory and d1sconf1rmatory evidence, as a 
scientist would do. H1s procedure rather goes in the other 
direction; he finds that officers ~' b, ~' etc. in the French 
navy of that period were noblemen and he summarizes this for 
simplicity's sake into the statement that all officers were (he 
does this even if he has not examined every individual case of 
an off1cer and so cannot be absolutely sure about his 
generalizat1on, and 1f he finds an exception later on it is 
very doubtful whether he would revise his statement). 
It may be that generalization of this k1nd is not what 
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is meant here by hypotheses. We m1ght be told that something 
much more fundamental was referred to, namely certain assumptions 
necessary for a historian's work. Now, without doubt, there are 
such assumptions, the most important ones being perhaps those 
which allow him to decide whether a fact 1s relevant or 
irrelevant for some purposes, e.g. for the purpose of writing the 
history of a spec1fic subject. But we cannot say that these 
assumptions are hypotheses which are tested. In the light of 
further experience they may be modif1ed, altered or replaced 
by other assumptions, but they are not tested by emp1rical 
historical investigation. The conduct of the 1nvestigation 
itself is dependent on those assumptions, not the other way 
round. A h1storian does not systemat1cally try to verify or 
falsify them in the course and on the strength of h1s research. 
However, so far we have spoken only about general 
hypotheses. But not all hypotheses are general in character. 
They can be 's1ngular statements about one individual event, or a 
number of such events•, 79 ) and although it may be true that 
between hypotheses of this k1nd and universal 'pointsof view' 
there is only a gradual variation80 ) the difference has to be 
taken into account. Now 1t is true that sometimes such an 
1nd1vidual hypothesis is 1ndeed tested by a historian. This is 
the case when previous research and knowledge (1ncluding general 
london 1%1, 
The Poverty of H1storic1sm, 2nd ed., R~ 79) K.R. Popper, 
p.l07. 
80) Popper, The Open Society .•. , p.266. 
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knowledge) makes him suspect that something must have been the 
case. He has then indeed a hypothesis 1n the proper sense of the 
word, say '~happened at time! in place!', and he tests it by 
looking at certain ev1dence. If he 1s lucky, and provided he has 
interpreted his ev1dence correctly, hls hypothesis will be 
conf1rmed by his f1nd1ngs. But we should not forget that 
historical facts are not always (and perhaps only infrequently) 
established 1n this way. A historian may 'stumble on' a fact 
c 
by pure chan¢e, without hav1ng looked for it or expected 1t and so 
without having had beforehand any hypothesis whatsoever. 
All this shows that it 1s m1slead1ng to say that facts 
only speak to someone who w1shes to test a hypothesis. A 
histor1an never w1shes to test a general hypothes1s and only in 
some cases does he w1sh to test an 1nd1vidual one. We 1gnore the 
quest1ons 1n what sense is the assertion of a h1storical fact 
1tself of hypothetical character, how far are hypotheses 
necessary in order to establish connexion between facts and can 
an interconnected historical account be viewed as a hypothesis. 
7. Facts and Connexions 
So far we have taken into account only simple, i.e. 
single and individual facts and we have done so in the belief 
that there is a d1fference between these and the connexions 
between them. Using the term 'connexions' in this context has its 
dangers; it might occasion a p1cture of invisible ties which 
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connect two or more facts with each other 1n the same way in 
which ropes t1e ships to jetties or rubber bands hold toge~her 
bundles of index cards. This, of course, is nonsense and that 
it is nonsense follows from the notions of fact and event 
explicated prev1ously. Nevertheless, we shall use the term 
'connexion', for it is commonly used in this context, but we 
shall try to avo1d the pitfalls assoc1ated ~th this usage. 
It also follows from our not1on of fact that connexions 
between facts are facts themselves. 'It is the case that x' and 
lit is the case that X lS connected to X' both express facts 
provided they are true. 'The French Revolution took place' and 
'the French Revolution was influenced by the philosophy of the 
Enlightenment' are both factual statements. The distinction 
between facts and connexions between facts E, therefore, really 
only a distinction between two different kinds of fact. 81 ) 
Another preliminary point is that it does not matter 
very much whether we speak of connex1ons between facts or 
connexions between events (or things or s1tuations). A statement 
of the form 'event E happened' expresses the fact that ~ happened 
while 'event E is connected to event C' can be regarded either as 
stating that the fact that E happened is connected to the fact 
that C happened or it can be regarded as stating that the event 
E is connected to the event c. Further, although there are 
81) Th1s is the common v1ew. Only Berl1n, H1stor1cal 
Inev1tabil1tx, p.6o, seems to think that an assert1on of a 
connexion between facts is not an assertion of a fact 1tself. 
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differences in some respects between the event itself and the 
happening or occurrence of the event, in the present context 
this distinction is of no importance and it does not matter 
whether we say that E is connected to C or that E's happening 1s 
connected to C's happening. 
However, the connexions in question are not logical 
relations, i.e. they are not relations between statements or 
relations between terms. A simple statement£, e.g. 1 E happened', 
may be logically related to a simple statement s, e.g. 'C happened) 
e.g. by conjunction, disjunction or mater1al 1mplicat1on, but the 
existence of such relations does not entail that E 1s connected 
to C or that the fact expressed in E is connected to the fact 
expressed in ~· (On the other hand, it 1s true that certain 
connexions, e.g. causal ones, can be construed 1n such a way that 
1n certa1n respects they correspond to or entail logical 
relations, e.g. material impl1cation). Similar considerations 
apply to relat1ons between terms, e.g. in respect to definitions. 
In short, the connexions under discussion can be 
viewed as connexions between facts or as connexions between 
events (or th1ngs or s1tuations) or as connex1ons between the 
occurrences of events; they are not logical but factual relat1ons 
and they are facts themselves {or rather that such a connexion 
exists is a fact); but they are certa1nly not events. We cannot 
say that a connex1on happens, that the fact that an event E is 
connected to an event C is an event itself. A true statement 
asserting a connexion between two or more events expresses a 
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fact but does not descrlbe or report an event. The exlstence 
of, for example, a certain causal relationshlp lS a fact but the 
causal relationsh1p itself is not an event. At least, speaking 
of connexions as events cannot be reconclled wlth what we have 
said before about the characteristics of an event. Events have 
causal efficacy and for a causal connexion to be an event it 
must have causal efficacy itself. But it makes no sense to say 
that the fact that event C caused event E caused a further event 
F, an event whlch is different from any event caused by C or E. 
Connexions between facts can be d1vided into two large 
classes. Speaklng now ln terms of events we can say (1) that 
there are connexions between an event E and somethlng else of 
which E is a part or which is itself a part of E and (2) that 
there are connexions between an event E and something which is 
82) 
not a part of E and of whlch E is not a part. The relations 
between an event and lts subevents and between an event and lts 
superevents fall under the f1rst class. To say that the storming 
82) Similar distinctions are made by Gomperz, Interpretation, p.7 
('to interpret a fact ultimately means to determine the way 
ln which, on the one hand, its parts are connected with each 
other or ln which, on the other hand, it is itself 
connected with other facts') and Fales, 'Historical Facts', 
p.89 (' a historical event is specified by its subordinate 
events and can be lnterpreted by connective events•). 
However, our connexion of inclusion is different ln that 
it lS not a connexion between the parts of an event, and 
not only the connexion between an event and its 
X»~~~~~~~i£x subevents. but also the connexion between 
an event and its superevents. 
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of the Bastille was part of the French Revolution is to connect 
two events Wlth each other the first of whlch lS lncluded in the 
second, and to make the statement in question is only to state 
that it is so included. The problem arises here again (we 
have already mentloned it before) of whether such a connexion of 
lnclusion is not perhaps after all non-empirlcal,i.e. whether 
to assert that the storming of the Bastille is a subevent of the 
French Revolution lS to make an analytic statement. The answer 
depends on what is understood by 'French Revolution'. It may be 
that our concept is such that the statement 1s indeed analytic. 
But tmis need not be the case for it is certainly possible to 
dlscover that an event has another event as one of its parts or 
is ltself part of another event, end then the connexion is not one 
which is necessary by vlrtue of a relation between a definlendum 
and part of its definiens, i.e. 1t is not a logical connexion 
between two terms but is non-analytic and empirical ln character. 
As far as the second class is concerned the connexion 
which springs to the m1nd most eas1ly is the emplrical connexlon 
between what conditions and what is conditioned without one of 
the elements being a part of the other. Let us call connexions 
of this k1nd 'connexions of dependence' for stating that such a 
connexion exists is to assert that two elements ~ and £ are not 
lndependent but that one exerts some kind of influence on the 
other. The most obvious case is a stralghtforward causal nexus 
but we should not only think of this, at least not of causal 
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corrnexions in a more restricted sense, for teleological and 
functional connex~ons, to mention only these, are also corrnexions 
of dependence. 
However, the second class of corrnexions 1s not only 
constituted of corrnexions of dependen~ Although we shall be 
mainly concerned w~th these in the following we must not forget 
that there are many other connex1ons which also fall under th1s 
class and 1n which histor~ans are 1nterested. To ment1on some of 
them, there are temporal or spat1al relations between facts or 
events, and to say that the battle of Waterloo took place after 
the battle of Leipzig is to assert a temporal corrnexion between two 
events wh~ch 1s not a connexion of dependence and where none of 
the events concerned is a subevent of the other. There are also 
relations of quantity or quality - one country may have a h~gher 
b~rth rate than another country, a pr~me minister may be 
successful in certain pol1cies where his predecessor was 
unsuccessful - and these, too, are not connexions of dependence or 
inclusion. And there may be other k1nds of corrnexion whXh fall 
under the same class. There is no need to attempt any 
classificat~on and it is sufficient to make clear that not all 
corrnexions of the second kind are connexions of dependence or even 
causal connexions, while none of the f~rst kind are. Many 
writers seem to equate a statement which connects two facts with 
each other to a statement which answers a 'why'-question and the 
latter is ~n turn somet~mes equated with a causal or motivational 
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statement. This concept1on of what constitutes a connexion 
between facts is too narrow and leaves out of account many 
connex1ons found in history books. 8 3) 
In more general terms, according to our concept of a 
connexion any statement is connective in character if its truth 
depends on the occurrence or existence of at least two 
indiv1dual phenomena as well as on the existence of a specific 
factual relationship between the two. There are simple 
statements ana there are connective statements. Simple 
statements merely assert that someth1ng (E) occurs or exists ( 1 E 
happened' or 'E existed') but they may also assert that E has a 
certain feature or property ('E was f'). This difference is of 
minor importance here for, as we have pointed out already, a 
statement asserting a feature can be viewed, at least in the 
context of history, as a statement asserting existence, the 
existence of an 1ndividual phenomenon, namely the existence of 
the specific feature in question. Instead of saying that Napoleon 
8J) In an art1cle on 'The Substantiation of Historical Statements' 
The Durham University Journal, Vol. 58, 1965/66, pp.75-85, 
I have been guilty myself of conceiving connexions between 
facts too narrowly as connexions of dependence. If we adopt 
instead the wider concept1on proposed here we meet the 
criticism of Gardiner, The Nature ••. , p.81, that 1 the 
connexion-between-facts~rminology encourages the same 
confusions' as assimilating all explanat1ons to the causal 
pattern. - One might think that there 1s a difference between 
(1) connexions of dependence and (2) other connexions in 
that a statement formulating (2) can be replaced by, or 
translated into, two or more other statements while 
statements formulating (1) cannot be so replaced and are 
therefore the only 'genuine' connective statements. 'E 
occurred after C' might be said to be replacable by two 
other statements, ~ occurred at time !' and 'E occurred 
at time!±!'· But what if we do not know the times at wh1ch 
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was ambit~ous I can say that Napoleon's ambitiousness existed, 
even ~f that sounds rather awkward. If 'E was f' is understood 
as assert~ng the membersh~p of an ind~vidual E in a class f then 
what is asserted is the existence of th~s particular membership. 
The important po~nt ~s that ~n th1s case as 1n the case of tE 
happened' or 'E existed' the truth of the statement presupposes the 
existence or occurrence of one and only one individual phenomenon. 
It would be wrong to say that ·~ was f'implies the existence of two 
~ndividuals, E and f, for f is not an indiv~dual at all but a class, 
and although 'is a member of' is a relation it is not a relation 
between indiv~duals but between ind~viduals and classes. 
But there are other statements where at least two 
individuals must exist or occur in order that they can be true, and 
these are statements which assert that one individual ism some way 
or other connected or related to another individual. Therefore, the 
criterion for deciding whether a given statement E is a connect~ve 
statement (~.e. whether E asserts a connexion between facts) or 
whether ~t ~s a simple statement (i.e. whether it asserts a simple 
fact) is whether E is true only if more than one individual exists 
or occurs or whether it can be true if there is just one. The 
matter can be expressed differently as follows (and this has the 
advantage that we avo~d speaking in terms of existence or 
occurrence): Asserting a connexion between two facts entails the 
C and E occurred and know only that E occurred after C? The 
-replacement would then be quite as impossible as it ~s in 
the case of a statement formulat1ng (1), e.g. in the case of 1 E 
was caused by C'. This is the reason why we cannot adopt this-
~nterpretatioll: 
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assertion of the facts wh~ch are connected but not vice versa. 
I.e., the truth of a connective statement depends on the truth of 
each of two s1mple statements but the truth of the latter does not 
depend on the truth of the former. Anyone who says that the 
French Revolution was influenced by the phiksophy of the 
Enlightenment commits himself to the truth of each of two simple 
statements, the statement that there occurred an event called 
'French Revolution' and the statement that there was such a thing 
as the philosophy of the Enlightenment. In short, a connective 
statement consists of at least three parts, the assertion of a 
statement £, the assertion of a statement ~ and the assertion of a 
connexion between the fact stated in E and the fact stated in ~· 
It is not necessary to assert the existence of a 
connexion between facts in a connective statement in wh1ch a term 
such as 'because•, 'therefore, 'consequently' or- if we th1nk of 
connex~ons which are not connexions of dependence - a term such as 
1 before', 1 after 1 , 'greater as', etc. occurs. The assertion may not 
be explic1t but may be 1mpl1c1t in the arrangement of a whole 
h1stor1cal text. Th1s is why the absence of such key terms is no 
guarantee that only simple facts have been asserted. On the other 
hand, anf 1ndividual statement which at a f1rst glance seems to be 
s1mple in character may on 1nspection also turn out to be 
connect~ve. 1 Aristarchus anticipated the theory of Copernicusr 84 ) 
84) Th1s example is adopted in altered form from Danto, 
Analytical Ph1losophy ••• ,p.156. 
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is a connective statement even if it does not seem to be one. 
For its truth depends on the truth of more than one other 
statement to the effect that Aristarchus developed a certain 
theory, that Copernicus developed a certain theory and that both 
theories are related to each other in a certain way. The fact 
that connective statements can be disguised in these and other 
ways does not prevent us from making a distinction between the 
assertion of simple facts and the assertion of connexions between 
facts for it is always possible to make explicit what so far has 
only been implicit. 
The distinction, however, cannot be as obvious as it 
seems for it has often been maintained that tnere is no 
difference, at least not in history, between facts and connex~ons 
of facts and so between statements which express facts and 
statements which express connexions between facts ('connexions 1 
here usually means 'connex~ons of dependence' and we shall have 
those in m1nd in the follow1ng). The case is parallel to the 
denial of a d~fference between facts and interpretations and in 
as far as our retort to the latter can also be applied to the 
former we shall not repeat it. However, the cases are not 
completely the same and the denial of the difference between facts 
and connexions between facts rests on some arguments which have 
not been cited in favour of the denial 1n the case of facts and 
interpretations. 
to deal now. 
It is only with those arguments that we have 
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On the face of ~t the den~al of the possibility of 
d~stinguishing facts from connexions 1s even less plausible than 
the denial of the difference of fact and interpretation. For it 
is obvious that in works of h~story we do find statements which 
merely assert that someth~ng occurred or ex~sted but we also find 
statements wh~ch assert that the occurrence or existence of 
something is connected with (for example, 1s dependent on) the 
occurrence or existence of something else. The latter clearly 
connect two facts with each other, or rather they assert that 
two facts are connected in a certain way. How can th~s be 
reconciled with the view under discuss~on, w~th the assert1on 
that when a h~storian 'knows what happened, he already knows why 
it happenedt 85 ), to quote a well-known phrase?. As a matter of 
fact, it cannot be reconc1led at all and the denial is untenable 
but in order to show this we have to go into greater detail. 
The view in question has different versions and ~s 
supported by different arguments. One has to do with the 
~dentificat~on of the simple fact wh~ch ~s asserted, and it goes 
roughly as follows: The concept of a certain fact or event can 
only be formed within the framework of other facts or events 
wh~ch are connected with ~t. Consequently, these connex~ons are 
already implicit in the concept itsaf. For instance, we can call 
an event E a revolution only if we have recognized certain 
85) R.G. Coll~ngwood, The Idea of History, Repr., London, 1963, 
p. 214. The same point has been made be~re by G.Salvem~ni, 
H~storian and Sc~ent1st, Cambr~dge, Mass., 1939, p.51. 
Others have formulated ~t in d1fferent terms, so Nowell-Sm1th, 
'Are Historical .•• ', p.l35, according to whom there is no 
sharp divis~on between an event and what expla~ns ~t. 
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connexions between E and certa1n other events {or th1ngs or 
si tua t.1. ons ) • The task of identifying E as a revolut.1.on is, 
therefore, not d.1.fferent from the task of 1dent.1.fying the 
connex.1.ons between E and those other phenomena. 86 ) 
It is not difficult to see that two d1fferent things 
are confused here, namely what happened and the description of 
what happened. The fact that an event E, commonly called 
'French Revolution', occurred is different from the descript.1.on 
of E as the French Revolut1on. It could be named or described 
otherwise. To know or to establish that E occurred is different 
from describ.1.ng E as a revolution. Therefore, even if .1.t .1.s true 
that describing E as a revolution presupposes the assumption of 
causal or other connex.1.ons between E and other phenomena it does 
not follow that to know or to establish ~'s occurrence 
presupposes the same or s1milar assumpt.1.ons. 
But is .1.t even true that describing~ as a revolution 
presupposes the assumption of connexions between E and other 
phenomena? We can grant that there are terms wh.1.ch are 
.1.mplicitly connective, for instance, causal. 'Rust', to give 
an example, is defined as a 'yellowish-brown coating formed on 
.1.ron or steel by oxidation •••• • (The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 4th ed.) which means that to know that something .1.s 
rust we have to know how it was caused. However, asserting that 
there 1s rust on this screw is not assert.1.ng why there is rust 
on it. The quest.1.on why there .1.s rust on it~ just the question 
why in consequence of oxidation a yellowish-brown coat1ng 
developed, and to this the reply cannot be 'because of oxidat.1.on'. 
Qt: \ r-...-'L-..-- f'T'")....- ""---..:-I'YO 
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But it is not true that all historical terms are causal 
or connective even in this sense. 1Revolutlon' is certainly 
not one of them, and while rust by defin1tion must be caused 
by oxidation a revolution can be caused by any of a whole series 
of different thlngs. It is, of course, possible to lay down the 
law and to say that anything that ls not caused by, say, soclal 
discontent is not a revolution, and then it follows that one 
cann± call E a revolution unless one knows or assumes that E 
was caused by social discontent. But this lS hardly the way a 
h1storlan would proceed although a sociologist or political 
scientlst may be more incllned to do so. One might also say 
that not connex1ons of dependence but other connexions are 
relevant here, e.g. the connex1ons between an event and its 
subevents or superevents. But even this claim goes too far for, 
as we have seen already, a hlstorian m1ght know that a certaln 
event E happened wlthout knowing any superevent or subevent of E. 
He might know that a battle was fought without knowing anything 
about the war the battle was a part of or about any particular 
engagement which was part of the battle. True, the forming of 
the concept of a battle or revolution, or of any other event, 
presupposes the assumption that the battle or revolutlon was 
caused by something and was itself the cause of something else. 
But tnis does not mean that one needs to know what caused it and 
what was caused by it. 
However, the pronouncement that when a historian knows 
what happened he already knows why it happened can be understood 
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in a sense that is somewhat different from the one discussed so 
far. For R.G. Collingwood and his followers hlstory is or should 
be concerned exclusively with human actions (understood here in 
the narrower sense of deliberate actlons). What happens in 
history lS then always the actions or deeds of individuals. 
Further, the proponents of this Vlew make no distinction between 
knowing that an action E took place and understanding ~· Or 
rather, the thesis is that we only know E if we understand the 
agent who committed E, i.e. if we know the agent's reasons or 
motives for doing E, in short if we know why he did what he did. 
So what this view amounts to is the thesis that a hlstorical 
event is an action and an actlon can be known only if it ls known 
why it was committed and, therefore, to know what happened is to 
know why it happened. 
anybody. 
It lS difficult to see how this argument could convince 
It is open to attack at nearly every point but the 
point we are concerned with at the moment is the assertion that 
to know what action took place is to know the reasons why it took 
place. What is involved here is the peculiar opinion, very 
fashionable at present, that there is a 'logical' connexion 
('logical' 1n some rather idlosyncratic sense) between an action 
and the reasons for it. An action, so we hear, is more than a 
mere physical performance; it lncludes or entails the reason or 
reasons for which it is commltted. (This, incidentally, is also 
one of the stock arguments for the view that reasons cannot be 
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causes since the relation between cause and effect is not a 
'logical' but a 'cont1ngent' connex1on). 
It is true that mere phys1cal behaviour 1s usually not 
called 1 act1on 1 , and in this sense one can say that an action 1s 
more than a phys1cal event. But from th1s 1t does not follow 
that the knowledge of an act1on presupposes or enta1ls the 
knowledge of the reason or reasons for wh1ch 1t was comm1tted. 
Ev1dently, there are cases which are analogous to our example of 
rust 1n that an action 1s named or described 1n such a way that 
reasons 1mplicitly enter the description. To say that Sm1th 
comm1tted suic1de is to say that he k1lled h1mself because he 
wanted to kill himself, 8 7) and not by misadventure or acc1dent, 
Just as to say that there 1s rust on a screw 1s to say that a 
yellowish-brown coat1ng has formed on it as an effect of 
oxidat1on. But, aga1n parallel to the case of rust, 1 i~not to 
say why Smith comm1tted suicide. The reason for his suicide 1s 
not included in or enta1led by the descr1ption, only the reason 
for the fact that he killed h1mself. In other words, 1 Sm1th 
comm1tted suic1de' states that Smith k1lled himself and why he 
87) This 1s str1ctly speak1ng not quite correct. In antiquity 
people were sometimes ordered to commit suicide; some 
political prisoners of the Gestapo committed suicide in order 
not to betray their comrades; and in respect to more normal 
circumstances it is a well-known fact that many people take 
their own lives in the hope that someone will rescue them 
from death at the last minute. In these cases it is rather 
misleading to say that the people concerned wanted to lull 
themselves. But let us assume for argument's sake that 
'wanting to' is in some sense part of the not1on of suic1de. 
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k1lled himself, but it does not state why he committed suicide. 
And the reason why someone k~lls himself is very d~fferent from 
the reason why someone comm~ts suic~de. People commit suicide for 
nearly any reason and the reason why Smith committed it is 
certa~nly not stated, and cannot be stated, by saying that he 
committed .. d 88) su~c~ e. 
Put ~n more general terms the matter is as follows: An 
action, like any other event, can be described in various ways and 
we have to distingu~sh the action E itself from its different 
One description may be more general 
than another description (the description of Smith's action as 
1 kill1ng himself 1 ~s more general than its descr~pt~on as 
•comm1tt1ng su1c~de' wh~ch 1n turn 1s more general than, say, 
'comm1tt1ng suicide because of a hopeless love-affa1r•) and for a 
more spec1fic descript~on we requ~re more knowledge than for a less 
spec 1f1c one. In a case where causes or reasons enter a 
descript~on, as in our example, we can say that by describ~ng E 
(sm~th 1 s act~on) by means of ~2 ( 1 Sm1th comm1tted su1cide') we g~ve 
a reason forE under a descr~ption d 1 ('Smith killed himself 1 ) 
which ~s d~fferent from and more general than d 2 . What we can 
never do 1s to g~ve a reason for E under ~2 s~mply by descr1b~ng 
~ under ct2 . In order to give a reason for E under ~2 we requ~re 
more knowledge than is needed for describ~ng ~ in terms of ~2 . 
And all this does not only hold for act~ons but for other events 
as well. 
88)A very s~m1lar expl1cat~on can be found 1n M.Brodbeck, 'Mean1ng 
and Act1on', Ph1losophy of Sc1ence, Vol.JO, 1963, pp.J21/22. 
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This, however, is not all. For there are many cases 
where reasons do not enter the description of an action at all. 
Take the example of a statesman or civll servant who submits his 
resignation. A historlan may know from his evidence that such a 
person did in fact submit his resignation,i.e. he may be quite 
certain, as certain as any historian can be, that an action E 
was committed. But he may be completely in the dark as to the 
reasons for it, and since 1 to submit one's resignation' does not 
even implicitly refer to reasons for E under another description 
there is nothing available to him which would correspond to 
'because he wantedt~' in the case of suicide. It is not necessary 
that a man should intend to resign when he submits his 
resignation, and modern history is full of examples where 
resignations were submitted in the hope that they would not be 
accepted. It is, therefore, impossible to see what reasons could 
be referred to in 'he submitted his resignatlon 1 • 
Of course, the proponents of the view here crtticized 
can always reply that if we do not know the reasons for an actlon 
we do not know the action, or we do not 'really' know it. In 
other words, if we have no knowledge of why the action took place 
we may know that something took place but we cannot call it an 
t . 88a) ac lon. 
88a) Or an event, if event 1s equated with action: 'An account of 
events, by definltion, involves an understandlng of the 
actors'. Aron, 'Evldence ••• ', p.2J. The important point is 
this feature of definltion. So it has been asserted that if 
a woman who wants chlldren talks of the stork, then her 
•talking about the stork lS wantlng ch1ldren 1 • T.Mischel, 
'Concerning Rational Behaviour and Psychoanalytic 
Explanation', Mind, Vol. 74, 1965. 
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This amounts to a redefinition of 'action' (or of 'knowledge of 
action') which is not in accordance with the ordinary usage of 
that term, and for ph1losophers who are usually prone to equate 
the meaning of a term with the context 1n which it is used this is 
rather a damaging point. In essence, such a reply would consist 
in an ident1fication, at least as far as actions are concerned, of 
knowledge and understand1ng. But knowing that something is the 
case and knowing why 1t is the case are two different things and 
it is not possible to make one out of them without defective 
reasoning. 
However, there is a variant of tne view discussed which 
asserts, not that in order to know an event E it is necessary to 
know Etg reasons or causes, and not that 1n order to identify or 
form a concept of E it is necessary to know how E is connected 
with other events, but that it is necessary to know these 
connex1ons, or at least some of them, if we want to establish that 
E happened89 ) (where 'to establish' means making the assumption 
that E happened so probable that for all practical purposes 1t 
cannot be doubted any longer and where 'connexions' usually 
89) Gardiner, The Nature ... , p.78, speaks of a 'procedural 
interconnexion' between fact-finding and the discovery of 
causal relations 1 while Danto, Analyt1cal Ph1losophy ••. , p.l40) is 1 1nclined to believe' that it 1s not possible to establish 
1t as a fact that a certa1n event occurred 'without having 
established connections between this event and other events 
in the past'. -There is also the other v1ew that the 
establishment of a fact is at the same time the establishment 
of connex1ons between thiS and other facts. 
seems to be neglig1ble. For to establish a 
the sense of 'establish' explicated above) 
previous knowledge of the connex1on. 
But the difference 
connexion (1n 
presupposes 
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refers to corrnexions of dependence). 
Now this may be sometimes true but it lS certainly not 
always true. It may be sometlmes true because one can at least 
imagine a sltuation in which a historian thinks it possible that 
an event ~ happened, but is by no means sure about it, and that 
he has to look into the questlon of why E happened or into the 
quest1on of E 1 s consequences ln order to confirm his assumptlon. 
If he findsthat there were factors which made forE's happenlng 
or that there were subsequent events whlch can best be accounted 
for by assuming that E did ln fact occur, then he has made his 
hYPothesis to that extent more secure, even if he can find no 
lndependent evldence forE's happernng, for instance, in a 
contemporary written document. But probably it will always be his 
endeavour to find such evidence and so to become lndependent of 
any inference from E's probable causes or effects. (It is true 
that the existence of the document itself can be regarded as an 
effect of E or as somethlng whose existence can best be explained 
by the assumptlon that E did in fact occur. But this is hardly 
what is meant when people say that a fact cannot be established 
without establishlng or having established its corrnexions Wlth 
other facts). In other words, in the normal case there ls a 
difference between establishlng facts and establlshing corrnexions 
between facts (at least as far as corrnexions of dependence are 
concerned) in that the evidence on whlch the establishment is 
- 98 -
based is different in each case. An ~ndication of this 
difference can be seen in the fact that historians are usually 
much more sure and much more in agreement about what happened 
than about why it happened or what consequences followed from 
it. This is not surprising for connexions between events are 
usually not open to confirmation to the same extent as the 
occurrence of the events themselves. 90 ) 
90) So also W.H. Walsh, '"Pla~n" and "Sign~f~cant" Narrat~ve 
in History', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.55, 1958, p ~83. 
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CHAPTER II: KNOWLEDGE OF FACTS 
1. H~storical Scept~cism 
We have tried to gain some clarity in respect to the 
character of the entities historians are concerned with. 
Historical knowledge, we can say, ~s knowledge of events, things 
and situations as well as knowledge of their connexions. The 
problem then arises of how such knowledge is acquired and what 
are the criteria for its correctness and adequacy. Posing the 
question of how historical facts and connex1ons can be established 
is to make the assumption that they ~ be established. But is 
this assumption Justified? Is there, or can there be, historical 
knowledge at all, i.e. knowledge of someth~ng that happened or 
existed in the past? Is it not at least possible that all our 
knowledge or alleged knowledge of the past, indeed that the past 
itself, is a figment of our imagination, that a past fact or event 
is a construction of our minds, something whose existence is not 
independent of our thinking about it as the existence of this 
table is independent of our think~ng about this table? 
Strictly speaking, we are under no obligation to answer 
these questions. A work on the analytical philosophy of history 
can take for granted that there is or was a past outside our minds 
and independent of them, in the same way in which a work on the 
philosophy of sc1ence can take for granted that there is an 
external physical world independent of and outside our m1nds. In 
both cases the philosopher in company with the historian or the 
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scientist takes the position of 'naive realism', and he is 
justified in doing so. On the level on which he is occupied it 
is not his task to enquire into the possibil~ty of knowledge as 
a relation between mind and object but to look into the structure 
and validation of knowledge understood as such a relation. But 
wh~le the philosopher of science is hardly any longer confronted 
with scepticism as to the reality of the physical world and the 
possibility of scientific knowledge, the philosopher of history 
is indeed confronted with historical scepticism. 1 ) While 
scepticism in respect to science seems to be nearly extinct 
historical scepticism is very much alive, and this is why it is 
pert~nent after all to discuss the question of the independent 
reality of the past and of the possibility of historical 
knowledge. 2 ) 
l) We dist~ngu~sh here between histor~cal scept~cism and 
h~storical relativism. The latter does not deny the reality 
of a past independent of the mind of the historian. It asserts 
only that the truth of a historical statement is relative to 
the position (social, cultural, psychological, etc.) of the 
person who makes it and that, consequently, no historical 
statement can be 'objective'. Of course, from the alleged 
fact that we can have no objective knowledge of the past it has 
sometimes been inferred that the past itself only exists in 
the mind of the historian, and in this way relativism may 
shade into scept1cism. But the two positions are nevertheless 
basically different, which is also shown by the fact that 
there are sceptics who are not relativists and have not been 
led to scepticism by way of relativism. See, for example, 
M.Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes, Cambridge, 1933, 
pp. 109/10, who takes exception to relativism from a 
scept~cal point of view. 
2) There is also the problem whether h1story is indeed confined 
to the past (there can bern doubt that the past is not 
confined to history). After all, 'past history' is not a 
pleonasm; we do speak of contemporary history; and a 
clairvoyant's detailed and connected account of things to 
come, if it were possible, could very well be called a history 
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Now, if somebody insists that there is or was no past, 
that, for example the world complete with all our memories and 
with all historical remains came into existence this very 
instan~e, we cannot prove him wrong as we cannot prove wrong the 
man who maintains that there is nothing in the present world 
apart from his own mind. (In fact, there is no good reason why 
one should adopt temporal but not spatial scepticism. The thesis 
that the world came into being a moment ago has the same degree 
of plausibility or implausibility as the thesis that only my 
mind or my body ex~sts.J) In both cases no experience can be 
imagined which could act as refutation, and in this sense both 
theses are equally bare of empirical content). We can also give 
no proof or evidence for our own view that there is or was a 
past. But the sceptic is in exactly the same position; he, too, 
cannot prove his thesis nor can he disprove ours. So, as far as 
proof or evidence is concerned the matter is a stalemate. The 
question, however, is on whom falls the burden of proof, and 
since without doubt there is an initial assumption in favour 
of the reality and independence of the past, an assumption which 
is built into large parts of our language, the burden falls on the 
person who challenges this assumpt~on, i.e. on the sceptic. 
The argument so far is not as sterile as it may seem 
for ~t directs our attention to an important fact, the fact that 
of the future. But although the meaning of ~'history' does not 
necessarily include pastness (see The Concise Oxford 
Dictionary, 4th ed.) the word is usually ~pplied to the.past 
or a record of the past. Cases where it ~s not so appl~ed are 
relatively rare and we can safely ignore them: . 
So also A.C.Danto+ Analytical Philosophy of H~story,Cambr~dge, 
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there is an assumption which by its very nature is unprovable, 
but which underlles all our thinking about the past and, 
consequently, all our historical thinking. This is the 
assumption that there was a past, i.e. that past events or things 
occurred or existed and that their occurrence or existence is 
independent of our present thinking about them. It may sound 
strange to say that this assumption is unprovable for do we not, 
after all, have very good evidence for the occurrence of certain 
events in the past? So we have, but the point lS that something 
becomes evidence for a past event only under the assumption that 
there was a past and for this assumption there is no evidence 
whatsoever. It is not true that there are certain things around 
- 4) 
us which bear what has been called 'marks of pastness' and 
from which we can infer that there was a past. For these marks 
become marks of pastness only after we have made the assumption 
that past entities happened or existed. The characteristic of 
being in the past is not open to inspection and there is nothing 
in our present experience which could lead us to connect it with 
the past. It is only because we assume from the start that past 
events or things happened or existed that we can treat present 
experience as evidence for past facts. But there is nothing 
in present observable qualities which would suggest or support 
this assumption. A statement to the effect that a particular 
event happened, if it is not a mere guess, is indeed based on 
4) C.I. Lewis Mind and the World Order, New York ••• , 1929, p.153. 
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present ev~dence, but this evidence has become evidence only 
because we have assumed that there was a past, that ~n general 
past events did happen.5) 
In short, ~t is not possible to prove or to support by 
an appeal to exper~ence the assumption that there is or was a past. 
But what about memory? Do we not have at least convinc~ng inner 
experience of the reality of the past, even if it is only our own 
past? It ~s true that memory and only memory gives us a sense 
of the past. w~thout memory we could not form any concept of the 
past, and s~nce without such a concept there could be no 
historical knowledge we can indeed say that history is based on 
memory. 6 ) But although the concept of the past depends on memory 
the fact that we have memory does not prove or support the 
reality of the past, does not prove or support the assumpt1on that 
there were past events whose occurrence is ~ndependent of our 
minds. We know that our memory can play tricks on us and we 
sometimes remember (or seem to remember) events which did not take 
place and th~ngs which did not exist. This means that memories 
5) We have here very closely followed G.C. Field, 'Some Problems 
of the Philosophy of H~story', Proceedings of the Brit1sh 
Academy, Vol. 24, l9381 pp. 60/l and 69. See also E.J. Bond, 
'The Concept of the Past', Mind, Vol.72, 1963, p.537. 
6) So also R.N. Lee, 'Knowledge and Truth 1n Historical Inquiry', 
Tulane Studies in Philosophy, Vol. 5, 1956, p.63,and W.H. 
Walsh An Introduction to the Philosophy of H~story, 
7th impr., London, 19647 p.84. This point was made before by 
B.Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Repr., London ••• ,l964, 
p.ll5, who says that without memory we would not know that 
there was a past nor would we understand the word 1 past 1 • 
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have to be checked, and they can only be checked by their 
coherence with other memories (our own or other people's) or with 
historical records. In order to make these checks we have to 
assume that these other memories or these records are themselves 
evidence for something which happened in the past, and as we 
have seen we can assume this only if we have made the basic 
assumpt~on that there was a past at all. Therefore, memory gives 
us the sense of the past but its existence does not prove the 
reality of the past; 1 the ~dea of the past ~s an "~nnate" 
'd ' 6a) ~ ea • 
But the fact that the existence of the past, or the 
existence of past events or things, independent of our think~ng 
about them, cannot be proved does not lend credence to the 
sceptical view that the past is not real and 1 there is nothing 
at all which ~s not present through and through' 7 ) or that past 
events are present ideas 8 ) and statements about them are not 
about something outside our minds but are only instruments for 
the 'special organ~zation' of 'the present world of experience 19 ) 
or whatever form the thesis may take. What ~s ~n our minds is 
the knowledge or supposed knowledge of the past but knowledge of 
the past is not identical with the past itself. The main failure 
of scepticism, whether ideal~st, pragmatist or pos~t~vist, lies 
6a)R.G. Collingwood, The Idea of H~story, Repr., London, 1963, 
p. 247. 
7) Oakeshott, Exper~ence ••• , p.l09. 
8) ibid., p.99. 
9) lbid., p.lll. 
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in making this equation of the past with the knowledge of the 
past10 ) and in lnslsting on the meaningless or self-contradictory 
character of the vlew that there are or can be past events or 
thln@ of which we know nothing and perhaps never shall know 
anything.ll) But this view lS nelther meanlngless nor self-
contradlctory. 12) In fact, it can be based soundly on inductive 
lnference. For (1) there is no doubt that by design or accident 
we discover previously unknown events and things all the time 
and (2) we know that at the present a very large number of events 
are taklng place and a very large number of thlngs exist while 
the number of known past events and things is incomparably smalle~ 
From (1) and (2) we conclude rightly that our records of the 
past must be incomplete and that many more events must have 
occurred and many more things must have existed than we know of 
and most probably ever shall know of. 
From the identification of the past with the knowledge 
of the past (an identification which, incidentally, is related 
to the identificatlon of the knowledge of a fact with its 
10) 
11) 
12) 
'There are not two worlds - the world of past happen1Ngs 
and the world of our present knowledge of those past events -
there is only one world, and it is a world of present 
experience',~., p.l08. 
'··· a course of events independent of experience, untouched 
by thought and judgment, lS a contradlctiont, ibid.,p.94; 
see also pp. 95, 107. 
Of course, as with similar statements asserting igno~ance it 
seems there is a contradiction involved ln that knowlng that 
one knows nothing is at least some kind of knowledge. But 
apart from the fact that thls is not the point here and is 
not the reason why the sceptlc considers the Vlew in question 
to be untenable! there ls a sense of 'knowledge' such that lt 
wouldonly be self-contradictory to speak of a specific event 
of which we know nothing whereas it would not be self-
contradictory to say that there are ~ events about whlch we 
- 106 -
description) the rest of the sceptical argument follows eas1ly. 
No doubt, our knowledge of the past changes, and ~f this 
knowledge is ~dent~cal with the p~ itself, then the past changes 
as well and a 'fixed and finished past' ~s unthinkable.lJ) 
Ev~dence does not follow fact but fact follows ev~dence and the 
correspondence theory of truth becomes impossible and ~s replaced 
by a coherence theory. 14 ) Indeed, there ~s no d1fference at all 
between a historical fact and the evidence for ~t:'All that 
history has is "the ev~dence"; outs~de this l1es nothing at 
all• 15 ) - and th1s entails that a h~storical fact is a present 
fact, for allevidence is, by def~n~tion, present ev~dence. In 
other words, the past is really present, and thus we are led back 
to the thesis we started with, namely that there is no past but 
only 'present experience'. It is hardly necessary to crit~cize 
this view ~n detail, for instance by po~nt~ng out that 'knowledge' 
and 'evidence' are correlat~ve terms, 1.e. that knowledge to be 
knowledge must be knowledge of something, that evidence to be 
ev~dence must be evidence for something and that in history this 
something cannot be present but must be past. 16 ) 
have no knowledge, ~.e. wh1ch we cannot describe. The case is 
parallel to an example given by J.R. Bambrough, 'Unanswerable 
Questions', The Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol.40, 1966, 
p.152: ~~ • ... we can say that there are some numbers that will 
never be thought of, even if we are not able to say of any 
particular number that it will never be thought of'. 
lJ)Oakeshott, Exper~ence .•• , p.107. 
l4)Jb~d., pp.llJ ff. 
l5)Ib~d., pp.l07/08. 
l6)So also in respect to ev~dence P.Gard~ner, 
H~storical Explanat1on, London, 1952, p.J9, 
An Introduct~on ••• , p.89. 
The Nature of 
and W.H.Walsh, 
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If knowledge is equated with present experience then 
we cannot know the past, and it lS thls narrow notion of 
knowledge which is adopted by many sceptics. (Some sceptically 
inclined historians express their regret that we cannot have 
v 
present experience of historial facts and see in the fact that 
/., 
no direct observation or inspectlon is possible a major 
disadvantage of history. They do not recognize that if it were 
possible hlstory would no longer be histnry, that lt is just the 
purpose of history to find out about things which cannot be 
directly experienced any longer)~ 7 ) If 'knowing' denotes a 
relation between a mlnd and a present object then there can 
lndeed be no historical knowledge for, by definition, a past 
18) 
object is not present. The sceptical argument, then, runs on 
the following lines: only what can be directly experienced 
(i.e., what lS observable or inspectable by means of our sense 
organs) can be known. Only what is present can be directJ.y 
experienced. Therefore, nothing past can be known.l9) 
The catch is in the second premise. It is simply not 
true that we can only know what we directly experlence. To assert 
this is to assert an empiriclsm of the crudest form which has 
17) So also Danto, Analyt¢cal Phllosophy ••• , p.94. 
18) See J.W. Harvey, 'Knowledge of the Past 1 , Proceedings of 
the Ar~otel1an Society, N.S., Vol.41, 1940/41 p.161, who 
also points out that if this kind of argument were sound it 
would also prove that we cannot think about the past for 
,{'thinklng', too, involves two terms - There 1s, of course, 
the freak case of astronomy where we can actually observe 
an obJect which does not exist any longer. But, as Field, 
'Some Problems ••• •, p.6o, emphasizes, this is lrrelevant 
for history. 
19) See also Bond, 'The Concept ••• •, p.535. 
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most implausible consequences, e.g. the consequencP that I cannot 
know that I posted a letter this morning and that this event has 
only reallty in my mlnd. For nobody can observe it; nobody can 
see, hear or touch my posting the letter as I can see, hear or 
?O) ~ouch somethlng wh1ch goes on right now ln my room.-
It does not help lf the sceptical thesis is reformulated 
in terms of verlfication or verifiability. A statement about a 
historical event is not equivalent in meaning to a statement about 
the present and future evidence for the occurrence of this event, 
and it is amazing that anyone could have believed that lt was 
equivalent. 'I posted a letter thls morning• does not mean that I 
have a certain memory or that there is a certain entry ln my 
dlary. 'The battle of Waterloo was fought ln 1815' does not mean 
that there are certaln papers in archlves and certain passages ln 
memolrs. The truth of a statement about the past, like the truth 
of any other statement, is not the same as the cr1teria which 
allow us to decide whether the statement is true. I know, or I 
think that I know, that the battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815 
without having the falntest ldea what evidence there is for the 
truth of this statement. 21 ) 
20) 
21) 
For simllar crlticisms see A.J. Lovejoy, 1 Present Standpoints 
and Past History', H. Meyerhoff (Ed.), The Philosophy of History~ Our Time, Garden C1ty, N.Y., 1959> P• ~84; 
Gardlner The Nature ..• , pp.J7, 80; Danto, Analyt1cal 
'--Philosophy ... , p.92 
Danto, Analytical Philosophy ... , p.45, also points out 
(against C.I. Lew1s) that equatlng the mean1ng of a 
statement w1th the set of experlences that verify it 
entalls that the meaning may differ each tlme the 
statement lS verif1ed. 
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But perhaps the most important point 1s that the 
scept1cal argument proves too much. If the sceptic were right 
not only would histor1cal knowledge be 1mpossible but knowledge of 
the present as well. For knowledge of the past is 1nvolved in 
knowledge of the present in many ways. Knowledge of the present 
does not cons1st in present perception; it is not what we see, 
hear and feel here and now. 
on indirect evidence, e.g. 
half of all we see is seen 
First of all, 1n most cases we rely 
on the testimony of others. 1 A good 
through the eyes of others.' 22 ) In 
respect to directness the difference between knowledge of the 
past and knowledge of the present is not as great as the scept1c 
If I cannot adm1tthe ex1stence of Caesar I cannot 
admit the existence of my absent son. 23 ) And if we think of 
sc1ences such as physics or chemistry or certain parts of biology 
it becomes still more obvious that 1n non-historical fields, too, 
we often have no direct access to our subJect matter by way of 
sense perception. It is just as impossible to see an electron as 
to see the Charge of the Light Br1gade. Statements about both 
have to rely on indirect evidence, and although there are many 
differences between the tracks 1n a cloud chamber and the words 
wr1tten in a historical document (for example the former can be 
reproduced at will, wh1le the latter cannot) as far as directness 
22) M. Bloch, 
p.49. 
The Historian's Craft, Repr., Manchester, 1963, 
23) G.G.S. Murphy, 'S1r T~iah Berl1n on the Concept of Scientific 
H1story: A comment', History and Theory, Vol.4, 1964/65 7 p.23b. 
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~s concerned there is not much to choose between the two. 24 ) 
But not only is knowledge of the present indirect in 
these and similar respects, it is also indirect in that it involves 
memory. An observation usually takes time and if we forget 
before we have finished with ~t what we have noticed at the 
beginning we get nowhere as far as the acquisition of knowledge 
is concerned. Even a scientist who reads a figuFe off the scale 
of a meter and then turns round to record the reading ~n h~s 
diagram relies on memory. In fact, he records a past event, and 
if he turns back to his apparatus and finds that the pointer has 
changed its position he w~ll most probably not conclude that his 
f~rst reading was false or that the event of the first reading d~d 
not take place. He will firmly believe in the truth of the now 
historical statement that at time t the pointer was in position 
1, and without beliefs of this sort not only history would be 
impossible. 
What is more, memory is ~nvolved ~n the very use of 
language and if knowledge is dependent on language then it is 
dependent on memory. We remember habitually the correct uses of 
words and grammatical rules. A man who sees a table can say 
'table' if he associates the o~ct with the word, and this process 
of associat~on, even if ~t is unconscious, is based on past 
experience and memory. ~mmember how to apply a name, a term or 
24) See also F.Dovring, H1story ~ ~ Soc1al Sc1ence, The Hague, 
1960, p.22; and Danto, Analytical Philosophy ••• , p.22. 
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a rule correctly, and someone who completely lost his memory 
would not be able to use language. To recognlze a table as a 
table and to call it 'table', therefore, would be impossible if 
0 
all our knowledge were present knowledge. 
But the past is lnvolved in language ln still another 
way. As we have seen, there are terms such as 'rust' which 
lmplicltly refer to the cause of a phenomenon. The notion of 
causality is connected with the notlon of the past and, 
therefore, reference to a cause entalls reference to the past. 
If there is no past then the statement 'there is rust on this 
screw' is necessarily false for it can only be true if there was 
a previous time when the brow~ stuff on the screw was formed by 
oxidation. 2 5) The denial of the lndependent existence or reality 
of the past implles the assertion that all statements such as 
these are either false or meaningless. 
In summary, it is impossible to see how there could be 
knowledge of the present which is completely independent of 
knowledge of the past. If knowledge of the past is imposslble, 
then knowledge of the present is llkewise impossible, at least 
knowledge which deserves its name and lS more than 'momentary 
awareness of transient and private data ••• devoid of all 
external relations and continuants, of all reference to 'others" 
25) See also Dante, Analyt1cal Ph1losophy .•• , pp. 71-74, who 
uses the example of a scar and speak of 'past-referring 
terms'. 
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or "beyonds 11 ' • 26) On the other hand, it is also true that we 
could have no knowledge of the past without havlng knowledge of 
the present. Both are lnseparably lntertwlned and, as it has 
been put, we only reach into the past because we have a foothold 
in the present and we have a purchase upon the present only 
because we get a leverage from the past. 2 7) 
All this does not disprove the sceptical thesls - it 
cannot be disproved - but it shows that it is not possible to 
confine oneself to hlstor1cal scepticism. To be conslstent 
scepticism must be all-embrac1ng. One cannot malntain that there 
lS no past, that past facts are presnnt mental facts or that 
statements about the past are not about anyth1ng 1ndependent of 
our minds but only have the function of organiz1ng our experlence 
here and now, one cannot say all this without saying the same 
about the present and the future and about present facts and 
future facts. One cannot be an idealist as far as h1story is 
concerned and a realist ln respect to science and daily life. 
One cannot be sceptical about h1story without being sceptical 
about everything else. 28 ) An all-embracing scepticlsm, however, 
loses the little plaus1b1lity a partial scepticism m1ght have. 
It is a posltion which a reasonable man will hesitate to adopt 
(and if he adopts 1t he can only do so in theory but not 1n 
26) Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints ••• •, p.l84; see also Harvey, 
'Knowledge ••• •, p.152. 
27) Harvey, 1 Knowledge 1 ••• 1 pp. 165/66. 
28) So also J.Huizinga, 'The Idea of Hlstory 1 , F. Stern (Ed.), 
The Varietles of Hlstory, 11th printlng, Cleveland & New 
York, 1964, p.J02; Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints ••• •, 
p. 186; Danto, Analytical PbjJqsgphy ••• , p.llO. 
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practice). It is absurdity par excellence and we need not say 
anything further about it. 
2. The Inferential Character of History 
H1storical knowledge is inferent1al knowledge, i.e. 
knowledge gained by inference. But, so one might reply, what 
of it? After all, all emp1rical knowledge 1s inferential. To 
know that such and such an 1ndiv1dual thing or event exists or 
happens in the external world here and now I have to make some 
k1nd of inference because I am never in direct and immed1ate 
contact w1th the obJect of my knowledge. This is true (forgett1ng 
now about the problem of whether we can speak of 1nference here, 
whether I really'1nfer' that there is a desk in front of me) but 
history is inferential 1n a stronger sense. While in knowledge 
of the present the inference is usually direct, in historical 
knowledge it is always indirect; what is inferred is, so to speak, 
one step further removed. In knowledge of the present we normally 
1 infer 1 from tfie fact that we have certain perceptions, in 
conjunct1on with certain other facts, e.g. facts of memory, that 
x is the case. But in historical knowledge we not only do this 
but we go further and infer from the fact that x is the case, 
aga1n in conjunction with certa1n other things, that X was the 
case in the past. 
Inference of th1s k1nd 1s, however, not conf1ned to 
knowledge of the past. The presence of electrons is inferred 
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from certain tracks; the chemical composit1on of celestial bod1es 
is 1nferred from the propertles of their specUra~Sa) In these and 
simllar cases the inference is as ind1rect as in history although 
what is inferred concerns a present object, property or event. 
On the other hand, there is also knowledge of the past, namely 
knowledge of one's own past, which is not based on indirect 
lnference. From the fact that I remember having posted the letter 
this morning I 'infer' the fact that I have really posted it, 1n 
a way similar to that ln whlch from the fact that I see a desk now 
I 1 1nfer' that there is a desk. True, 1t lS easier to be mlstaken, 
and checking is more d1fflcult, in the case of memory than in the 
case of sense-perception but this does not affect the s1milarity 
ln respect to directness. 29 ) Not all knowledge of the past 
is, therefore, lnferent1al 1n the stronger sense of the word30 ) 
and not only knowledge of the past is lnferent1al 1n this sense. 
But 1f we comblne these two features, pastness and lnference, we 
come to a fairly accurate characterization of history (although 
28a) 
29) 
30) 
But as Bloch, The Historian's Craft, p.55, remarks, 
scientists can-produce their tracks while historians 
cannot produce their evidence. 
A similar account is given by V. Kraft, Die Grundformen der 
Wissenschaftlichen Methoden, Wien & Leipzig, 1925> pp. 258759, 
who contrasts the direct ascertainment of ind1vldual facts 
with the indirect ascerta1nment of other indivldual facts 
on the basis of directly ascertained individual facts. 
Collingwood, The Idea ••• , pp. 252/53, excludes knowledge 
which is based on-me;ory alone from hlstory because nothing 
can be hlstorical knowledge which lS not based on evldence. 
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it is still too wide to be used as a definit1on). 3l) 
The same point can be made more concisely by say1ng 
with F.H. Bradley that 'it is only from our knowledge of what 1s 
tnat we can conclude to that which has been' or with R.G. 
'-Collingwood that it 1s the h1storian•s bus1ness~to study events 
not accessible to our observation, and to study these events 
1nferent1ally, argu1ng to them from something else which is 
access1ble to our observat1on, and which the historian calls 
"evidence" for the events in which he is interested'. 32 ) In 
short, to say that historical knowledge is inferential in character 
means only that 1t is based on evidence. What, however, is 
evidence?. 
31) The two features are shared by history with 'historical 
sciences' such as palaeontology and geology. This compar1son, 
however, has been criticized on the ground that in sciences 
which are concerned w1th the past the object of inquiry can 
be exhibited while in human history this is not possible. 
The subject-matter of a palaeontologist 1s the skeletal 
structure of past animals and when he is confronted with a 
fossilized skeleton he is confronted with his subject-matter 
itself. The subject-matter of the histor1an, on the other 
hand, consists in the past actions and s1tuat1ons of man, and 
with those he is never confronted. See B. Waters, 'The Past 
and the Histor1cal Past•, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.52, 
1955, p. 263. {The same po1nt was made many years before by 
E.Bernheim, Lehrbuch der Historischen Methode und der Ge-
»ch1chtsphilosophie, 3.M.4 Aufl., Leipzig, 190~p.227y:-- Th1s 
argument 1s not convincing. For, firstly, there are many 
instances where the subject-matter of such a 'historical 
science' cannot be exhibited (one need only th1nk of past 
volcanic eruptions to see this point). And, secondly, in 
h1story, too, the rema1ns of the past may themselves be the 
subject-~atter the hLstorian is interested in. The subject-
matter of an art histor1an may consLst 1n Italian seventeenth 
century paintLngs {not painters) and these he can exh1b1t in 
the same way Ln which a fossil can be exh1bited. 
32)F.H.Bradley, 'The Presuppositions of Critical History', 
Collected Essays, Vol.l, Oxford,l935 p.25. Collingwood, ~ 
Idea •••• , PP• 251/52. 
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Like many other key terms in history or the ph1losophy 
of h1story, the term 'evidence' is so vague and ambiguous that 
it 1s almost useless unless it is specified at least to some 
extent. Bas1cally, 1t has two meanings, the reasons for asserting 
something and that which is thought to supply those reasons. It 
is the latter sense wh1ch we shall have in m1nd here. Thus, the 
existence of certa1n documents suppl1es us w1th good reasons for 
the belief that there was a battle of Waterloo. Therefore, these 
documents are ev1dence for the event in question. In short, 
ev1dence cons1sts 1n present objects (these need not be material 
in character; a present custom or lnstitutlon can be evidence 
for a past thing or event). But instead of saying that something 
present constitutes evidence for something past we can also say 
that a statement £ asserting the existence of something present 
constitutes evidence for a statement ~ asserting that someth1ng 
was the case 1n the past. It is a matter of choice whether one 
regards the evidential relat1onsh1p as holding between objects 
' 
or as holding between statements33 ) but whichever we prefer we 
must not forget that, as far as empirical evidence 1s concerned 
(and formal evidence we shall ignore here), the relationsh1p in 
e1ther case is not an inherent or logical one. Objects are not 
evidence for each other per ~; statements are not evidence for 
each other by log1cal necessity, but 1 the very idea of evidence 
rests upon the mediation of our knowledge•. 34 ) 
33) So also N. Rescher, 'A Theory of Ev1dence', Ph1losophy of 
Sc1ence, Vol. 25, 1958, p.83. 9 34) N. Rescher& C.B. Joynt. 'Eviaenee in Histo~ and in the Law • 
~ Journal ~ ?hilosoP4y, Vol. 56, 1959, p. 565. 
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In other words, ln order to make the step from evidence to fact 
we need something ln addition to evidence. 
The function of evldence is twofold, although in 
practice it 1s often not possible to separate or to distinguish 
the two factors. Evidence is needed for establishlng a fact 
(establ1sh1ng in the sense of flndlng out that something is or was 
the case) but it is also needed for supporting what has already 
been established. A fact lS established on the basis of certain 
evidence (and without evidence we could not speak here of 
establishment at all). At a certaln time we did not know that an 
event E happened. At a later time we know it because we have been 
led to it by certain evidence. We also can say that the fact has 
been suggested by certain evidence. But further evldence is 
requlred in order to increase the likelihood of E's occurrence. 
After the fact has been established on the basis of evidence1 
further evldence 2 lS used to support the original establishment, 
to make E's occurrence more likely than it was before. 35 ) At some 
point, sooner or later, we shall have to stop and be satlsfied 
with the degree of likelihood achieved. We than take E 1 s 
happening for granted until such time as further discoverles are 
made which shake our confidence or remove it altogether. 
This process of establlshing and supporting is at the 
same tlme a process of JUstification. If a historian claims that 
35) Slmilar Rescher 'A Theory ••• ', pp. 83-87, who distinguishes 
confirming evldence by means of which a hypothesis is 
established from supporting evidence by means of which it is 
rendered more tenable. 
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something was the case he must be in a position to justify his 
cla~m to anyone who questions him, to anyone who asks 'how do you 
know?' or 'why should it be as you say and not otherwise?'. He 
must then be able to point ~ to certain evidence and to reply, 
in effect, •this is why'. 
whatever he may be.36 ) 
Otherwise he is not a historian, 
However, the fact that all histor1cal knowledge rests on 
evidence does not imply that ~t only rests on evidence. We have 
said already that to make the step from evidence to fact we need 
someth1ng ~n addition to evidence. The basis of h~storical 
knowledge does not consist in evidence alone but something else is 
requ~red. 37 ) It is not the case that a hlstorian f1nds certain 
evidence, e.g. a document, just looks at it and concludes without 
any further ado that someth~ng happened in the year dot. For, 
firstly, to recognize something as evidence is only possible under 
certaln conditions and, secondly, from ev~dence alone nothing 
follows at all. 
This means that no historian and nobody else can approach 
his evidence with an empty mind. The v~ew 
is/ 
that this(posslble 
could be called the 'positivist fallacy', a fallacy which is 
usually associated with historlans and ph~losophers of the 
36) So also Collingwood, The Idea ••• , p.252. 
37) So also V. Kraft, 'Geschichtsforschung als strenge 
Wissenschaft', E. Topitsch {Ed.), Logik der Sozialwissenschaften 
Koln & Berlin, 1965,p.81. - There is, of course, a wider 
concept of evidence which includes everything that is needed ln 
order to make an inference to an individual fact. But th1s 
is not the concept adoptedbere. 
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nineteenth century (although it seems rather questionable whether 
any of them really believed in this tabula rasa thesis; these men 
were not quite as foolish as they are somet~mes made out to be 
nowadays on the strength of short quotations taken out of 
context). This is so self-evident that it hardly needs 
emphasiz~ng, and ~t is pointed out ~n almost every work on 
historical knowledge, written from any point of view, that open-
mindedness is not intellectual vacuity, that no inquiry can take 
place in a mental vacuum, that without initial ideas nature as 
well as h~story is 'one blooming confusion'JS) or that 'one does 
not go naked into the archives 1 ?9 ) In other words, the po~nts 
from which inference starts are not just the points of evidence 
~n the sense explicated. Before we can infer anything from 
ev~dence we have to take a lot of things for granted. We~prevurus 
empirical knowledge, including historical knowledge and knowledge 
of ~ndividual facts and their connexions, and we need certain 
1 t . •t 40) genera assump ~ons or presuppos~ ~ons. 
38) 
39) 
40) 
So (in respect to nature) M.R. Cohen, The Mean~ng of Human 
History, La Salle, Ill., 1947, p.78. ---
Danto, Analytical Philosophy ••• , p.lOl. 
It may be true, as ma~ntained by Oakeshott, Experience ••• , 
p.98, that no line can be drawn between what is known and 
what ~s presupposed, at least no sharp l~ne. After all, all 
empirical knowledge is in a sense presuppositional. But 
although all data may be presuppositions we can still 
distinguish between these data on the one hand, i.e. the ~terns 
of knowledge from which we start, and the facts we establish 
and support on the basis of these data (so also Cohen, 
The Mean~n~ •••• , p.44). And although data may themselves be 
products of ~nference it ~s wrong, or at least mislead~ng, to 
say with R. Aron, 'Evidence and Inference in History', 
D.Lerner (Ed.), Evidence and ~nference, 2nd pr~nting, New 
Yo~ 1962, p.27, that no 'rigorous distinction between data 
and inferences' is possible. 
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It lS obvlous that all empirical lnquiry rests on and 
starts from some recelved knowledge. All research is really 
further research41 ) and this holds for history ln part~cular. 
When a hlstorian starts his work he has already acquired a huge 
amount of historical knowledge wh.Lch by cUld large he takes .for 
granted. (It may even be that some inconsistency o~ inadequacy 
in such a transmitted historical account induces him to engage 
in research in a certain field 42 ) but this lS another question 
connected with the selection of a topic or the formation of a 
hypothesis). He treats certa~n things as if they were settled4 3) 
even if it is hls lntentlon that they should be in the end 
altered or supplemented through his activity, and he has to do 
thls because lt lS simply impossible to question and to check 
everything at once. But some items are taken more for granted 
than others; some are regarded as virtually certainJe.g. such 
facts as the past existence of Napoleon or of the Roman Empire or 
such connexions between facts as that Caesar lived after Hannibal. 
Whether he _is ~n all cases justifled in doing so, _and in how far 
he lS JUstified ln any indlvldual case, is questionable, but in 
order to get anywhere he cannot proceed differently. 
This already follows from the fact that no datum could 
become evidence, or could be regarded as evidence, without previous 
41) 
42) 
So ~n respect to history W. Bauer, E~nfuhrung in das Stud~um 
der Gesch~chte,_!ub~ngen, 1921, p.81. 
W.B. Gallle, Phllosophy and the Hlstorical Understanding, 
London, 1964, p.6o. 
43) Collingwood, The Idea ••• , p.244. 
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knowledge. If here lS a coln and I 1nfer from its inscription 
something about the later Roman Emp1re, then I can only do th1s 
1f I know, or if I th1nk I know, that there was a Roman Empire. 
What lS more, to recogn1ze or to ldentlfy the object 1n question 
as a Roman coln may already presuppose my convlct1on of its 
existence. It 1s true that when a historian or archaelologist 
opensup a completely new f1eld of scholarship he may infer from 
an artefact the past existence of such an ent1ty ltself. But 
even then it is doubtful whether he could do so Wlthout taking 
other historlcal facts for granted, even lf 1t lS only in order 
to use them for analogies and comparisons. 
This brings us to the second kind of precondition of 
lnference from ev1dence, to general assumptions or presuppositlons. 
One of these, and perhaps the most fundamental one for history, 
we have d1scussed already, namely the assumption that there was a 
past, that past events happened and past things existed. 1 We 
cannot begin to think about what happened unless we are already 
±aking for granted that someth1ng happened.r 44 ) The step from 
the present to the past, from present evidence to past fact, can 
only be made lf 1t is assumed that there was a past, and wlthout 
th1s assumption evidence could not even be seen as evidence. 45 ) 
Th1s is so obvious that we shall not say anything more about 
lt; and we shall also not say anything about necessary 
assumptions of a formal or loglcal character, assumptions 
whlch are precond1t1ons not on~y of hlstorlcal but of all 
44) F1eld, 'Some Problems .•• 1 , p.61. 
45) Danto, Analytical Phllosophy ••• , p.95 
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th~nking and all discursive knowledge. 
But historians also need general assumptions of a 
d~fferent character in order to make inferences from ev~dence to 
facts. 46) Or rather, to give these inferences a valid logical 
form such general~zations are required. There can be no doubt 
that in most cases they are not made explic~t at all; they are 
usually not even distinguished from each other but form an 
interwoven texture, a unified complex of 'l~fe experlence' in the 
light of which certain things seem more or less obvious. 46 a) 
The pr1nc1ple which underlies the use of such complexes of 
experience 1s a principle of analogy. Whoever makes the step 
from evidence to the past has to assume that past events and 
th1ngs had certain basic characteristics which are very much like 
the characteristics which can be observed today, 47 ) and if we 
assume a world with neither un~form1ty nor consistency 1t is hard 
to see how we could use anything as evidence at all. This 
applies to the sphere of nature as it appl~es to the sphere of 
46) This has been emphaslzed by many wrlters, e.g. by Cohen, 
The Meaning ••• , pp. 37, 115; Danto, Analytical Philosophy ••• , 
p.lOO; C.G. Hempel, 'The Function of General Laws in H1story 1 , 
H.Feigl & W. Sellars {Eds.), Readings in Philosophical 
Analysis, New York, 1949, p.470; S. Hook, 'Problems of 
Terminology in Historical Writing: Illustrations', Theory and 
Pract1ce in Historical Study, New York, 1946, p.l24. 
46a)I.Berlln, 1 Hlstory and Theory - The Concept of Scientific 
H1story•, History and Theory, Vol. 1, 1960/61, p.20, in a 
different context (that of explanation) uses the phrase 
'experience in general'. 
47) Simila~]Field, 'Some Problems ••• •, p.6o. See also E.W.Strong, 
'Fact and Understanding in History', The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 44, 1947, p.622. 
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ce±ure as it appli'ii'fiii tw tlil'ii' sp:lii:'ii'ifi!Q eif man. We postulate that men 
who lived ln the past faced a physical unlverse identical Wlth 
48) 
ours, a universe in whlch, for example, no man and no object 
can vanlsh in one place and reappear ln a different place, and a 
universe in which artefacts such as coins, temples or manuscripts 
do not come into existence naturally like trees or stones but are 
due to the actlvities of man. 49) 
In short, we assume the uniformity of nature.50) But 
we also assume a uniformity of hrunan nature, at least in certain 
respects. We assume, for example, that certain creatlons of man 
presuppose that the creator has reached a certain stage of 
lntellectual maturlty (that a work such as Plato's Laws could 
not have been written by a small child) or that men normally 
have certaln needs and desires which they strive to satisfy and 
which sometimes conflict wlth each other. 
This account of the basic character of hlstorical 
presupposltions has been criticized by Collingwood5 2 ) who 
maintains against Bradley that the criterla supplled are of a 
negative character and only glve us knowledge of what could have 
happened but not of what did happen. Agalnst this, however, one 
48) A. Johnson, 
York, 1926, 
49) M.R.Cohen, 
1964, p.l5. 
of Hl story t , 
The Historian and Historical Ev~dence, New 
p.l54. 
Reason and Nature, 2nd ed., New York & London, 
See also D.C. Willlams 'More on the Ord~nariness 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.52, 1955, p.274. 
50) Bradley, 1 The Presuppositions ••• •, p.21. 
52) Collingwood, The Idea ••• , pp. 239-241. 
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can point out, firstly, that it is a matter of form whether our 
presuppositions are formulated 1n negative or posit1ve terms, 
whether we say 1 th1s text cannot have been written by a child' 
or 'this text must have been written by an adult person', and, 
secondly, that it is imposs1ble to arrive at what dld happen 
from any general assumption without the knowledge of 'initial 
conditions', 1.e. without statements asserting lndiv1dual facts. 
Collingwood wants to supplement the princ1ple or prlnClples of 
uniformity by another and in his v1ew sole positive principle 
wh1ch he calls 'historical interpolation',52a) but it seems that 
th1s 1s just another form of the same pr1nc1ple he has cr1ticized 
before. This lS at least suggested by the example he gives of 
interpolation:'··· our authorities tell us that on one day 
Caesar was in Rome and on a later day in Gaul; they tell us 
nothing about the journey from one place to the other, but we 
interpolate this with a perfectly good conscience.' Of course, 
we do, but only because we subscribe to the general 
presuppos1t1on that if anything or anybody 1s 1n a place at one 
time it can only be in a dlfferent place at a later t1me if it has 
moved or travelled there and that this movement must have taken 
some time. 
However, the issue ra1sed by Coll1ngwood is really 
whether the presuppos1tions in quest1ons are gained by experience 
52a) The same procedure has been described before Collingwood by 
others. Bernheim, Lehrbuch ••• , pp.571, calls it 
'combination', while L. Reis & P.O. Kristeller, 1 Some Remarks 
on the Method of History', The Journal of Philosophy,Vol.40, 
1943, p.237, refer to it (liUe Collingwood) as 'historical 
imagination'. 
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or are ~ Priori. Collingwood thinks that Bradley opts fOr the 
~o~er while he himself fOllows Kant and speaks Of ·~ prio~megi­
nation'. But it is doubt~ul whether he is right. i.e. whether any 
Of these presuppositions is A Priori in the sense that whatever our 
experience may be we shall stick to it. or that it is eve~ a pre-
condition o~ all possible relevant experience. A~ter all• we can 
imagine their contra»ies; we can imagine that Plato wrote the L§ws 
when he was three years old or that Caesar vanished in Rome and re-
appeared in Gaul. And assuming that all, absolutely _all the evidencE 
.. 
direct and cireumstan~1al, written and unwritten~ supplied by eve~ 
witness. even the most sober and re;liable one. by o~icial reports 
and papers Of state, and supported by seient1~1c investigations such 
as measurements o-r Greek and Roman skulls, assuming that ell this 
were to support the conclusion that some babes in a~a Of those daya 
could compose intellectual works Of great maturity~ or that some 
people could vanish in one spot and reappear in another, then it is 
at least possible that serious historians might &fter all be in-
clined to the beliee that Plato did write the ~ when he was three 
or that Caesar did vanish and reappear. 
In other words, if all the evidence pointed that w~y, we 
tnigbt be persuaded 1ha1 O"--:.o cr· other Of' the present laws Of' nature 
or o~ human nature did not hold at a certain time in the past. lt 
is, there'f'Ore, risky to call any o~ those laws A priori or to assert 
that 'there are certain accounts which we would simply mot fllow 
63 
as true no matter what the Mevidence" f'Or them mdght be'. At 
least. we can only be sure about this in cases Of contradiction aDd 
53) Danto, APfi~tiCil.PiiilosophV ••• , P• 106, who gives t.he cas2 Of.' 
the child ato as author o~ the ~ as example. 
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formal impossibillty, e.g. in respect to reports to the effect 
that in Caesar's time two and two made five. This we would and 
could lndeed not allow to be true, however strong the evidence in 
lts favour. But not all presupposltions of history are of this 
formal nature and a presupposltion necessary for history need not 
be a necessary proposition.5 4 ) 
However, all this does not prove tnat there are no 
a priori and non-formal presuppositions whatsoever. It perhaps 
only proves that Collingwood and others have looked for them in 
the wrong place. It may be that no partlcular uniformity lS 
~ priori but that the general principle of uniform~ty is. In order 
to make the step from evidence to fact it may not be necessary to 
hold any partlcular law, such as the law that nothing can vanish 
and reappear in different places, but it may be necessary to stick 
to the general rule that matters in the world by and large were 
ordered in the past in the same, or at least in basically the 
same, way in which they are ordered now. In fact, it is most 
likely that if we were to scrap all the laws in which this 
uniformity is embodled we could not get anywhere in history and 
that under the assumption of non-uniformity nothing could be 
evldence at all. Similar conslderations hold in respect to the 
conceptualizatlon of reality in terms of things, situations and 
54) Some presuppositions which might appear to be empirical at 
first sight turn out to be analytic, e.g. the principle that 
no man can be in two different places at the same time. For 
it follows from our conception of identlty that if somethlng 
is in two places at the same time it is not one thing but two. 
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events. That there are such entities as events wh~ch change the 
s1tuat~ons of th~ngs may be regarded as a basic presupposition of 
all our experience which means that no experience, and 
consequently no evidence, can change it. 
But the empir~cal and, therefore, refutable character 
of any particular and spec1f~c presupposition, as opposed to 
those general principles, can hardly be denied, and we can 
~phold our orig~nal v~ew that they are based on generalized 
exper~ence. This experience, however, 1s, at least in part, 
itself of h~storical character, and this is why histor1cal 
knowledge can have an 1nfluence on the spec~f1c presuppos1tions 
wh~ch were applied ~n the process of acqu1ring ~t. It is 
poss~ble, at least ~n princ1ple, that certa1n presuppos~tions 
used ~n histor~cal research are changed or modif1ed 1n the light 
of the outcome of th1s research. Th1s k1nd of c1rcularity 1s 
frequent, not only in h~story but 1n all empirical 1nquiry, and 1t 
cannot be avoided. 
J. Problems of Ev1dence 
We have spoken of the inference from ev1dence to fact 
and although we have pointed out that presuppos1t1ons are 
necessary to make such an inference possible, one might still 
th1nk that a h1stor1an f~nds h1s ev~dence readymade and has only A 
to apply his presuppositions ~n order to 1nfer that something was 
the case. But th1s would be a very inadequate conception of 
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historical procedure, for presuppositions are necessary for the 
very identification of a datum as evidence as well as for the 
evaluation of evidence. If a historlan is confronted with a 
certain datum, such as a coin or a document or a ruined temple, it 
seems that three problem& arise: (1) The problem of the 
identlflcatlon or interpretation of the datum, l.e. the problem of 
what this thing is; (2) the problem of what it lS evidence for 
i.e. what fact or statement of fact is established or supported 
by it; and (3) the problem of the degree of such establishment or 
support, i.e. in how far the fact or statement in question is 
established or supported by lt. Let us look more closely at each 
of these three problems. 
(1) It is useful to distinguish between data and evidence. 
A datum is what is perceived or known in the present but it only 
becomes evldence if it is used as evidence,55) i.e. if it lS used 
to .:infer that something is or was the case. But if the datum is 
not identified in a certain way it cannot be used as evidence. 
If I am confronted with a Roman coin but I do not recognize it as 
a Roman coin it lS not evidence for anything relating to the 
Roman Empire (although it may be evldence for something else). 
Still more obvlous would be the case of a document written on an 
unknown materlal in an unknown script and an unknown language. 
This, too, could not be evidence although it might become evidence 
one day, namely when somebody is able to ldentify the mater1al, 
to decipher the symbols and to understand the language. 
\ 55) SimilarJCollingwood, The Idea ... , p.280. 
- 129 -
From these consideratlons it becomes clear that 
'evidence' lS amblguous lll a further sense not mentioned so far. 
There is a relativlsed and an unrelatlVlsed concept of evidence,56 ) 
or, as we can also say, there is actual and potential evidence.57) 
Every present indivldual thing Wlth a past lS potentlal evidence 
for somethlng, 58 ) even if lt lS only for facts relatlng to lts 
own past. But lf thls lS so, then it lS not very practical to use 
the term 'evldence' for potentlal evldence for then there could be 
hardly anythlng which would not be evidence. Consequently, by 
1 evidence 1 we shall refer here to actual evldence reserving the 
terms 1 datum 1 or 1 data 1 for potential evidence, and we can then 
say that only data which are identifled or interpreted can be 
evidence. 
(2) Identlflcatlon or interpretatlon lS thus a necessary 
condltion lf a datum lS to establlsh or support a statement about 
the past. The questlon lS whether this lS also a sufficient 
condltion. In a sense it is. If I have identified this object 
here as a Roman coin then the object is evidence for the past 
existence of the Roman Emplre. And lf I reflne my identlficatlon, 
e.g. by describlng it as a Roman coln of the time of Hadrlan, 
then its value as evldence lS increased in that lt becomes 
evldence for a more speclfic past existence, and this process of 
56) J. Gledymln, 1Rellablllty of Informants', The Brltlsh Journal 
for the Phllosophy of Science, Vol.l3, 19627b3, p.299. 
57) Colllngwood, The Idea .•. , p.279. 
58) Slmllar1J~., p.280, and G.J.Renler, 
and Method, London, 1950, p.99. 
Hlstory. Its Purpose 
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more and more refined identification and so of more and more 
specific conclusions can be continued. This seems to entail that 
our problems (l) and (2), the problem of correct identification of 
a datum and the problem of what it is evidence for, are basically 
the same.5Sa) 
However, this presupposes a meaning of 'identification' 
(or of 1 interpretation 1 ) which is too inclusive. It presupposes, 
for instance, that the recognition of the truth or falsity of an 
assertion contained in a historical document is part of the correct 
identification or interpretation of that document and that a 
histor~an can only cla~m to have identif~ed or interpreted a datum 
exhaustively and correctly if he has found out exactly what it 
supports, i.e. what conclusions can be drawn from it. He would 
have to know that the assertion in the document is true and so is 
evidence for the event whose occurrence has been asserted. This 
would not permit us to say that someone has identified or 
interpreted a datum adequately and sufficiently but has drawn the 
wrong conclusions from it. However, we do say this sometimes, and 
in fact the whole divis~on of labour between 'history proper' on 
the one hand and disciplines such as paleography, epigraphy, 
diplomatic, sphragistics and heraldry on the other, as well as the 
common distinction between external and internal criticism of 
sources, rests on the assumption that it ~s one th~ng to identify, 
58a) This is the conclusion of Bernheim, Lehrbuch ••• , p.527, who 
writes that strictly speaking the identification of an object 
as a source of historical knowledge is already an 
interpretative activity. 
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to read, to ~nterpret a document and another thing to find out 
what it shows or proves in respect to past events and things. 
It is, therefore, better to conceive 'identification' 
and '~nterpretatlon' more narrowly ~n such a way that we are able 
to say that ~dentifying a datum, e.g. identifying 1t as a Roman 
co~n, is to transform it into evidence, but that it lS still an 
open question what it is evidence for, i.e. what historical 
conclusions can be drawn from it, apart from conclusions of the 
most obvious kind, e.g. the conclus1on that there must have been 
a Roman Empire. A conclusion llke this ~s indeed given with the 
ident~fication itself, and in this elementary sense to identify 
or interpret a datum is to recognize what it is evidence for. 
But when it comes to more detailed (and more interesting) 
conclus~ons, then we no longer regard it as a matter of mere 
1dentification or 1nterpretation but as a separate and distinct 
activ~ty, the activity of finding out what fact or statement is 
established or supported by an identified and interpreted datum, 
i.e. by a piece of evidence, even if both activities may blend 
into each other so that no sharp line of d~vision can be drawn 
between them. 59 ) 
As a matter of fact, one and the same piece of evidence 
59) A slmilar dlstlnction between the decision to recognize 
something as evidence and the decision as to_~he conclusion 
1t points to ~s made by Walsh, An Introduction ••• , p.SJ. -
J.H. Wigmore The Sc~ence of Judic1al Proof, Jrd ed., 
Boston, 1937, p.982, from a~egal polnt of view, 
distingu1shes between the authentication of a histor1cal 
document and its use as testimony. 
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can establlsh or support dlfferent concluslons; one and the same 
datum can be used as evldence for different facts. A Roman 
funerary inscrlption, for example, can serve as evidence relating 
to the speech of the time, to lts religious beliefs and practlces, 
to its polltical system (the name and date of an emperor may 
appear on lt), to lts economy (the deceased may have had an 
unusual and lnteresting trade), etc. etc. 60 ) It is very obvious 
that what such a datum is used for depends on the interest of 
the historlan concerned, on the questions he wants to answer, the 
problems he intends to solve. It has often been emphasized that 
a question or hypothesis is necessary in order to use something as 
evidence61 ) and that this is not suggested by the evidence 
itself. 62 ) This is true, provlded we understand 'question' and 
'hypothesis' in a w1de and rather vague sense and do not want to 
say that only someone who has a specific, definite and clearly 
formulated problem can make use of a datum as ev1dence. History 
lS not a theoretical disclpline, and the sweeplng desire to 
1ncrease one's knowledge of certain aspects of a historical period 
often takes the place of a specific questlon. 
60) 
61) 
(3) But to know that something is evidence for a fact lS 
Th1s example lS taken from Bloch, The Hlstor1an 1 s Craft, p.l45. 
Bloch, The Histor1an's Craft, p.64; Collingwood, The Idea ••• , 
pp. 280781; Giedymin, Reliability ••• ', p.299; L.J. Goldstein, 
'Evidence and Events in H1story', Philosophy of Science, 
Vol. 29, 1962, p.l80; Renier, Hlstory, p.l03. 
62) Cohen, The Meaning ••• , p.8o. 
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not yet to know how strongly it lS evidence for it, i.e. in how 
far the fact concerned or the statement assertlng that fact is 
established or supported by it. In short, evidence lS a matter 
of degree; it is a 1 probablist1c concept'; and there is no unique 
answer to the questlon as to how good evldence must be befor~ it 
can be regarded as suffic1ent. 63 ) There is no sharp dividing 
line which would allow us to say that up to here the evidence is 
lnsufficient to make the fact a virtual certalnty while from here 
onwards it lS sufficlent. In history, as everywhere else, there 
lS no specif1c criter1on for dec1ding where conjecture becomes 
knowledge. 64) 
The decision for considering certain evidence as 
sufficlent depends on many factors. It depends most of all on 
the congruence or coherence of several pieces of evidence. One 
piece glves strength to the other and this mutual interlocklng 
support is one of the essential features of historical knowledge. 
63) So also Rescher & Joynt, 'Evidence ••. ', pp.563, 565. See also 
Lee, 'Knowledge ••• ', p.65- Rescher & Joynt (p.562) and 
Rescher, 1 A Theory ••• ' p.93, also point out that the 
evidential relatlonship is not a relation of enta1lment, not 
only because lt is not a loglcal lmpllcation but also because 
one statement may be evidence for another statement wh1ch 
goes beyond the first in 1 assertlve content'. In other 
words, the first may only partially cover the second. 
Consequently, a true statement may provide evidence for a 
false one or for several lncompatlble statements. We can 
add to this that it may also be the other way round in that 
the statement which provldes evidence may cover a wider field 
than the one for which 1t prov1des evidence. In that case 
the problems involved are not as serious. 
64) Lee, 'Knowledge ••• 1 , p.65. 
- 134 -
However, the demand for reclprocal reinforcement may feed back 
on the criterion of what constitutes sufficient evidence in that 
we lower our sights in cases where we cannot expect to find many 
records or remains. In other words, what constitutes good or 
sufficient evidence is also pragmatically dependent on what is 
available. Where evidence is more abundant we tighten our 
requirements while where it is scarce, we l~sen them. 65 ) The 
amount and quality of evidence considered as sufflcient for the 
early Middle Ages would never do for the nineteenth century. 
Finally, lt is also obvious that we take into account the quanxity 
and quality of •negative' or 'contradictory' evidence, i.e. of 
evidence which points in a directlon which is opposite to our 
conclusion and which diminishes the degree of support provided 
by 'posltive' evidence. 
So much for our three problems. What we have said 
amounts in the end merely to the recognition that historical 
knowledge, like any empirical knowledge, can only be probable and 
never certain although it is probable in different degrees. 66 ) 
The interesting question is, however, whether there are any 
criteria which allow us to pin-point the degree of probability and 
to weigh the evldence for a historical fact or statement. If 
there are, then it is posslble to decide between conflicting claims 
of different historians as to whether a fact is established by the 
65) Bernhelm, Lehrbuch ••• , p.506; Rescher & Joynt, 
66) So also Walsh, An Introduction ••• , p.87. 
'Evidence ••• •, 
p.564. 
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evidence or whether it 1s better supported by it than another 
fact. 
But before we come to that we had better ask first 
whether there are any criteria for the correct identification or 
1nterpretation of data. The answer to th1s can be fa1rly brief 
and straightforward. It is, of course, true that the principles 
of interpretation change 1n time67 ) with the change of our 
knowledge and presuppositions but within any generation of 
histor1ans they are relatively constant. This has to do with the 
fact that the relevant presuppositions are fairly intersubjective 
and shared by the majority of scho~s. Naturally, there are 
always borderline cases where the experts disagree about the 
ident1fication of a datum (whether this fragment is really 
Etruscan, whether this deed is really a forgery, whether this 
charter really dates from the tenth century, whether this passage 
is really to be construed in this sense rather than that, etc.). 
But by and large the criteria appl1ed and the conclusions reached 
are lntersubJective (and the application of science to histor1cal -
criticism, as in carbon dating and textual analysis by computer, 
may, with1n limits, help to increase this lntersubJectivity). 
Matters are not as bright when it comes to deciding 
whether a certa1n datum is evidence for a certain fact. It has 
been said that a histor1an has to decide for himself that 
something is evidence and that if h1s colleague does not agree 
67) Collingwood, The Idea ••• , p.248. 
--- -----
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with him there is nothing he can do about it. 68 ) This, although 
a bit of an overstatement, is basically true. The datum 1tself 
can indeed not enforce any agreement. This feature is shared by 
history with other fields of inquiry in which the evidence is 
d~rect and observational. A sc~entist can ask a colleague to 
'see for himself' and look through a telescope or m1croscope but 
he cannot force him to come to the same conclusion, i.e. to 
regard what he sees as evidence for the same fact, while in a 
sense he could 'force' him to agree that two and two make four 
by demonstrating that a denial of this proposition leads to a 
self-contradiction. All th~s is not surprising for it follows 
directly from what we have po~nted out before, namely that from 
a piece of evidence alone nothing can be inferred but that 
presuppositions are necessary in order that such inference be 
possible. If another person does not make the same pre-
suppositions he may come to different conclusions, if he comes to 
any conclusions at all, and the presuppositions here are not as 
easily shared by all or most historians as those which are 
relevant for the identificat~on or interpretation of data. 
Now, it is just this feature of d~fferent 
presuppos~tions which has been used in an attempt to show that in 
the last resort there ~s no genuine disagreement at all in such 
cases. 69 ) The argument goes as follows: assuming there are two 
68) Walsh, An Introduct1on ... , p.117. 
69) Danto, Analytical Philosophy ••• , pp. 107/08. 
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h2storians, A and~' and A has a set of presuppositions P 1 from 
which (2n conjunction with certa2n evidence ~) a statement of 
historical fact £ can be inferred while B has a different set of 
presuppos2tions ~2 from which (in conjunction with the same 
evidence ~) a different statement ~ is derived (where £ and ~ are 
incompat1ble). Then, so 1t ls said, there is no log2cal 
oppos2tion between the two statements for £ 2s acceptable 
relat2ve to P 1 (and~) and~ is acceptable relative to P 2 (and e). 
Further, there can be no genuine disagreement between ! and B for 
1 e2ther they share the same set of presuppositions, and hence 
cannot genu1nely disagree, or they have d2fferent sets of 
presuppositions, in which case they cannot genuinely disagree'. 
If th2s argument were tenable any genuine d2sagreement 
as to what can be 1nferred from the same evidence would be 
lmpOSSlble • Or rather, disagreement would be poss2ble only where 
h1storians share the same presuppos2t2ons and base themselves on 
the same evidence but come to different conclusions which could 
only happen 2f there were some formal error of reason2ng (and such --
errors are detectable and the accompanying disagreements 
elim2nabl e) • However, th2s d2ssolution of 1 d2sagreements through 
relat2vizat2on' presupposes that histor2ans proceed hypothetically 
and that tueir arguments start w2th formulas such as 1 assum2ng 
that such and such presuppositions are justlfied .•. '. But the 
historian who argues 1n th2s way has to be 1nvented. History does 
not proceed l1ke mathemat1cs, w2th postulates, axioms and the 
69) Danto, A:l'it!!lytictd Ph:ilet::~ephy,, • 1 pp • 107/08. 
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rest. Historians argue categor~cally, if they argue at all; they 
hold their presuppositions absolutely and believe firmly in their 
truth, even if they believe only that someth~ng is more probable 
than something else (probabil~stic statements can be just as 
firmly asserted as non-probablilistic ones). What is more, in 
many cases they are not even aware what their presuppositions are 
~-(and if they are aware of this then only ~ncompletely and 
vaguely) for, as we have pointed out already, the individual 
presuppositions are usually not distinguished from each other but 
form an interconnected texture of 'life experience'. Such a 
complex whole cannot be formulated in words (although parts of ~t 
may be formulated inadequately); much less can it be used as the 
antecedent in a hypothetical argument. 
Genuine disagreements exist; ~t does happen that 
historians agree as to the identification or interpretation of 
their data but genuinely disagree on what they are evidence for or 
~n how far they support a particular conclusion. Different 
scholars begin with the same evidence but come to different 
results;they cannot come to the same conclusion as to what the 
past had to be like in order best to make sense of present 
data,70) and they disagree not because their modes of reasoning 
are different but because they start with different 
presuppositions. Similar difficulties arise in other disciplines 
but they are perhaps more frequent in history for here it is more 
70) So Goldsteln, 'Evidence ••• ', p.l77, and L.J. Goldstein, 
'A Note on the Status of Historical Reconstructions', 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.55, 1958, P·~~~. 
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difficult to make the presuppositions explicit, and to make them 
explicit would be a precondition for com2ng to an agreement about 
them. 
A h2storian A may assert 'this ~ is evidence for event 
E' or 'e (in conjunction with other evidence ~l' ~2 , etc.) is 
sufficient to prove that E occurred' while historian B replies 
1 no, ~ is not evidence for E at all' or 'e may constitute some 
-
evidence for E but (in the light of certa2n contradictory 
evidence ~x' e 
-y' etc.) e lS not sufficient to prove that E dld 
occur'. Is there any procedure available which would allow us 
to decide in favour of either A or B? There is none, at least not 
a cut and dried one wh2ch could be applied methodically and in 
all cases. There 2s no 'logic of nondemonstrative 2nference•7l) 
and although the lack of it has certain consequences also in other 
d2sciplines, in history tney are more obvious. Fortunately, 
there are presuppositions which are shared by all historians and 
others which are shared by most of them, and there exist also 
'many unformulated hab2ts of thought which embody sound 
principles of nondemonstrative reasoning• 72 )(not only in respect 
to the inference of individual facts from ev2dence but also in 
respect to the connexions between facts), and 2t 1s due to this 
what 
that disagreements about "'iJ~.iefl. constitutes evidence and what 
const2tutes sufficient ev2dence in a part1cular case are not as 
71) E. Nagel, The Structure of Science, London, 1961, p.592. 
72) Ibid. 
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frequent and not as ser1ous as they m1ght be. 
There is no JUstification for drawing scept1cal or 
relativist conclusions from the fact that there is no log1c of 
non-demonstrative inference and that there are disagreements which 
cannot be resolved. Historical knowledge is not impossible because 
there are cases where the experts cannot agree. Neither does it 
follow that the truth of an assertion of a historical fact is 
'relative' to the presuppositions of him who makes it. Any such 
statement is either true or false, whatever the presuppos1tions, 
and this is not affected in the least by the fact that because of 
differences in these presuppositions historians sometimes cannot 
come to a unanimous opinion about truth or falsity. After all, 
there is no absolute certainty and no absolute proof to be had in 
any empir1cal investigat1on so that there will always be some room 
for argument for or aga1nst a part1cular conclus1on. 
In our account of evidential inference we have only 
considered cases where from the presence of evidence it is 
inferred that something was the case (or was not the case). 
However, it is also possible to reach certain conclusions from 
the absence of evidence. From the fact that there is no record or 
rema1ns of a certain event or th1ng 1t can sometimes be inferred 
that the event in quest1on did not occur or the thing concerned 
did not exist. For instance, from the absence of contemporary 
documents 1t 1s concluded that there was no Donation of 
Constantine (and that later documents which assert that there was 
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are spurious). 73) This kind of inference is sometimes called the 
'argument from s~lence' and ~t is also used in courts of law. 
Most of what we have sa~d about the inference from 
ev~dence to fact also holds for the argument from silence. It 
might seem at first that there is noth~ng here which corresponds 
to the ~dentif~cat~on or interpretat~on of a datum because there 
is no datum. But~f we look somewhat closer we f~nd that there is. 
For, first of all, ~n many cases the argument is not an argument 
from the total absence of data but only from the absence of 
certain features in available data, e.g. from the absence of a 
reference to an event in one or more documents; and th~s, of course, 
presupposes that the data in question are identified or 
interpreted. But even where the argument is from the total 
absence of data it is usually necessary that certain existing data 
should be interpreted in such a way that they do not constitute 
evidence for the fact in question. I can only say that there was 
no Donation of Constantine because there are no contemporary 
documents to this effect when I have identified all existing data 
as records wh~ch are not contemporary or which do not assert 
the fact in question. 
Further, there can be no doubt that here, too, 
presuppositions are needed. For the argument takes roughly the 
following form: ~ . 'If event E had occured some ev~dence for ~ts 
73) This and other examples can be found in J. Lange, 'The 
Argument from Silence', History and Theory, Volo, 1966,p.289. 
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occurrence would be present (or would be known); but there is no 
evidence present (or known) for E 1 s occurrence; therefore E has 
not occurred.r 74 ) The premlsses here rest on at least three 
assumpt1ons, the assumption that lf E had occurred it would have 
left some trace, the assumption that such a trace would not have 
been lost or destroyed 1n the time-interval between E's 
occurrence and the present but would still exlst today, and the 
assumptlon that the trace would be known to exist today. 
Needless to say)ln any partlcular case each of these 
assumptions rests on a host of presupposltions, e.g. on the 
presupposltion that it lS against human nature not to report 
lmportant events whlch affect the life of everybody (such as a 
war or the assassination of a natlonal flgure) if means are 
available for reportlng them (e.g. if writing is not an unknown 
art). It is equally obvious that here, too, hlstorians may not 
share the same presuppositions and so may disagree as to what 1s 
supported by the absence of evidence or as to the degree of such 
support. And for these disagreements there is also no decislon 
procedure.75) In short, the results we have arrived at in respect 
to the inference from the presence of evldence also hold in respect 
to the inference from its absence. 
74) 
75) 
Lange proceeds on slmilar lines. - The argument can, of course, 
also be to the occurrence of E (instead of its non-occurrence) 
in which case 1t takes the form: 'If E had not occurred then 
some evidence for its non-occurrence would be present; but 
there is no evidence present for it; hence E has occurred.' 
Lange (although he treats the problem in a much more detailed 
way) only takes lnto account the absence of written evidence 
(whereas we have spoken of evidence in general) but he also 
comes to the conclusion that no logic of confirmation is 
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4. The Interpretat~on of Data 
According to our thesis a datum must be identif~ed or 
~nterpreted before ~t can become evidence. But it is not 
sufficiently clear yet what we mean by 'identification or 
interpretation•. In the view we wish to adopt there is no 
difference between the two (although in common usage 1 ~nterpretation 
has a flavour of subjectivity and uncerta~nty not associated with 
1 identif~cationt) and both are in turn closely related to 
descr~ption. In all three cases the word 'as' is essential in 
that an object is ~dentified, interpreted or described as a (or the) 
so-and-so. 76 ) In fact, description is only the explicit or 
d~scursive part or aspect of identificat~on and interpretation, 
and the relation here is somewhat sim~lar to the relation between 
concepts and terms. As far as discursive knowledge ~s concerned 
~dentifications or interpretat~ons always take the form of 
descript~ons, and it has been truly said that to interpret 
something 'means to discover terms by which it may suitably be 
76) 
appl~cable and that in the end historians have to rely 1 on 
their subject~ve estimat~ons of l~kelihood•. See ~bid.,pp. 
300/01. 
It might be objected that only interpretations which take the 
form of definite descriptions (•the so-and-so') can be viewed 
as identifications, and this is indeed the meaning attached 
to the word in many cases ('the body of the man found in the 
river has not been identified yet•). However, 1 identification 1 
is also used ~n a more inclus~ve sense in connexion with 
indefinite descriptions ('the strange animal in Hampshire 
has been identified as a puma•) and it is this sense which ~s 
adopted here. 
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described•. 77 ) An object ~ 1s perceived and 1s recognized or 
seen as something, i.e. 1t is identified or interpreted, and 
1f th1s identification or interpretat1on lS made explic1t one 
arrives at a description. (we are not concerned here with the 
question in how far, if at all, it is possible to split off 
perception from identification or interpretation, but it will 
not affect our argument if we grant that a completely 
unidentif1ed or uninterpreted object would be a Ding ~ sich 
and, consequently, unknowable and imperceptible; that, in other 
words, any perception is at the same time an identification or 
1nterpretat1on, even if only a very rudimentary and primitive 
one.) 
Obv1ously, an object can be identified, interpreted 
and described in different ways and all these identifications, 
interpretations and descriptions may be correct and compatible 
with each other. I perceive something 1n the street and identify 
1t as a human being, or as a man, or as a bald man, or as a 
bachelor, or as my next-door neighbour, or as Mr. John Sm1th, or 
as the manager of the local branch of Lloyds Bank. All these 
identifications may be correct, in spite of the var1ations in 
spec1f1city and detail. Some entail others (•this is a 
bachelor' enta1ls •this is a man') while others do not. In 
77) H. Gomperz, Interpretat1on, The Hague & Ch1cago,1939, p.6 -
One could define interpretation as the expaanation of data 
(as opposed to explanation proper, i.e. explanation of facts) 
but we shall not do so because we want to use 'explanation 
of data' (or rather 'explanation of evidence•) in a spec1fic 
sense. 
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general, the more specif1ed a description the more knowledge is 
conveyed by it. But there are exceptions to this rule, and it 
may be more enl1ghtening to know that this is a person suffer1ng 
from diabetes than to recognize him as the man who sat next to me 
1n the theatre yesterday. 
As far as history 1s concerned, it would seem that the 
ident1f1cation of a datum must be in terms of past events or 
things. Thus, if a historian meets with a flat metal disc of 
c1rcular shape its 1dent1fication as a flat metal disc of 
circular shape is pretty useless while the identification as a 
Roman coin is not. Nevertheless, there are descript1ons no part 
of wh1ch refers to the past but which are still historically 
useful, namely in connexion with items of historical knowledge 
previously acquired. If, to give a primitive example, someth1ng 
1s interpreted as a text printed with movable types, then one can 
conclude immediately that it cannot be older than Gutenberg's 
invention. 
Interpretation has often been understood as the 
d1scovery of the meanings of symbols7S) but this is too narrow 
unless our conception of 'symbol' becomes so sweeping that there 
1s noth1ng a histor1an can touch which is not of symbolic 
character. If we restrict the application of this term to 
entities whose status depends on their being used (or intended to 
78) So E. Cassirer, An Essay~ Man, Jrd printing, New Haven, 
1945, p. 177 & pas;Im, who sees in this the special 
task of history. 
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being used) 1n communication,79 ) even if it is only communication 
with oneself, then we cannot say that the historian's data are 
all of a symbol1c nature and that histor1cal interpretat1on 
always consists in the d1scovery of meanings. If someone 
1nterprets a datum as an arrow-head he is not dealing with a 
symbol, for this object has not been produced with the purpose 
of convey1ng some meaning. It is, of course, trivially true 
that in one or more senses of 'meaning' which are different from 
the sense of referential meaning the arrow-head, too, has or had 
a meaning to someone, e.g. the meaning of being dangerous, 
effective or beautiful. This 1s tr1v1ally true because there can 
be no object man comes 1n contact with that may not be assoc1ated 
80) 
w1th some feeling or thought, and s~nce, by definition, 
h1story 1s concerned with men, the1r actions and creations, any 
h1storical datum must have 'mean1ng 1 and must be 1 meaningful 1 
in th1s sense, and it is at least part of the historian's task 
to discover these 'mean1ngs 1 • If he has identified his object as 
an arrow-head he has discovered its 'meaning' in the sense of 
hav1ng found out to what purpose 1t was designed and what its 
creator had in m1nd when he made it. But 1t would be far-fetched 
to call the arrow-head (which we assume has no inscription) a 
'symbol' of those past purposes and aspirations. It was not made 
to convey these thoughts and feelings to anybody; it was not made 
79) So also W.P. Alston, 
N.Y., 1964, p.56. 
Philosophy of Language, Englewood Cliff~ 
80) See also R. Gruner, 'Understanding in the Social Sc1ences 
and History', Inquiry, Vol. 10, 1967, pp, 154/55. 
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to convey meaning at all. 
But there are historical data of symbolic character and 
these have meaning ln the proper sense of the word. As far as 
usefulness as historical evidence is concerned they may be the more 
important ones. This, however, does not justify our declaring 
·~ all data symbolic or meaningful. It only justifies us dividlng 
I 
the data used by historians as evidence for past events or things 
into two broad categories, symbollc and non-symbolic {whereby we 
should, however, not forget that every symbolic datum also has 
a non-symbolic aspect, but not vice versa). Both have to be 
interpreted to become evidence, and this is why interpretation 
cannot be the same as the discovery of meaning. 
Interpretatlon {whether of symbolic or of non-symbolic 
data) is only possible on the basis of previous knowledge and 
prevlous assumptions. 81 ) The first point to be made here lS the 
very general one that a historian must be able to distinguish 
between present data that originate from the past and those that 
do not. He must have some criteria by means of which he can 
distingulsh 'old' from 1 new 1 and these are derived from knowledge 
as to what tralts are shown by obJects when they date from the 
past. Quite apart from the specific historical knowledge which 
usually enters already at this stage we have a rough idea in what 
ways objects of a certain klnd change their appearance with age, 
and tnis is why we can exclude a large amount of presently 
avallable data at first sight without engaglng ln any process of 
81) So also Collingwood,~~ ••• , PP• 247/48. 
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reasoning. 
But know1ng that something is old and may, therefore, 
be considered as evidence for the past is not enough. The 
historian is only interested 1n the human past, and if he finds 
that the datum, although old, has been completPJy unaffected 
by man he will likewise exclude it as evidence. A stone may be 
very old 1ndeed but if its colour and shape and the marks on its 
surface are due to w1nd and weather alone it cannot be regarded 
as historical evidence. Therefore, a datum has to be identif1ed 
as something connected with the activit1es of human beings of 
the past, and, as we have emphasized before, for this, too, 
general presuppositions are essent1al. 
If a datum has been positively identified in these two 
respects the historian knows that 1t is evidence for something. 
But he st1ll does not know what 1t 1s evidence for, and in order 
to find this out he will have to find out first how old it is. 
The datum has to be assigned a place in a chronological series, 
and s1nce chronology, at least in history, is basically a question 
of before and after, this is in effect a process of comparison. 82 ) 
Fix1ng the date of an object is comparing it temporally with 
other obJects or with known facts. Dat1ng, therefore, is 
only possible 1f we possess previous historical knowledge, 
knowledge of individual as well as general historical facts. If 
a h1storian 1s confronted with a medieval charter wr1tten in 
French he will date it after A.D. 1200 (and if the charter itself 
82) Bloch, The H1storian's Craft, p.llO. 
purports to be of an earlier date he will declare ~t a forgery) 
because he relies on a historical generalization tall charters 
~n French were written after 1200' which ~n turn is based on 
~nduction in that so far no charters in French have been found 
which date from before 1200 (to be exact, from before 120h). So 
the historian sees whether the features of the datum conform to or 
contradict the general circumstances of the period concerned83 ) 
and his knowledge of these general circumstances is derived by 
induction. This induction, however, ga~ns ~ts force only from the 
assumption that ~n a society of a certain type there preva~ls a 
similarity of custom which is too strong to permit anybody to 
deviate from it. The question is then in how far this 
assumpt~on is justified and where and when we should fix the 
points where the force of such custom becomes irresistible or 
ceases to be irresistible. To this there is no clear-cut answer 
and this means that the generalizations cannot be held as laws 
wh±h do not allow of exceptions. A charter written in French but 
dated 1180 need not be a forgery after a11. 84 ) A text may be 
older than Gutenberg although it is printed with movable types. 
As these examples show, the generalizations involved vary in 
respect to the degree of their reliability. It is less likely 
that someone was printing with movable types before Gutenberg 
than it ~s that someone wrote a charter in French before 1200. 
83) 
84) 
Kraft, Dle Grundformen ... , p.263. 
Bloch, The Historian's Craft, pp.ll3-121, from whom this 
example is taken, comes to the same conclusion. For a 
similar example see J.R. Strayer,(Ed.), ~Interpretation of 
History, Pr~nceton, 1943, p.15. '}~~~~~uc~~~~~' J.R. S~ray~ 
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The decision of whether ~n any given borderline case the 
general~zation should be upheld can only be made by teking other 
factors into account, i.e. in the light of coherence or congruence 
with the rest of our knowledge. If the French charter purport~ng 
to date from 1180 is written in a style pecul~ar to the 
thirteenth but not to the twelfth century then another 
generalization comes into play and we decide the case accordingly. 
When all the factors (e.g. language, style, writing material, 
ink, etc.) point in the same direction the decision is not 
d~fficult although even then a ~t element of doubt will remain. 
Many of these generalizations are based not only on the 
assumption of the invariability of custom within a certain society 
but nn the wider assumption of the basic invariability of human 
nature, an assumption which permits us to construe the behaviour 
of men of the past in analogy with our own behav~our. This holds 
not only in respect to establishing the date or genuineness of a 
datum but also in respect to interpretation in general. If a 
building is excavatPd with very large rooms we sha~l probably 
identify it as a house used for communal or religious purposes 
on the assumpt~on that nobody is so irrat~onal to waste space 
and energy for nothing. 8 5) In general, we can say that no 
interpretation of historical data is possible without this 
assumption of the fundamental similarity of human nature. 86 ) 
85) 
86) 
This example is taken from Q. Gibson, 
Enqudry, 2nd~ impr., London, 1963. 
The Logic £! Social 
So also L. Gottschalk, 'The Historian's Use of Generalization: 
L.D. White (Ed.), The State of the Social Sciences, Chicago, ' 
-- ---1956, p.445, and F.A. von Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of 
Science, Glencoe, Ill., 1952, pp. 7E?9. Bernheim, Lehrbuch ••• , 
p.5J4, mentions this assumption only in connexion with the 
interpretation of written sources. 
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This becomes still clearer where we deal with the 
interpretation of symbols (symbols in the sense indicated before). 
The basic presupposition here is that we are sufficiently like the 
men of the past to understand the meanings they have attached to 
certain signs. If a historian meets with a written text he wishes 
to interpret h~s immediate task is to subsume ~t under two general 
systems of rules and correlations, the system of script and the 
system of language. These systems must be given first before any 
~nterpretat~on can take place {and in cases where they are not 
given their establishment is usually allocated to another 
discipline, e.g. to philology or linguistics). 8 7) 
However, even if script and language are known th~s ~s 
not yet a full guarantee of right understanding. We also have to 
take into account the vagueness, ambiguity and shift of meaning of 
individual words as well as of whole phrases. Intent~onally or 
unintent~onally, men do not always express themselves clearly, and 
they also 'fail to change their vocabulary every time they change 
their customs• 88 ) so that even fairly well-known words, such as 
'beneficium' or 'biv~tas' may refer to quite d~fferent th1ngs at 
d1fferent times. 8 9) To establish the exact meaning historians 
will have to take into account the context and the situation in 
87) So also Kraft, D1e Grundformen ... , p.260. 
88) Bloch, The Historian's Craft, p.J4. 
89) lbid., p.J4, and E.M. Hulme, History and 1ts Neighbours, 
London .•. , 1942,p.70; see also Dovr~ng, History .•. , p.15, 
and Berheim, Lehrbuch ... , pp.5J8/J9. 
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which the word or phrase was used and also the way in which it 
was understood by the contemporary public to whom it was addressed. 
Comparison is again all-important here, be it the comparison of 
the text in question Wlth other textq of the same or similar 
klnd and content, be it the comparison with texts of a different 
klnd but written by the same author or by one of his 
contemporaries. 90 ) In the end, the crlterion of whether a word 
or phrase has been understood or construed correctly can only 
consist once more in congruence or coherence, i.e. in whether our 
interpretation fits ln with the rest of our knowledge, whether, 
ln the light of all we know, it 'makes sense'. 
As pointed out before, knowledge and presuppositions 
applied ln historical research are sometimes modlfled in the light 
of this research. This is especially true in respect to 
historical lnterpretation. In order to gain knowledge of facts a 
historian must lnterpret data but if he wants to interpret data 
he must have knowledge of facts 7
91 ) and the facts may be the same 
90) Gomperz, Interpretation, pp. 67, 76 - 78 - Gomperz (p.6J) also -
directs attention to the fact that in the interpretation of 
written evidence something must be taken for granted at some 
point if an lnflnite regress is to be avoided. The 
lnterpretation of a certain passage in a text is based on 
certain other passages (in the same or in different texts). 
91) 
But each of these needs interpretation itself which in turn 
is based on comparison wlth further passages and further 
texts, etc. At some polnt we have to stop and have to accept 
an interpretation on its own merlts, i.e. on the basis of 
'intultlon'. The slmllarlty to the process of explanatlon is 
here obvious. 
Ibid., p.6. 
----------
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in both cases. Expressed differently, historical 2nterpretation 
presupposes previous knowledge of facts (historical and non-
historical, individual and general), but the result of the 
interpretat2ve activity may change the quantity and quality of 
this knowledge. This is most obvious j_n the case of written 
ev2dence. In order to be sure that one has understood a text it 
would ideally be necessary to know everything about the per2od in 
question, including the Zeitgeist92 ) and the Geist of the author~J) 
However, the text is itself an expression of this general and 
individual 'spirit', and in order to know both completely one 
would have to know the meaning of the text. 
There is no way out of th2s difficulty and all a 
historian can do is to bring his knowledge of the times and the 
author to bear upon the interpretation of the text even if this 
knowledge is corrected or supplemented afterwards in the light of 
JUst this interpretation. Such situations are not confined to 
history but can be found in many branches of knowledge. A 
physic2st 'seeks to infer general laws of nature by instruments 
themselves subject to these laws. For measuring heat, a fluid 
like quicksilver is chosen as a standard, and it is cla2med that 
2t expands evenly with increasing warmth. Yet how can such an 
assertion be made without knowledge of the laws of thermodynamics? 
And again, how can these laws be known except by me~surements in 
v 
92) 
93) 
L. Gottschalk, Understanding History, New York, 1950,p.27. 
R.Aron, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 
2nd. impr., London, 1961, p.28. 
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which a fluid, e.g. quicksilver, is used as a standard?' In short, 
the clrcle is here as unavoidable as it is in history in that 
'every instrument as every document participates in the structure 
which it is meant to revealt,94 ) 
5. Remains and Records 
Historical evidence has been classified in various ways 
the baslc distinction being usually that between records and 
remains. The crlterlon of this distinction is, however, often not 
as clear as it should be so that one does not know whether it 
conssts in the feature of possessing symbolic or non-symbolic 
character or ln the feature of being used for inference of one kind 
lnstead of another. Here, the latter criterion will be used; 
l.e. we adopt a pragmatic concept of remains and records such that 
if there is a text containing a statement I?. which asserts a fact E 
and .P. is used as evidence for E we shall say that E (or the text of 
which 
.P. is a part) is used as a record while in all other cases of 
inference it is used as remains. This implies that all data of 
non-symbolic character as well as symbolic data which contain no 
factual assertions can only be used as remains whereas symbolic 
data which do contain factual assertions may be used either as 
remains or as records, depending on the interest of the person 
who uses them. 95 ) 
94) 
95) 
E. Wind, 
Sclence', 
Hlstory. 
'Some Points of Contact between History and Natural 
R.Kllbansky & H.J. Paton (Eds.),Philosophy and 
Essays Presented to Ernst Cassirer, New York, 1963, 
p.257. This dependence on interest has also been emphasized by 
Bernheim, Lehrbuch •••• , p. 232; Johnson1 The Historian •••• , p .17; 
and Dovrlng, History •••• , p.32. 
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To make this somewhat clearer, let us first point out 
the obv~ous, namely that in the case of artefacts without 
inscriptions (we speak of inscriptions here because the symbols in 
question are usually symbols of language) an interpretat~on of 
symbols is neither necesoary nor possible. Consequently, the 
question of whether the assertion of a fact E is evidence for E 
does not arise, simply because there is no such assertion. Similar 
considerations hold in cases where there is an inscription but 
one in which no fact is asserted, i.e. where language is used 
exclusively in one of its non-informative functions (moral 
exhortation, relig~ous praise, aesthetic contemplation, etc.). 
Since no facts are asserted, such data can also only be used as 
rema~ns, but they can be used as remains in two ways, one in which 
the interpretation of symbols is not necessary (one may infer 
something fr~m such a text about the manufacture of parchment in 
the M~ddle Ages) and one in which ~t ~s necessary (one may 1nfer 
something about the relig~ous attitudes prevalent in med~eval 
times). F~nally, there are data which bear inscriptions of an 
~nformative nature, i.e. in which it is asserted that something is 
or was the case, and these can be used in all three ways, not only 
as rema~ns ~n the two respects ind~cated but also as records, as 
ev~dence for the fact or facts asserted in them. 
If a historian is confronted with a document of this 
character he can, first of all, draw conclusions from it w~thout 
having a clue as to the meaning of its contents (as, for instance, 
~n respect to medieval writing materials), and this means using 
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the document as rema1ns. But he also can use it as remains in a 
way wh1ch presupposes the understand1ng of the text concerned. 
He may read a charter and note 1ts formal characteristics in order 
to draw conclusions as to the bureaucratic pract1ces engaged in by 
certain scribes or chancelleries; or he may read an ambassador's 
report and note what was included 1n it and what was left out, 
which persons were praised and which were crit1cized, etc., in 
order to make certain 1nferences as to the ambassador's 
capabilities, prejudices, etc. 
All the cases ment1oned so far have in common that the 
symbol1c or non-symbolic features of a datum are used as evidence 
for or against facts which are not themselves aff1rmed or denied 
in or by the datum. From the fact that an interpreted datum has 
a certain feature another fact lS inferred. 96 ) In short, it is 
1mmaterial here whether an assert1on contained 1n a datum (if 
there is any assert1on at all) is true or false. The truth or 
96) This may only be the fact that somebody committed a forgery. 
Or it may be the fact that a datum of this kind has a certain 
feature. A historian may ask 'what were Robert Curthose's 
charters like?' (this example is taken from V.K. Dibble, 
'Four Types of Inference from Documents to Events', 
History and Theory, Vol. 3, 1963/64 , p.213), and all he has 
to do is to look at and read one or more of these charters. 
The 1nference involved here runs on the following lines: 
'This 1s one of Robert's charters; it has features f, ~' h; 
therefore, Robert's charters have features f, ~' h'. Stated 
in this form the reasoning is inductive (from a sample to 
the whole population) but if all of Robert's charters had 
been preserved and if all of them were examined it would not 
be inductive (unless we want to speak here of 'perfect 
induction•). But then we might prefer not to speak of 
inference at all but only of a summary restatement of 
individual observat1ons. 
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falsity of a statement recorded ~n a text does not affect the use 
as evidence, and this in our terminology means that the datum ~s 
used as remains and not as a record. Or, ~n other words, if a 
historian is ~nterested in whether any or all of the statements 
made in a text are true or false (or in how far and Jn what 
respects they may be JUdged as true or false) he uses the text as 
a record. If he ~s not so interested he uses it as remains. 
If a datum ~s used as a record, i.e. as evidence for 
what ~s affirmed or denied in it, the quest~on arises of how one 
can decide as to the truth or falsity of the recorded assertion, 
and this is where the whole apparatus of internal criticism comes 
into play. But there are also cases where no such decision need 
be made and where we take the text or document in question at its 
face value because the fact that the assertion has been made 
entails the truth of the assertion. This happens when the 
record~ng of an action ~s ~dentical with performing it, and in 
analogy with 'performative utterances' we can speak here of 
'performative evidence' or 'performative records'. If a charter 
grants a certain right it asserts in effect 'herewith ! grants 
right ! to Z' and (provided the charter is not a forgery and bears 
all the seals and signatures which make it legally effective) 
the action of granting the right has been performed by recording 
or reporting its performance (no matter whether the right granted 
was actually taken up or whether it was revoked a short time 
later), in the same way in which 'I now pronounce you man and 
wlfet in a marriage ceremony simultaneously performs and reports 
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the action. Other examples from history are a declaration of war 
-
(whether fighting broke out or not, the war was declared) or an 
-
order g~ven by a commanding officer in a battle ('I order the 
reg~ment to attack on the left wing at 6 a.m. sharp'; the fact 
that the regiment might not have received the order or might have 
been unable or unwilling to carry it out does not affect the fact 
that the order was given). An ordinary record only reports that 
an action E was performed, and so the question arises as to 
whether the report is true, i.e. whether~ really was performed. 
But a performative record not only reports E but by reporting ~t 
E ~s or was performed, and the question of whether the report is 
true, i.e. whether E really was performed, does not arise. 97 ) 
Th~s is why performative records are less troublesome and make a 
lot of critical analysis unnecessary. The~r disadvantage, however, 
~s not only that they are relatively rare but that in the nature 
of th~ngs for many interesting historical facts they do not and 
cannot exist. After all, we are probably keener to know whether 
"'( 
a certain waf was fought and how it was fought than to know 
whether it was declared. In the following, therefore, 
performative evidence will be ignored. 
Our thesis was that data of a symbolic nature can be 
used as remains or as records and that in the former case a 
statement £ made ~n a text is not regarded as evidence for the fact 
97) It seems that the only wr1ter who has clearly recogn~zed th1s 
d~st~nction between performative and non-performative evidence 
is W~gmore, ~Science ••. , p. 988 (the 'status as~ 
gestae, i.e., a law in the or~g~nal record, is by autoptic 
proference its own evidence of its enactment'). Bernhe1m, 
Lehrbuch ... , pp.495/96, only impl1es 1t. 
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asserted in £ while in the latter case it is so regarded. Now, 
Collingwood has criticized historians who proceed in the latter 
way and inquire whether a recorded statement is true or false. 
According to him, the question should not be 'true or false?t but 
1 what does 1t mean?' 1n the sense of 'what light 1s thrown on the 
subject 1n wh1ch I am lnterested by the fact that this person made 
thls statement, meaning by it what he d1d mean? 1 • A h1storian 
should treat recorded statements not as statements but as evidence, 
'not as true or false accounts of the facts of which they profess 
to be accounts, but as other facts which, if he knows the right 
questions to ask about them, may throw l1ght on those facts'. 98 ) 
This, to be clear about it, does not only amount to the demand 
that a h1stor1an should never take the truth of a recorded 
statement for granted but should always apply his critical tools 
1n order to find out whether and 1n how far 1t is true. It lS the 
much more extreme demand that he should not be lnterested in the 
question of truth or falsity at all. In our terminology, it 1s 
the demand never to use a datum as a record but always to use it as 
remains. 
Is such ascet1c1sm poss1ble and, 1f so, 1s 1t JUStlf1ed? 
As a matter of fact, lt lS not possible. If a historian is 
1nterested 1n the quest1on of whether a certa1n event E happened 
and he f1nds 1n a document a statement£ to the effect that it d1d 
happen, he w1ll naturally ask whether £ 1s true and how the 
author of the document could have known that 1t was true. No 
98) Coll1ngwood, The Idea ••• , p.275; see also p.260. 
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philosopher in the world wlll prevent him from doing so. True, 
he should not accept E at its face value by simply saying 'in 
thls document it is asserted that ~happened; therefore ~ did 
happen' but should criticize his text, compare it with other 
evidence, etc. This may sometimes be difficult and he may not 
always be successful in separating chaff from wheat, in 
recognizing what is bias and what is fact in a given text, but 
however this may be, what he cannot do is to ignore the question 
of E's truth or falsity, especially if E is just the statement he 
lS himself interested ln, i.e. if E coincides with his own 
assumptlon as to what happened. 
But even if it were possible to ignore the question of 
p's truth, what would be gained by it? Would history be more 
'crltlcal', more soundly based on evidence, more successful in 
f1nding out about the past? It is dlfficult to see why it should 
be and why the questlon 'is this recorded statement true? 1 should 
do any harm. A one-s1ded reliance on one type of evldence is 
indeed harmful, and if Colllngwood's thesls had been only to the 
effect that historlans often rely too much on what could be 
called 'dlrect' and too little on 'indlrectt or circumstantial 
evldence we could agree to it~ (in fact, we shall argue 
ourselves in favour of such a thesis). But this would not amount 
to a proscrlptlon of the use of direct evldence altogether as 
Collingwood has proscribed 1t. 100 ) 
100) There 1s the further polnt that in certain special1zed 
h 1 stor1 es (e.g. the history of philosoph~ or the ~istory of 
sclence) the historian has a legitlmate lnterest ln whether 
(or in how far) statements made in the past are true or 
have turned out to be oonfirmed. 
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6. The Reliability of Witnesses 
To whatever conclusion one may come as to whether a 
recorded statement £ should be used as evidence for the fact 
expressed in£, it is at least certain that if £ lS used 1n this 
way, lt should be done with all possible care. Hlstorians are 
very much aware of thls, and large parts of thelr methodological 
handbooks are devoted to the technlcal problems which arise in 
th1s context. 
When we are confronted with such a statement and have 
done the necessary lnterpretative work (l.e. have found that the 
document in quest1on lS not a forgery, have understood its 
contents and have made sure that the statement lS and was meant 
to be a factual statement101 )), we ask whether what lS asserted 
is true or false. As lt is usually understood, th1s amounts to 
the questlon whether the author of the statement (the 'witness' 
or '1nformant') can be trusted, whether and in how far he is 
reliable. But there are two concepts of reliability which are 
relevant here. (1) An author A is reliable if other statements 
made by A and relating to the same domain have turned out to be 
true, and (2) A is reliable if (a) he had the means and 
competence to report correctly (e.g. if he was an eye-witness 
and a tralned observer) as well as (b) the intention, and the 
ablllty to follow hls intentlon, to do so (e.g. if he was free 
101) Gomperz, Interpretation, p.J2, rightly points out that the 
d1fference between what lS fact and what is i~rpretation 
in a source is not given but has to be established by 
histo~lcal criticism. 
lQ:g) He:re \and fa:rtly also in the ~ollowin.g) we are inde)ted to 
Giedylrdn. !~$liability ••• 1 , passim. 
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from bias). 102 ) Both concepts are applied simultaneously ~n 
judg~ng the truth or falsity (and th~s means here no more than the 
amount of probability) of the statement in question. 
As far as reliab1lity in the first sense is concerned 
~t depends on the contingent fact of whether any other comparable 
~ 
statement made by! are known and, if so, whether we have some 
~dea about their truth or falsity. If none are known at all, then 
reliab~lity ~n this sense cannot be judged. If some are known, 
then the question arises how do we know that they are true, and if 
we remain w~thin the circle of A's reliability we shall have to 
apply the same criteria again which leads us into an inf~nite 
regress. In other words, at some point or other we shall have to 
leave this circle and have to look for other evidence independent 
of A and his statement or statements. 
As for reliability in the second sense, let us assume 
that there is no evidence available for the fact in question apart 
from A's statement. In that case, it has been said, we must rely 
on the plausibility an~onsistency of the whole of A's account. 
But this presupposes that only one account can be plaus~ble and 
harmonious, and in order to be sure about that we would have to 
examine all other poss~bil~t~es and exclude them as implausible and 
disharmon~ous, an ~mposs~ble task. 104 ) However, we are not 
completely dependent on this criterion of inner plausibility. As 
far as point (a) (means and competence) ~s concerned, we may know 
104) So also Johnson, The H1stor~an ... , p. 146. 
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on the basls of other and 1ndependent evldence that ! was a good 
observer and was on the spot when the event in question took place. 
But apart from the fact that here again the question arises as to 
the reliabillty of those independent reports, thls is only of any 
help if we assume that ! did not lie or distort the truth, be it 
lntentionally or unintentionally, and so we are led to aspect 
(b), A 1 s objectivity. Here, if we do not want to fall back on 
reliabillty in sense (1) ('A was unbiased when he gave other 
reports; therefore, he lS unbiased ln this one'), we have to make 
two assumptions in order to get an~vhere, namely (I) that nobody 
misrepresents the facts he knows without cause or reason,l05) and 
(II) that lf we cannot detect such cause or reason there was none 
and we can conclude that A was free from b1as. These are large 
assumpt1ons, and even if we take (I) for granted, in respect to 
(II) there ar1ses not only the problem of whether we can ever be 
sure that we would know such reasons if they had been present, but 
also what is to count as possible reasons which induce people to 
g1ve biased reports. To this there is no clear-cut answer, and we 
have to rely on our own feeling and exper1ence, whlch is 
necessarily limlted and so can only provide a shaky foundation. 
The historlan is here in a posltion slmilar to that of 
judge and jury in a court of law who also ask themselves whether a 
witness could possibly have an interest in distortlng the truth or 
mlght be prejudiced ln this or that direction. In court, however, 
105) lb1d., pp.l42/4J, who here follows Bernheim, 
--------
Lehrbuch ••• , 
pp.48J/84. 
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it is possible to put questions to the witness such that his 
answers are llkely to reveal any existing bias, a way which is not 
open to the historian. Even so, a court does notmly on this 
remedy alone but, where possible, calls a second one to its help, 
the examination of other witnA~SPS with dlfferent characters and 
different backgrounds. The analogous procedure in history would 
be to use evidence provided by other authors ln which the same 
fact lS reported, but this presupposes that there is such evidence. 
In short, our result for reliabillty ln sense (2) is the 
same as it was for reliabillty in sense (1), namely that the 
historian is ln a rather hopeless position if he is forced to 
~ 
rely on one piece of testimony alone. If the event in question is 
not reported by anybody else, there is hardly justificatlon for 
comlng to a firm decision as to whether it did or did not take 
placel05a) (although the likelihood that it took place is greater 
when it lS reported by one person than ln cases where it is 
reported by nobody at all), unless, that ls, we have other, 
Clrcumstantial evidence which makes lts occurrence probable, 
evidence which lS not used as reoord but as remains. 
The reason why we think that a fact is more certain if 
lt lS reported by more than one author lS obvious. As aheady 
pointed out by Bradley (although in a somewhat different context), 
the coexistence of the same observation with every variety of 
standpolnt is a cruclal factor for judging the reliability of the 
105a) Bernhelm comes to the same conclus1on (lbid., p.486). 
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b t . 106) . 1 . h. o serva ~on. As ~n aw, so ~n ~story, we think that ~f one 
and the same event or thing is observed and reported by different 
people with different competence and different prejudices, it is 
much more likely that the event did take place or that the th~ng 
d~d ex~st than in cases where it is observed and reported by one 
~ndividual only or by several indiv~duals who all share the same 
abilit~es and outlook.l07) 
However, not all statements reporting facts or~g~nate 
from s~ngle and individual authors. Many reports are made 
anonymously ~n that groups of people, e.g. the servants of an 
institution, are responsible for them. They are the result of what 
has been called 'social book-keep~ng'lOS) and not the testimony 
of indiv~dual witnesses. Parliamentary debates, bank books, tax 
returns, court records, etc. fall under tnis heading, and 1n cases 
such as these many ind1viduals participate in drawing up the 
report. They are, therefore, more trustworthy than cases in which 
one s~ngle individual has recorded a fact 109 ) and the~r value is 
somewhat comparable to the value of a whole set of statements made -
106) Bradley, 'The Presuppositions .. ·', p.59. 
107) Giedymin, 'Reliab~l~ty ••• •, p.291, po~nts out that the 
differences in the mental make-up of the appraising 
historians play a role as well. If scholars of the most 
different backgrounds and outlooks arrive at the same 
conclus~on as to whether a reported event did in fact occur, 
then the l1kelihood of its occurrence is much greater than in 
a case where only one historian or a group of l~ke-minded 
histor~ans comes to th~s conclusion. 
108) D~bble, 'Four Types .... ', p.206, from whom the examples below 
are taken. 
109) So also Johnson, The H~stor~an ••. , p.249. 
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by different individuals of different abilitles and different 
110) backgrounds. 
Another distlnction which is relevant here lS that 
between records intended for the public (the public of the day or 
the public of posterity) and those intended for private and 
confidential use.lll) Historlans have come to rely more and more 
on the ~ter, on 'evidence of Wltnesses in spite of themselves', 
and they prlck up their ears far more eagerly when they are 
permltted to overhear what was never intended to be overheard. 112 ) 
Agaln, the reasons are obvious. We assume that men are more 
inclined to be frank, and less inclined to put things in a 
favourable light, in their private and confldential transactions 
than ln those that are destlned to come to the attentlon of many 
people. We only need to compare the report ln a newspaper or in 
the memoirs of a general on some milltary campaign wlth an 
internal military report marked 'top secret' on the same matter, in 
order to see the polnt. 
110) Two provlsos must be entered here: (1) Many lnstltUtlons 
develop a certain esprrt de corps or self-interest, and this 
may affect the reliabil1ty of the records of those facts 
which relate to the recordlng lnstitution ltself. (2) The 
above only holds within the limits of certain presuppositlons. 
No matter how many people of how many different backgrounds 
report on the existence of the devll, we shall not even 
stop to conslder truth or reliabllity. See also Bradley, 
'The Presuppositlons .•. ', p.59, and Hulme, History ••. , p.72. 
(But if circumstantial evidence points in the same direction 
it may be a different matter). 
111) Thls dlstinctlon is made by Bloch, The Hlstorian's Craft, 
pp. 60 ff, and by Renier, History, p.98. 
112) Bloch, The Historian's Craft, p.6J. 
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If these two features, the feature of be1ng part of 
1 soc1al book-keeping' and the feature of be~ng of private and 
confidential nature, are combined, we get the best we can ever 
expect as far as the reliability of recorded statements is 
concerned. But even then it is not advisable to rely on those 
reports exclusively, i.e. to use only statements asserting a 
fact E as evidence for E. If possible (and it is usually 
possible) we also should rely, and perhaps primar~ly so, on 
evidence of a different sort, on 'indirect' or c~rcumstantial 
evidence. 
7. Circumstant~al Evidence 
It 1s a well-known fact that many people are not very 
dependable when ~t comes to observing things or events which 
exist or take place in their presence. Not only do they go 
through the world without noticing half of what goes on around 
them, but what they do notice often bears little resemblance 
to what actually is the case. And later on, when it is a 
quest1on of remembering what has been noticed and of putting 
those memor~es into words, there arise further occasions for 
~ncorrectness and distortion. As we have seen)the number and 
var1ety of different w~tnesses of the same event is certainly 
of some help but then it is not unusual for their reports to 
contradict each other. Even where a relat~vely short and simple 
occurrence ~s concerned, such as a motor accident, the 
observations of one witness may be incompatible with those of 
another. on the other hand, if every witness reports exactly 
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the same there arises the question of whether they are not 
perhaps in collus~on with each other113 ) or are subject to some 
invalidating common experience, such as mass hysteria, 114 ) and 
how far this may be the case. 
It is, therefore, preferable if we can establish .for 
ourselves what must have been the case, without depend~ng (or 
without depend~ng solely) on what other people tell us. When 
many details which are independent of the fa1l~ngs of man point 
1n the same d~rection so that their presence suggests or perm~ts 
only one explanat1on, namely that such and such must have 
happened or existed, then we can be fairly sure that th~s is what 
really happened or existed. To use the terminology of law, we 
have then relied not on 'd~rect' but on '1ndirect' or 
1 c~rcumstant1al 1 ev1dence. 
113) Ibid., p.ll4; Wigmore, The Science •.• , p.984. 
114) There are further d1sadvantages of relying solely or mainly 
on historical w~tness•s reports, even where those are 
absolutely reliable. For instance, we may arrive at a one-
sided picture of a historical per1od because only the 
educated and literate have left records; and_Qnly the dramatic_ 
and spectacular may have been found worth reporting, ~.e. 
those events which in the eyes of the authors were unusual 
or except~onal. In short, we are dependent on the pre-
selection made for us by the w~tnesses. Also we might be 
~nclined to think that the records tell us all, while actually 
they only tell us part of what was the case. They may lead us 
to assume that something originated at the time from which the 
earl~est record dates whereas ~n fact it had started much 
earl1er. The sources may inform us that Solon or Lycurgus 
promulgated such and such laws, and so we may conclude that 
these laws came ~nto existence at that time while actually 
they may have ex~sted before and may have only been 
reaffirmed and reinforced by these men. See also A.M.Hocart 
'Evidence 1n Human H1story 1 , P• 9~., Psyche, Vol. 13, 1933 1 p. qt. 
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Now lt lS clear that all historical as well as all legal 
evldence is indirect ln the sense that neither in law nor in 
history are the events or things ln question observed directly. 
Nelther the judge nor the hlstorlan witnesses himself the facts in 
which he lS interested. Therefore, if Clrcumstc~.ntlal evidence 
means indirect evidence, then lt is opposed to direct evldence 
only in the sense of Wltness reports, not ln the sense of direct 
observation by the investigator. If ln a murder case the court 
bases its JUdgement on the deposition of one or more Wltnesses who 
saw the accused kill his Vlctim, lt relies on direct evidence. If, 
on the other hand, the declslon is made in the llght of certain 
clues, e.g. ln the light of the facts that the weapon was ln the 
accused's possession, that his handkerchlef was found on the spot 
where the murder took place and that he had a strong motive for 
seeing the victlm dead, then it relies on circumstantial evldence. 
In hlstory the posltion is the same. As our distinction between 
records and remains indicates, a historian either lnfers a fact 
E from the fact that E has been asserted in one or more 
historical texts, or he lnfers E from one or more individual 
facts (facts of present evldence and/or previously established 
hlstorlcal facts which are taken for granted) 114a) that are not 
114a) Of course, hlstorlcal facts whlch are taken for granted are 
in a sense also facts of present evidence. Nevertheless, 
there is a difference between (1) infer~ing a historical 
fact E from the presence of certain data such as 
archaeological remains or linguistic peculiarlties, and (2) 
lnferring a hlstorical fact E from other historical facts 
F, G, H (often, but not always, elementary facts like the 
existence of Napoleon or the occurrence of the Thirty Years 
War) without bothering about thelr present evidence, ln the 
belief that F, G, Hare so well establish~d that thelfeed 
not be questioned.- In fact, every historlan has to a e 
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facts of E's assertion. In the former case he uses direct, in 
the latter he uses circumstantial evidence. 
Historians have ~n the past usually preferred direct to 
circumstantial evidence. In fact, before the nineteenth century 
it was rare for circumstantial evidence to be used at all, and a 
historical work consisted almost exclus~vely of the skilful 
rearrangement of statements found in contemporary sources or ~n 
the works of later historians. Since then the emphasis has 
shifted considerably (as the means for analysing and criticizing 
recorded statements have been ref~ned enormously) but there is 
st~ll a lingering preference for d~rect evidence which is 
regarded as the 'normal' case, 115 ) and f~nding a contemporary 
text which asserts that something was the case is even today 
considered by many to be the hallmark of historical proof. But 
more and more historians as well as philosophers of history are 
t th 1 f . t t. 1 . d 116 ) com~ng o recogn~ze e va ue o c~rcums an ~a ev~ ence. 
What is, however, usually not recognized is that in any 
case the use of circumstantial ev~dence is normally unavoidable. 
For even ~f a historian bases his account exclusively on 
recorded statements, the data which const~tute his evidence must 
an enormous number of hlstorlcal facts for granted for it ~s 
lmposslble to check everything and to look up fhe evidence 
for every historical fact from which an infertence is made. 
115) So by R. Aron, 'De la verification en Histoire 1 , Revue 
Internationals de Ph~losophie, Vol. 5, 1951, p.J70. 
116) Hocart, 'Evidence ••• ', 'assim., l~ke Coll~ngwood, The Idea ••. , 
p. 276, wants historians not to rely on direct ev~dence at 
all, or to treat even recorded statements as circumstantial 
evidence, whereas Johnson, The H~storian ••• , p.49, comes to 
the conclusion that c~rcumstantial evldence is by and large 
preferable. 
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first be identified and interpreted, and this can as a rule only 
be done by reasoning from circumstantial evidence. He will 
hardly find direct evidence, i.e. he will hardly find other 
statements which inform him that the w~tness statement in question 
is not a forgery; he will hardly find testimonial evidence as to 
the authenticity of documents, 117 ) and even if he were to find it 
he would be faced with the question of whether such evidence is 
itself genuine. Similarly for the establishment of the meaning 
of h~s witness statement. He will be very lucky indeed if he 
discovers a~other statement which tells him directly how the 
statement concerned has to be construed, and if he does find one 
then the construction of this second statement itself becomes a 
problem. So sooner or later he will have to base his 
interpretation on circumstantial evidence and will have to dec~de 
on authenticity, meaning, etc. by tak~ng into account other facts 
and other evidence relevant to the period in question, in the 
manner we have already described. 
This ~s not all. In order to give a coherent and 
connected account of a subject or period a historian cannot base 
himself on recorded statements alone. In a way similar to that in 
wh~ch the blanks of present sense percept~on are filled by 
~nference118 ) the blanks in the recordings of past developments 
states of affairs have also to be filled ~n in order to arrive 
117) So also Wigmore, The Science ... , p. 983. 
118) So Hocart, 1 Evidence,,,r, p.9J, 
or 
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at a picture that makes sense. Facts are usually not recorded for 
the conven~ence of later historians so that the bare rendering of 
such records in itself constitutes a satisfactory account. Many 
records have been lost, others never existed, while st1ll others 
leave out important .item::. because the~r authors regarded them as 
not worth mention~ng. 
Th1s process of 'historical construction' or 
'~nterpolat~on• 119 ) cannot be based on fantasy and arbitrary 
invention but must be a process of rational inference if h~story 
is not to change its character. As we have seen, sometimes it ~s 
possible to interpolate a fact that 1s not recorded in one step, 
simply by apply1ng a general presuppos1t~on. (If Caesar is 
reported to be in Rome one day and ~n Gaul at a later day we 
interpolate his journey from Rome to Gaul in the bel~ef that 
nobody can reach one place from another place w~thout moving or 
travelling there). Often, however, a general assumpt~on ~s not 
suffic~ent and we have to use known indiv~dual facts so that a 
su~table ~nference can be made. For instance, the sources may 
tell us that at a certain time ~n a certain country there was an 
agrarian crisis and the large number of small landowners were 
el~m~nated by a few large ones. Other documents may inform us 
that fifty years later the class of small farmers was again 
numerous and prosperous. In between the sources are silent but no 
119) 'Interpolation' is used by Coll~ngwood, The Idea ••• , pp.239 ff 
but, as we have pointed out, he is not justified in 
regarding it as a process of 'a pr~ori imag~nation 1 • 
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historian worth his salt would just relate those two items 
without trying to fill the gap. 120 ) And he will not invent 
lntermedlate event ad hoc but he will take stock of all the 
an 
evidence and all the facts he knows about the period in question 
and will try to infer from these (.Ln conjunction with certain 
basic presupposltlons) what must have happened ln those flfty 
years. He may know that at that time the country was ruled by a 
king who was 1nvolved in constitutional struggles with the 
nobillty, i.e. Wlth the great landowners, and was finally able to 
subdue his opponents. From this he may lnfer that the king 
supported the small farmers agalnst their expropriators, took the 
121) land from the nobles and red1stributed lt amongst the poor; 
and he may do so in spite of the fact that no source exists which 
reports such a redistribution. 
It lS clear that clrcumstantlal evldence may consist in 
different items of varlous kinds. It is usually not only composed 
120) Here, incidentally, is a case where the establishment of an 
indlVldual fact and the establishment of a connexlon between 
facts amounts to the same thing. Instead of speaking of the 
filling of a gap by establishing a further fact we might 
well speak of explaining the gap or of f1ndlng the cause of 
the second event. We have then a type of historical 
explanation where the explanation consists in interpolating 
a fact so far unknown. 
121) Thls example lS adopted from M.I. Finley, 'Generalizations ln 
Ancient Hlstory', L. Gottschalk (Ed.), Generalization in the 
Writing£! History, 2nd impr., Chicago, 1964, p.JO, who---
speaks here of a process of 'extrapolation'• 'Interpolation', 
ho1vever, ls more appropriate for it expresses better the 
feature of putting something ln between (instead of 
extrapolatlng into an unknown field). 
- 176 -
of evidence in the sense we have used this term so far, i.e. of 
records and remains, but also of known historical facts which 
are taken for granted. (Therefore it would be wrong to equate 
inference from circumstantial evidence with inference from 
rema1ns). ~~d as far as it consists in evidence proper it may 
cons1st 1n whole or in part in recorded statements. We have seen 
already that a recorded statement E asserting a fact E can be 
used as remains, so that, irrespective of E's truth or falsity, 
from the fact that E was made another fact I 1s inferred. From 
the fact that an author reports that the enemy's troops 
numbered 10,000 men we can 1nfer that there was an enemy and, 
therefore, a war, whether the number of men was really 10,000 
or not. But witness statements may also be used 1n reason1ng 
from c1rcumstantial ev1dence not as remains but as records, 
namely 1n such a way that from the fact that an author x 
reports an event Ewe 1nfer f1rst the fact of E's occurrence and 
then use this fact as circumstantial ev1dence for another fact F. 
The fact that in one or more documents the enemy's number is 
given as 10,000 may be taken as sufficient evidence for the fact 
that the number was indeed 10,000, and from this 1t may be 
1nferred that in order to reach the place of a certain battle 
such and such problems of transport and supply had to be overcome. 
It is obv1ous that in such cases the reliability of inference 1s 
dependent on the reliab1lity of the w1tness reports. 
However, 1t 1s by no means inevitable that witness 
statements should come into c1rcumstant1al evidence at all. 
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Especially as far as periods are concerned for which no or very 
llttle written evidence exists it 1s posslble to arrive at facts 
w1thout havlng a Slngle witness at one's disposal. When art1cles 
made of amazonite were found ln the tombs of Ur and it was known 
that the nearest deposlts of thls mineral occur in India and near 
Lake Balkal, it was inferred that this city must have had very 
developed trade relations with dlstant countries. 122 ) 
But whether reasoning from circumstantial evidence is 
reason1ng from records or from remains or from both, this much 
lS certain: it is only possible on the strength of general 
presuppositions and assumptions, assumptions wh1ch allow us to 
connect individual facts with each other. 123) Thls holds for law 
as it holds for history. The soundness of inference depends on 
whether the indivldual facts are what they are supposed to be and 
whether the fact which is lnferred does indeed follow from them. 
If a court decides that the accused committed the crime because 
the dagger with which the victim was kllled was found in his 
possesQiQn, the question is, firstly, whether the dagger was reall* 
found in his possession (lt may have been a dlfferent dagger or 
the policeman who reported the finding may have been ly1ng) and, 
secondly, assumed that it was so found, whether th1s lS suffic1ent 
reason for conclud1ng that the deed was done by the accused. 
Whether 1t 1s sufflcient depends on the force of certa1n 
generallzatlons. Is 1t true that whoever possesses the lethal 
122) 
123) 
This example is taken from Bloch, The H1stor1an's Craft, 
- pp.SJ/54. 
So also Kraft, Dle Grundformen •.• , p.275. 
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lnstrument a short tlme after the murder was committed ls, or is 
most likely to be, the culpr1t? Saying so would be r1sky, for 
out of hand we can account in several ways for the fact of 
possession. One may flnd a dagger in the street and take lt 
home because it is a nice plece of workmanship. Or another person 
may leave it deliberately or accidentally ln one's house. In 
other words, the fact that the weapon was found in the accused's 
possession can be explalned ln several ways, and the assumption 
that he took it home with him after he had commltted the crime is 
only one of them. Consequently, no decent court would pronounce 
someone guilty on this piece of circumstantial evidence alone. 
And a sound historian, too, would suspend judgement ln an analogous 
case in history. 
The problem involved here is a problem of 'can' or 
'must': 'From such and such evidence it follows that E can have 
---
been the case' or 'from such and such evidence it follows that E 
must have been the case'. If lt is the first, then B lS possible; 
f t . th d th E ' 'bl 124 ) N t . tl l l lS e secon , en lS lmpossl e. ow, s rlc y 
speaking E lS never completely impossible. We cannot exclude 
freaks and coincidences of even the most unlikely kind. Therefore, 
what lmpossiblllty amounts to here lS only that tnere is no 
imaginable alternative, that we cannot flnd any other explanation 
to account for the presence of the fact or facts on which our 
inference is based, i.e. that we cannot think of any specific E 
124) S1m1larlibld., pp. 276/77; and Glbson, The Logic ••• , p.l85. 
-
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wh~ch could take the place of E. Or at least, ~f we can th~nk 
of such a fact it ~s, in the light of our general experience, so 
~mprobable that to all practical intents and purposes it can be 
excluded as a poss~bil~ty. In other words, the method of 
reasoning from circumstantial evidence consists ~n po~nting out 
certa1.n facts F, Q, ••• N (facts of present remains or records as 
well as known historical facts) which can only be Elausibl,r 
accounted for if a further fact E ~s assumed. 125) It is obvious 
that this type of reasoning can be found not only in history and 
in law but generally in any field where it is a question of 
ascertaining some individual fact which is not observed or 
observable by anybody. 
The method achieves its most impressive results when 
it leads to predictions (or retrodictions) which are later 
confirmed by the discovery of independent evidence. A detective 
(at least, a detective of fiction in the Sherlock Holmes style) 
may conclude that if his reconstruction of the crime (how it was 
committed, by whom, and for what reasons) is correct he will make 
a certain find in a certa~n place. He then goes, looks and finds 
what he expected to find and so has confirmed his conclusion as to 
what must have happened. In h~story~ s~milar cases arise, e.g. 
the well-known case of the German historian W. von Giesebrecht 
who in 1841 concluded on the strength of circumstantial evidence 
that certa~n chron~cles of the eleventh century must have drawn 
125) S~milar]Kraft, D~e Grundformen .•• , p.284; Hocart, 'Evidence •• ' 
p.so. 
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their ~nformation from an unknown common source, the hypothetical 
Annales Altahenses, and who went even further by constructing 
the contents of th1s document. Twenty-six years later these 
annals were discovered and their contents conformed in all 
essentials to von Giesebrechtts assumptions. Thls case is 
comparable to the discovery of the planet Neptune when from the 
fact that the orbit of the planet Uranus showed certain 
irregularities the existence of another, so far unknown planet 
was inferred, a conclusion which was confirmed by the d1scovery 
of Neptune in 1846. 
There can be no doubt that the results reached by 
1nference from circumstantial ev1dence are the more reliable 
the more facts are taken 1nto account. Wh1le a single fact may 
not be tell1ng, the cumulat1on of several facts is. If there is 
a large number of them, ~nd1cators of the most d1verse k1nds 
and from the most diverse fields, recorded statements and 
material and other rema1ns as well as well-established historical 
facts which nobody doubts any longer, and if all of them 
converge and polnt 1n the same d1rection, ~n such a way that only 
by stipulating a further fact can we plausibly account for their 
combinat1on and co-presence, while assum1ng any other fact would 
tax our credul1ty too much as far as unlikely coincidences are 
concerned, then we reach a degree of certainty which is the 
l . t . t . 12 7 ) If best we can ever expect in emp1r1ca 1nves 1ga 1ons. , on 
127) So Kraft, Die Grundformen ... , pp. 276/77. See also G1bson, 
The Log~c .•• , p.l85; and H.N. Lee, 'The Hypothetical Nature 
of Historical Knowledge', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.51, 
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the other hand, we base our 1nference only on d1rect evidence and 
rely on the trustworthiness of w1tnesses, the average likelihood 
of com1ng to a correct conclusion is much smaller. 
) 'Z..\' 
We have spoken on the 1nference of facts (or statements 
of facts) from ev1dence (and from other facts which are taken for 
grantec:Y. However, we can now also descr1be the pos1tion by saying 
that the existence of certain evidence or certain facts is 
accounted for or explained by certain statements of facts. 
'Explanation' here is, of course, different from the explanation of 
historical facts in the usual sense, as well as from the 
interpretat1on of histor1cal data, and 1s similar to the sense in 
wh1ch a scientif1c theory is said to texpla1n' certa1n data of 
observat1on or experiment. Adopt1ng this term1nology we can 
descr1be the task of h1story as bu1lding 'a body of informat1on 
wh1ch provides the most certain and simplest explanation of all 
available materialst. 128 ) In the ideal case the reason1ng follows 
the pattern '1f such and such an event took place, or if such and 
such a thing existed, then this piece or body of evidence is 
accounted fori if such and such an event or thing d1d not occur or 
ex1st, then this evidence cannot be explained'. (There is hardly 
need to point out once more that argu1ng in this way is only 
poss1ble on the strength of general presuppositions or assumptions 
w1thout which nothing can account for anyth1ng.) 129 ) As far as 
1954, pp.216, 218. Lee concludes that the more historical 
knowledge we have the more we can have because every piece may 
be used for the establishment of further facts, a point also 
made by Coll1ngwood, The Idea ••• , p.247. 
128) Re1s & Kr1steller, 'Some Remarks •••• ', p. 238. 
129) So also Lee, 'The Hypothetical Nature ••• •, p.216; and Lee, 
'Knowledge ••• ', p.67. 
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the maJor facts of history are concerned the matter 1s most 
obvious. What large amounts of ev1dence would have to be 
regarded as forger1es or m1s1nterpretations if one were to deny 
them, 130 ) and he who d1d not agree that such events as the French 
Revolution or the Crusades took place or that persons such as 
Aristotle or Napoleon existed, would have to expla1n away a huge 
b ~ d d . 131) num er Oi recor s an rema1ns. 
It has been maintained that this view of regarding facts 
as accounting for evidence is preferable to the 1 normal' view 
according to which facts are inferred from evidence, 132 ) but it 
is difficult to see why there should be any opposition or why we 
should even speak here of two d1fferent views at all. Anyone who 
infers a fact from evidence is saying, in effect, that if certain 
evidence e exists it is reasonable to assume that a certain fact 
E was the case, or - to transpose this - that if E was not the 
case then it is not reasonable to assume that one would find this 
evidence e. This is what is usually understood by the inference 
of facts from evidence. On the other hand, unless one makes 
• 
special assumpt1ons, as in the argument from silence, one cannot 
say that 1f E was the case it is reasonable to expect evidence ~' 
i.e. one cannot infer evidence from facts. But the view under 
discussion seems to hold that 'facts account for ev1dence' means 
I t.', 
130) V. Kraft, 'Intuitives Verstehen in der Geschichtswissenschaj 
M1tte1lungen des Inst1tuts fur Osterreich1sche &eschichts-
forschung, Erg.bd. 11, 1929, p.28. 
131) So also Cohen, The Meani~ ••• , p.21; and Lee, 'The 
Hypothet1cal Nature ••• •, p.218. 
132) Goldsteinp 'A Note ••• '. PP• 473/74. 
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that the evidence is somehow inferred or deduced from the facts 
or, to be more exact, from a postulate of the facts. 
The mistake involved here is the m1stake of seeing 1n 
historical events and things 'hypothetical constructs', of seeing 
in a whole historical account a 'theory' and in the historical 
past itself a 1 constructlon devlsed as the best explanat1on of the 
evidencer. 133 ) But is lt really appropriate to say that an event 
is a hypothesis whose function lt is to explain evidence, that 
historians 'construct' events~ order to explain evidence 
and that these events are not descr1pt1ons of 'real' events?134 ) 
If that were true we would expect a historian to proceed on the 
following lines: 'Here we have some evidence. Now then, let's 
see what event would fit it. This one? No, not quite. Better 
try that one. Well, that seems all right. So let's adopt it as 
a prov1sional hypothesis. As long as it fits the evidence it 
does not matter whether it really happened or not.' But no 
hlstorian reasons in this way (and it is questionable whether 
any scientist does). Rather, he is interested in a certain 
histor1cal period or problem and he looks at the data which in 
the light of his knowledge and experience may be relevant to it. 
He 1dentifies and interprets those data and comes to the 
conclusion that they are evidence for a certain fact. That is, 
he argues to himself: 'If I have interpreted correctly then this 
i33)Goldstein, 'Evldence ••• ', pp. 177, 179; s1m1lar Lee, 
'Knowledge ••• ', p.66; and Gibson, The Log1c ••• , p.l86. 
134)Goldstein, 'Evldence .•. ', pp. 181, 183. 
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s:c ·:!::I!::I'!::'I:Zi::!::t!~"t::CP~f~o=•'t:::!A:t:l:l ~dl=laa::iiz05ti:=ll:fl:e=l2:ftfle~i::::lizli:'i:. ~-'::!'i:j":li"'llt:I=:::!:I:W:t:~t:fi:Wi!IC argue on the f o 11 ow lng 
llnes: Every historian starts with the recognltlon of a problem, 
the recognitlon of something to be explained, and he does so 
because he regards previous statements or accounts as 
unsatlsfactory in one respect or another. 137) Thls problem is 
then given the form of a speclflc question, and here we have 
already the hxpothesls, an 1 1nterrogative hypothes1s 1 wh1ch, 
however, 1s eas1ly transformed lnto a hypothes1s proper, a 
'declarative hypothesis•. 1 3 8 ) The formulation of a hypothesis 
also provldes the histor1an with a criterlon of relevance in that 
he can then exclude from the start everyth1ng whlch has no 
bearlng on hls problem, which does not help h1m to answer h1s 
questlon.l39) There ls, however, always the danger that he mlght 
accommodate the facts to hls hypothesls, lnstead of the other 
140) 
way round, and th1s lS why some wrlters advocate the use of 
137) 
138) 
139) 
H.G.J. A1tken & B.J. Loewenberg, 'H1story among the Social 
Sciences: Nature and Purpose of the Report', The Soc1al 
Sciences in Historical Study, New York, 1954,---p.23; 
S.H. Brockunier, '~hods: Theory and Practice, ibid, p.131. 
S.H. Brockun1er, 'Problems of Historical Analys1s', 1b1d , 
p.93; L. Gottschalk, 1 The Historian and the Histor1ca_l __ __ 
Document', L. Gottschalk, C. Kluckhohn & R. Angell, The 
Use of Personal Documents~ H1story, Anthropology and 
Soclology, New York, 1945, p. 36; Gottschalk, Understand1ng .. , 
pp.l42, 196; Gottschalk, 1 The Hlstorian 1 s Use .•. , p.49. 
Gottschalk favours the interrogatlve form because he th1nks 
that 1t helps hlstorlans to keep an open mind. 
So, for 1nstance, Gottschalk, 1 The Historlan ... 1 , p.36; 
Gottschalk, Understanding ... , p.l43; E.W.Strong, 'The 
Mater1als of Historical Kn.ow-1-edge' , Y. H. Krikorlan (Ed. ) , 
Naturalism and the Htiman Spfrft, 2nd printing, New York,l945, 
. ri.l64. Tled to Theory ... , 
p.641. 
140) E. W:. Strong, 'Ho_w is Practice of History 
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol 46, 1949. 
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alternative hypotheses. 141 ) But whether one or more hypotheses, 
in any case the next step ~s thought to consist in testing by 
reference to evidence. 
If we want to give a more formal and s~mplified account 
of all th~s we might put ~t in the following terms (taking ~nto 
account only the establishment of facts, not the establ~shment of 
connexlons between facts with which we are not con~erned at the 
moment). A historian wants to solve a problem. He poses two 
specific alternative questions: 'Was this so or otherwise, E 
or E?t On the strength of prev~ous knowledge and generalized 
experience he is more inclined to favour one of these possibil~ties, 
say E. This, then, is h~s hypothesis which is subjected to 
test~ng but in doing so he always keeps the possibility of ~ in 
mind, i.e. by testing E he at the same time tests E. Testing, of 
course, cons~sts here in seeing whether the evidence (in 
conjunction with known histor~cal facts) confirms or disconf~rms 
E. If it confirms it, the historian cannot stop yet but must see 
whether it confirms perhaps also E, i.e. any of the many 
alternatives to E which occur to him. Only if he finds that he 
cannot ~cover any alternative which conforms equally well to the 
evidence can he rest and regard E as established (unt~l such time 
when either new evidence is discovered or someone else thinks of 
141) Brockunier, 'Methods ... 1 , p. 130; also F. Machlup, 'The 
Problem of Ver~fication in Economics', The Southern 
Econom~c Journal, Vol. 22, 1955/56, p.2~Johnson, The 
Hlstorian ... , pp. 162-166, c~tes Whewell and Venn as 
advocates of the use of alternative hypotheses but rightly 
polnts out that even ~f alternatives are formulated we are 
not prevented from bestowing parental affection on one of 
them alone, for the mind cannot pursue two lines of enquiry 
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an acceptable alternative). If the evidence does not confirm ~' 
i.e. if there is a clash between evidence_and fact, he must 
replace E by any of the possibilities of E, e.g. by!' and he 
will have to start all over again, asking 'For F?'. 
Thls or some other scheme of Slmllar neatness can 
easily be devlsed. But is lt 
hlstorians actually proceed? 
an adequate account of how t, 
More general, lS it approprlate at 
t-
all to describe the historlan 1 s activity ln terms of the testlng 
of hypotheses? Now, lt is certainly true that the lnterest of 
the hlstorian and the toplc he selects has an important 
influence on how he proceeds wlth his work. For lnstance - and 
we have pointed this out repeatedly - the conceptuallzation 
of his subject matter in terms of events, things and situations 
as well as the delimitation of these entities is dependent upon 
his interest, and his interest also plays a decisive role in 
recognizlng a datum as possible evidence for a particular fact.r~t) 
But all~ this does not mean that historians formulate and 
test hypotheses as scientists formulate and test hypotheses. 
The establishment of historlcal facts lS 'hypothetical' only 
ln two respects: (1) The results of historical enquiry are 
tentative and can be refuted in the course of further enquiry. 
at once and hence can only use one hypothesis at a time which, 
naturally, will be the one which is given priority because 
it seems to be the more plausible or probable one. 
142) If we wish we can say here with Collingwood, The Idea ••• , 
pp.280/81, that it depends on the 'question' asked whether 
something is evidence, or with Goldstein, 'Evidence •.• ', 
p.l80, that evidence becomes evldence only when a 'hypothesis' 
is formulated (although it is doubtful whether any explicit 
formulation is indeed necessary). 
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In th~s sense any single statement of historical fact as well as 
any whole historical account or reconstruction is a 'hypothesis'. 
(2) The step from evidence to fact is poss~ble only on the 
strength of certain general assumpt~ons or presuppositions. 
Consequently, statements of fact are correct only if these 
presuppositions are correct (exclud~ng now cases where their 
correctness ~sa matter of pure chance), and ~n this sense, too, 
they are 'hypotheses'. 
(1) and (2) however, do not entail that historical 
enqu~ry is also hypothet~cal ~n the further sense in wh~ch 
sc1entific enquiry can be said to be hypothetical. It is not 
hypothetical in a procedural sense, i.e. a historian does not 
normally see his task as confirming or refuting certain (general 
or individual) statements prev~ously formulated by him or by 
somebody else. True, it may happen that in the reconstruction of 
some h~storical fact on the basis of meagre evidence, in the 
course of some historical polemic or as a methodological device 
in some historical explanation historians do proceed in this 
way. 14J) But these are not their usual occupations and they can 
be regarded as except~ons to the rule. As far as the normal case 
of the establishment and support of facts on the basis of evidence 
is concerned it is difficult to find anything a historian does 
which could be called •testing of a hypothesis'. If he starts to 
-
143) Johnson, The Historian ... , p.l71, makes the point that for 
giv1ng a historical account it ~s not necessary to formulate 
hypotheses wh~le it may be necessary in cases of doubt as to 
how historical events are connected or are to be explained. 
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write a book on, say, the history of the Thirty Years War or on 
the state of France under Louis XIV, and he is asked what 
'problem' he wants to solve, what 'question' he is asking, what 
'hypothesis' he wishes to confirm or to refute, he may be at a 
loss for an answer, and the only reply he can give may be 
something like this: 'I have always been interested in that 
period, it is my speciality, and what has been written about it 
so far is a bit out of date and not quite satisfactory because ~t 
does not take such and such evidence and such and such factors 
sufficiently into account.' Where would be the hypothesis in 
such a case? Of course, one can always say that it is there, 
only hidden from view, perhaps even from the historian's own view. 
The fact that he is dissatisfied with previous accounts and thinks 
that a new account is necessary or at least useful indicates 
that he must have a hypothesis, or a number of hypotheses, as to 
what happened in the past, and writing his book amounts to 
testing or defending these hypotheses. But, we may ask, can one 
test a hypothesis without knowing what this hypothesis is or 
without being able to formulate it? It seems far-fetched to 
believe that this is possible. Formulating and testing a 
hypothesis, if these terms are to keep their usual meaning, are 
conscious processes; they presuppose that one is aware of what 
one is doing or attempting to do. Someone may be said to be 
testing a hypothesis only if he knowsthat he has a hypothesis, if 
he know.swhat this hypothesis is, and if he wants to test it. 
These conditions are usually not satisfied in the case of history, 
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and it will not do to say that whether a historian knows it or 
not, what he does is to test hypotheses. In that case, we might 
as well say that any small boy playing with his ball is testing 
Galileo 1 s laws of the free fall of bodies or Newton's theory of 
. t t. 144) grav1 a 1on. 
It is not the histor1an 1 s purpose to 1 solve problems' 
and to use evidence for the conf1rmat1on or d1sconfirmation of 
hypotheses. It is his purpose to state what was the case and to 
support h1s sta~ements as best as he can by evidence. Of course, 
one can demand (e.g. for reasons of clarity and 1ntersubJect1vity) 
that histor1ans should formulate problems and hypotheses so that 
any critic knows exactly what is at stake. But this would be a 
recommendation, not a description of what historians actually do, 
and it is d1sputable whether history would be 1mproved by 
following this adv1ce or would be able to serve the purposes it 
has served so far. 
8:M: B::F.LB:legy; B:Fld FJ:Si; 8 VCF)r geed 8B8; 
144) The case is, however, neither analogous to nor identical w1th 
the celebrated case of the use of generalizations in 
explanations of historical facts (or in the justification of 
such explanations). It does make sense to say that a 
historian bases himself on one or more generalizations when 
he gives a certain explanation, even if he is not aware of 
doing so (whether in any given case he is actually using 
a generalization is another question). For it may be 
poss1ble to show that a generalization is required as a 
presupposition because without it the ex~planation loses all 
its force. But it cannot be logically required that a 
historian must test hypotheses in order to establish facts. 
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speak of a pattern of interlocking pieces, which are fitted 
together similarly to the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle, and where 
the pieces consist of facts of evidence, and known historical 
facts. As in such a puzzle, if one piece does not fit (and we 
are really convinced that it belongs to the puzzle, i.e. that it 
is a genuine piece which cannot be left out) we have to dismantle 
the work already done and start again. All the relevant facts 
have to be accounted for but in order to accomLt for any one of 
them '\ve must not force it into the pattern by a process of 
bending, twisting and distorting. 145) 
But unlike a puzzle, the number of pieces in history is 
not fixed in advance and, what is more important, there may be 
several ways of fitting them together. 146 ) The question is again 
whether there are any criteria which allow us to decide that we 
have produced the r~ght picture or that one of two conflicting 
pictures is the better one. There is no problem as to 
falsification; any assertion of historical fact and any whole 
histor~cal reconstruction can be falsified, at least in principle, 
by the discovery of new evidence (and the position here is similar 
to the position in science although in history we usually cannot 
expose our account to falsification but have to wait for the 
145) So also H. Butterfield, ~ ~ 
p. 162; G. Ritter, 1 Scientif~c 
H~story, and Political Science', 
1960/61 p. 267; C.V. Wedgwoo~, 
1960, p.94. 
His Past, Cambridge, 19551 
Histo~y, Contemporary 
History and Theory, Vol. 1, 
Truth and Opin~on, London, 
146) The same point is made by P.R. Nowell-Sm~th, 'Are Historical 
Events Unique?', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 
N.S., Vol. 57, 1956/57, pp.l27, lJO. 
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acc1dental discovery of new evidence). But there is no 
comparable criterion as to verif1cation. It is a fact that 
very often the pieces of the puzzle can be fitted in different 
ways, i.e. that more than one reconstruction can satisfy the 
demands of consistency and coherence, and that incompatible 
accounts are consistent with the same evidence and the same 
facts. 147 ) As we have seen, what reasoning from circumstantial 
evidence in the end amounts to is an attempt to account for 
certain facts in a way to which there is no plausible 
alternative. But finding such an alternative is a question of 
the power of the imagination. It has been said that as the 
devil can cite Scripture to suit his own ends the historian 
can Clte documents to suit his. 148 ) This, no doubt, is an 
exaggeration but it does happen that one account of what took 
place or existed is incompatible with another account, but that 
both explain the evidence equally well and have the same degree 
of plausibillty (assuming now that plausibility is at least 
partially intersubjective and is not a purely subjective foible). 
Consequently, to say that the 'hypothesls which accounts best 
for all the present evidence i~ accepted as historical fact' 149) 
or that it is a questlon of finding a theory whlch explains all 
the data and to which there is no imaginable alternative,l50) is 
147) So also Goldstein, 'Evidence ... ', p.l82. 
148) J.A. Huston, 'Do Historians Seek the Truth?', Soc1al 
Studies, Vol. 44, 1953, p.260. 
149) Lee, 'The Hypothet1cal Nature ... ', p.215. 
150) Hocart, 'Ev1dence ... 1 , p.80. 
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not sufficient for supplying an adequate criterion in such a 
case. True, if the condition of accounting for all or most of 
the evidence is not met, the statement or account can be 
dism1ssed straight away.lSOa) But this condition may be 
satisfied and still the h1storian may not succeed in convincing 
us that his explanat1on of the evidence 1 ls more probable than 
any alternat1ve that has been (or can reasonably be) 
env1saged 1 ,l5l) In that case we have a stalemate and nothing 
short of future evidence can help us to come to a decision. We 
have to regard both accounts as equally good or equally bad, as 
far as the1r truth 1s concerned. 
8. Truth and Certalnty 
There was a time when histor1ans bel1eved without 
reservations in Ranke's dictum that history does no more and no 
less than~~ give an account of wie es e1gentlich gewesen. But 
when Ranke wrote these famous words it was ma1nly his purpose to 
indicate that he did not want to prove a thes1s or to support a 
philosophical doctrine. He wished to make it clear that unlike 
other contemporary wr1ters he d1d not intend to use history as 
the handmaiden of philosophy or of anything else, but Wlshed to 
study it for 1ts own sake and with the sole purpose of finding 
out what really happened and what really existed 1n the past, 
l50a) It is an overstatement to say with Nowell-Smith, 'Are 
Historical ... ', p.l)l, that a h1storlcal reconstructlon lS 
refuted if one fact is dlscovered whlch does not f1t in. 
151) Rescher & Joynt, 'Evldence: .. 1 , p.564. 
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simply because he thought that knowlng this would be valuable in 
itself. By and large, historlans stlll bel1eve in the autonomy of 
their disclpline and in the value of histor1cal knowledge in lts 
own r1ght, but they are much more sceptical in respect to the 
poss1b1lity of reallzing Ranke's programme and of ach1eving an 
unadulterated reconstruct1on of past real1ty. The establishment of 
~ ~ eigentlich gewesen has become much more problematical and 
seems much more fraught w1th d1fficulties than it dld in Ranke's 
tlmes, and it is recognized that what is regarded as the 
eigentllch depends on so many thlngs, from the accidental survlval 
of evidence to the personal 1diosyncrac1es of the scholar. 
It is, therefore, understandable that there are 
h1storians who profess, at least in their more reflectlve and 
theoretical wrltlngs, scepticism as to the possibility of mak1ng 
true statements about the historical past. What is more, the 
cons1stent den1al of this possibility has led some of them to the 
concluslon (encouraged and supported by the writings of certain 
philosophers) that the concept of truth, or at least the normal 
and everyday concept, i.e. the correspondence theory of truth, is 
not appl1cable in history at all and has to be replaced by 
somethlng else, e.g. by a theory of coherence. 
The argument here usually starts Wlth the premise that 
since the events, things or situatlons hlstorians are concerned Wlth 
are past and no longer existent, they cannot be directly observed. 
Consequently, no comparison is possible between a histor1cal 
statement and the fact asserted by it. Comparlson lS only 
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possible in respect of present facts, not in respect to past 
facts. 1 5 2 ) For we cannot go and see whether and how far our 
historical account corresponds to the facts. From th.1.s it is 
concluded t~ .1.t .1.s useless to regard a historical statement 
assert1ng a fact E as true if and only 1f E was the case. Of what 
use could .1.t be 1f it .1.s .1.mpossible to find out whether E really 
was the case, if the question 1 d1d th1s really happen?' cannot be 
answered .1.n terms of correspondence~ In short, the correspondence 
theory .1.s inappl1cable .1.n history,l53) 1.e. truth in the sense 
of correspondence with fact is unatta1nable and, therefore, 
illusory, wh1le what is atta1nable 1s truth in the sense of 
coherence. 154 ) (In fact, some authors would go so far as to hold 
that 1 d1d this really happen?' 1s a meaningless quest1on because 
we can never ascerta1n for certa.1.n that something d1d or did not 
really happen. If mean1ng is tied to verif.1.cat1on or falsification 
152) Oakeshott, Exper1ence ••• , pp.l08, 113. (There seems to be 
some incons.1.stency here in Oakeshott's account for elsewhere 
he hol& that the past 1s the present and that past facts are 
present facts. But within the general framework of hi-s 
philosophy these views can poss1bly be reconciled). 
153) So C. Blake, 'Can H1story be Objective?', P.Gardiner (Ed.)) 
Theories of History, 5th pr1nting, New York, 1964, pp.338,340. 
154) So E.J. Tapp, 'Knowing the Past', The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol 55, 1958, p.466 - Ot~s do not ;;define 
'truth' in terms of coherence but wish to replace the concept 
of truth altogether, e.g., by 1 probab1l1ty 1 or 
1 veris1m1ltude' (Gottschalk,'The H.1.stor1an .•. 1 , p.35; and 
Gottschalk, Understand1ng p.l39) or even by 1 pass1on' 
(J. Stannard, 'The Role of Categories 1n H1stor.1.cal 
Explanation', The Journal of Ph1losophy, Vol 56, 1959, 
pp. 439, 447). 
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and 1f 1n history we can never verify or fals1fy the correspondence 
of a statement w1th the fact expressed by 1t, then 1t 1s clear 
that the whole correspondence theory of truth must be meaningless 
in h1story, 1.e. must be inappl1cable to statements about the 
past.) ..K 
Coherence means here coherence with evidence and 
prev1ous knowledge, and 1f the concept of truth in history is a 
concept of coherence, then 'fact' does not mean any longer 'deta11 
of past real1ty 1 but 1 deta1l der1ved from a crit1cal exam1nat1on of 
h1stor1cal documents'. l55) Or, 1n the words of another author, 
'when the h1stor1an says, Th1s happened, that 1s always an 
abbrev1ated phrase for, The ava1lable evidence po1nts to this 
hav1ng happened' w1th the consequence that 'this happened' may be 
true although actually th1s never happened. 1 5 6 ) In other words, 
1t 1s ma1nta1ned that truth cons1sts for h1stor1ans 1 1n agreement 
with the ev1dence ••• rather than the facts',l57) or, to quote 
Oakeshott's well-known phrase, that '"what really happened" ... must .. 
be replaced by "what the evidence obliges us to bel1eve"'· A 
historical statement 1s true 1f 1t coheres w1th ev1dence; 1ts 
truth depends on the whole 'world of experience' to wh1ch 1t 
155) Gottschalk, 'Understanding ... 1 , p.l9J. 
156) F1eld, 'Some Problems ... ', p.70. (On the next page, however, 
F1eld ma1ntains, not qu1te cons1stently, that histor1ans 
have to assume a correspondence theory although their only 
criterion of truth cons1sts 1n coherence). 
157) So A.M. Maciver, 'The Character of a Historial Explanat1on 1 , 
Ar1stotelian Societ~, p.47, who, however, goes on to defend 
the correspondence eory of truth. 
Supp· Vol tl, llf~l J 
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belongs, and the decision whether it is to be regarded as true or 
false depends on whether thls world gains or loses in 
coherence. 1 5 8 ) 
In spite of the undenlable difflculties in respect to 
the ascertainm~nt of truth in history this view is open to 
serious objections. The most obvious consists in pointing out 
that, del1berately or by accident, two things are here thrown 
together which should be distinguished, namely what truth is and 
how truth is ascertalned, or, to glve it the more common 
formulation, between the meaning of 'truth' (and 'true') and the 
cr1terion (or cr1ter1a) of truth. There are powerful forces at 
work 1n present-day philosophy which make for an identificat1on 
of the two. For if the meaning of a term lS constituted by the 
criterion of its proper use of appllcation and if coherence is 
the criterlon for the proper application of 'true', then to be 
true does lndeed mean to cohere. There 1s no need here to show 
that this theory of meaning is untenable 1n general. It suffices 
to point out that lt is untenable ln respect to the concept of 
truth. For there can be no doubt that we do speak of truth and 
true statements 1n cases where we have not the slightest idea of 
how truth can be ascertained, that we know what 'truth' and 
1 true 1 mean even in cases when we do not dispose of any 
criterion for decldlng whether a given statement is true or 
false. 159 ) In fact, it 1s not self-contradictory or meaningless 
158) 
159) 
Oakeshott, Exper1ence .•. , pp. 107, 113, 114. 
So also K.R.Popper, The Open Society~ 1!2 Enemies, 4th ed. 
(rev.), Vol. 2, London, 1962, pp. 371-374. 
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to say that a statement is true or false but that nobody will 
ever know whether it 1s true or false or that nobody will ever 
have a criterion for deciding on its truth or fals1ty. 
If the concept of truth were a concept of coherence, 
truth and knowledge of truth would be ident1cal. Th1s, however, 
would lead to 1nsurmountable logical difficulties. For instance, 
1n a case where two incompat1ble statements are both equally 
coherent w1th all the evidence we would be forced to regard both 
as true. But 1ncompatibility JUst means that they cannot both be 
true, and in order to avo1d th1s contrad1tion we would e1ther 
have to say that no two 1ncompat1ble statements can be equally 
coherent with the evidence, wh1ch 1s obviously false, or we would 
have to drop the concept of 1ncompat1b1lity altogether so that 
any two statements would be compatible with each other, wh1ch is 
impossible. 
So, know1ng that or why a statement E is true is not 
the same as the truth of Ei the way in wh1ch a statement is 
1 tested 1 , 1.e. in which its truth-value 1s decided, does not 
comm1t us to any theory as to the mean1ng of 'truth' or 'true'. 
All th1s seems so obvious that it is difficult to understand how 
anybody could have thought differently. A judge or Jury is not 
content to condemn an 1nnocent man, however good the ev1dence may 
160) be on wh1ch the verd1ct 1s based. And a h1stor1an, too, 
160) Th1s example 1s taken from Maciver, 1 The Character .•. 1 , p.47. 
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{apart from those few who in their theoretical moments are 
2nclined to think otherwise) wants to ascertain what really was 
the case, not 'what the evidence obl2ges him to believe'. He 
does not regard 1 ~ happened' as true if E dld not happen at all, 
and he would be very surprised if one told him that '~ happened' 
is true, whether E really happened or not, as long as the 
statement coheres w2th all the ev2dence and wlth the rest of hls 
knowledge. In other words, the concept of truth applied in 
history is the same as the concept applied in ordinary life; lt 
lS a concept of correspondence. 'E happened' lS true if E d2d 
happen; 'E eXlsted' is true lf E dld exlst. 
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the only 
way of Judglng or appralSlng the truth-value of a hlstorical 
statement conslsts ln determining whether and in how far lt 
coheres w1th ev1dence and prev1ous knowledge. Coherence, although 
not 1dent1cal with truth, is a test of truth, 161 ) whereas 
correspondence, although 1t does not furn1sh a test of truth, is 
what we mean by truth. 162 ) A h1stor1cal statement is true if what 
is asserted by 1t corresponds to past reality. It is judged to 
be true 1f 1t 1s coherent, cons1stent, congruent, compat1ble or in 
agreement {there is not much d1fference between the mean1ngs of 
these terms when used in th1s context) with the facts of evidence, 
w1th known h1stor1cal facts and w1th general presuppositions or 
assumpt1ons. '••• 1n historical think1ng we have to assume a 
161) Walsh, An Introductlon ... , p.79. 
162) Lee, 'Knowledge ... 1 , p.68. 
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correspondence theory of the nature of truth. And yet the only 
evidence or proof or test we can have of this correspondence lS 
the coherence of the Judgements with each other and with the 
available evidence.' 163) 
So it see~s that we could say now that the concept of 
truth employed in history is the normal concept of correspondence 
but that since history is concerned with the past the criterion 
of truth is coherence. This, however, might be understood to 
imply that in knowledge of the present the criterion of coherence 
is redundant and that here we can compare statements dlrectly 
with the facts they are about. But this lS too sweeping an 
assertion and, therefore, false. For, f1rst of all, as we have 
seen in another context, very often in empirical knowledge of the 
present, too, no such comparison is posslble. A physicist making 
a statement about elementary particles cannot 'compare' 1t w1th 
the fact expressed by it. An astronomer who speaks about the 
chem1cal constitution of dlstant stars cannot go and see whether 
what he says corresponds to reality. Secondly, and thls we have 
also pointed out already, almost all statements about the 
present 1nvolve knowledge of the past and, therefore, criteria of 
truth in respect to statements about the past. Thirdly and more 
fundamentally, there is a case for say1ng that when we have 
163) Fleld, 'Some Problems ... 1 , p.71. -Lee, 'Knowledge .•. •, p.68, 
speaks in this context of 'matrix correspondence' (as 
opposed to 'picture correspondence') and does not use the 
term 'coherence'. In a sense, we can, of course, say that 
the criterion of tne truth of a historical statement consists 
in whether it 'corresponds to' (1nstead of 'coheres with') 
other statements, whereas it is true if 1t corresponds to 
the fact expressed in it. But it is questionable whether 
anyth~~g would be galned by this usa~e. 
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dlrect sense-percept1on the compar1son is not with the fact 
itself but wlth sense-data. 1 It lS ralnlng now' can be checked 
by a look out of the w1ndow and 1f what I see lS in accordance fi 
u~m 
Wlth my statement the latter lS regarded as true. But I may suf~ 
delusions or make a mlstake in my observation and ln sp1te of the 
correspondence between statement and sense-data the statement may 
not correspond to the facts. However, the terminology of sense-
data 1s rather 1n d1sfavour at the moment; so let us wa1ve this 
point. Even so, we can say, fourthly, that coherence is 
essentially lnvolved 1n knowledge of the present in that a 
statement about a present fact is regarded as true only lf lt lS 
coherent with all relevant experience. Assume I say that it is 
ra1ning now and look out of the window and see lt ralning. Assume 
further that half a minute later I look aga1n and notice that the 
pavement 1s completely dry. My first observation is then 
incoherent wlth my second one and (assumed the second to be more 
thorough and more prolonged than the flrst) I will judge now my 
previous statement to be false and will correct it: 'It dld not 
rain after all when I said lt did'. In short, the coherence 
between different observations or different memories (different 
observatlons or memories of the same or of different persons) is 
an 1mportant criterion for declding about the truth of statements 
concerning the present. 
All this indlcates that we cannot s1mply say that the 
cr1terlon of truth as far as statements about the present are 
concerned lS a criterion of correspondence whereas in respect 
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of statements about the past it is a criterion of coherence. 
Coherence somehow comes in everywhere, or almost everywhere, as a 
criter~on, not only ~n h1storical knowledge or in knowledge of 
the past, and 1t 1s more or less a myth that ~n knowledge of the 
present a d~rect comparison between statement and fact is possible. 
Coherence, moreover, is not an unfa~l1ng criter~on of 
truth. To show this, let us see in some detail what the 
relat1onsh~p ~s between truth and coherence. We know that 1t is 
not a relationship of 1dentity ~n meaning, 1.e. that ~t would be 
false to say that 'whenever a statement E is true 1t 1s coherent 
w~th ev1dence and previous knowledge, and whenever it is so 
coherent ~tis true'. If coherence 1s a criter1on of truth, one 
might th1nk that at least one of these two implicat~ons holds, 
either 'whenever E is true 1t 1s coherent' or 'whenever E is 
coherent 1t is true'. But neither 1s correct, for E may be 
incoherent but nevertheless true, and E may be coherent but 
nevertheless false. In other words, matters cannot be 
represented at all in the form of such statements of unlimited 
universality, but we have to speak in terms of likelihood of truth 
or fals1ty and of degrees of coherence or ~ncoherence. If we do 
th~s, we can say then that a statement E ~s the more likely to be 
true the more it coheres with evidence and prev~ous knowledge, and 
v1ce versa, or, alternat~vely, that E ~s the more l~kely to be 
false the more it 1s incoherent w~th evidence and previous 
knowledge, and v~ce versa. 'Coherence' is here understood to 
1 
mean no more than compat~bility, and incoherence no more than 
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lncompatibillty) 1.e. 1f two statements are coherent they can both 
be true (although they may both be false), while if they are 
lncoherent they cannot both be true (but may both be false). 163a) 
Perhaps the matter can best be clar1fled 1n the 
followlng way. On the one hand we have a statement E asserting a 
historical fact. On the other hand we have a set of statements 
a, b, c, d .•• , a set which represents a whole complex of knowledge 
constituted by statements about evidence, about individual 
histor1cal facts and about general facts. As far as coherence or 
1ncoherence lS concerned a number of different situat1ons can 
ar1se of whlch (1f we ldealize and purify) the following are perhaps 
the most typical: 
(1) E coheres completely with a, b, c, d~ .•. and there is 
no known alternatlve to E whlch shows the same degree of coherence. 
We then conclude that£ is true (or is most probably true), until 
such time as either new evidence e is discovered which is 
incompatible with £ and we decide for some reason or other in 
favour of~ against £, or an alternat1ve to £, e.g. g, is thought 
~ whlch 1s as coherent with a,b, c, d ••.• as £• 
16Ja) Th1s is not the only concept of coherence. There is a 
stronger version in which '£ is coherent with ~' b, £, d' 
does not 0nly mean that E is compatible or consistent with 
~' b, £, d, but that £ is made probable (or even certain) 
by a, b, c, d. We adopt here the weaker version for reasons 
which ;ill b;come clear shortly. (It is obvious that neither 
concept will do for a theory which attempts to define truth 
in terms of coherence. For saying that £ is made probable 
(or certain) by~' b, £, d is to say that if ~' £, £ 2 d are 
true then£ 1s probably (or certainly) also true, and the 
definition becomes circular. But it also becomes circular 
if we adopt the other version in that 'P is compatlble with 
~' b, £, d' is equlvalent to '£ and~' b, £, dlmay be true 
together• which again leaves us with ~ trutn. In fact, 
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(~) In the latter case we have the position already 
mentioned before where at least two statements, Q and ~' are 
equ~lly coherent with a, b, c, d ••• but are incoherent with each 
other, i.e. cannot both be true. Here the critenon of coherence 
would need a further criterion whlch goes beyond lt but there is 
no such criterion apart from new evidence. This compels us to 
suspend judgement until such new evidence is discovered, evidence 
but 
which is compat1ble either with Q or with q ~ not with both. 
(1) p lS lncoherent ~h a, b, c, d ••• , i.e. either Q is 
true and the conjunction of a, b, c, d ••• x lS false or vice 
versa. However, a conJunction is false lf at least one of its 
members is false so that the questlon arlses which member or 
members are the ones that clash with Q and how many members do 
so clash. Let us distinguish here just two possibilities: 
(~) p is incoherent wlth every single member of the set, or at 
least wlth a very large number of them. (One may think here of 
a statement such as 'Napoleon d1d not exist•). We then decide 
as a matter of course that Q is false, for it would be 
unreasonable to revise an enormous amount of previous knowledge 
JUSt to 1 save 1 Q• (£) Q is incoherent with very few items, or 
perhaps only with one item, say~· We then have the choice 
between~ and Qz i.e. we can either change a into a' in such a 
way that Q coheres with a' as well as with the ensuing 
conjunction of at, b, c, d, .. ~ Or we can keep~ and change Q 
1t 1s impossible to see how coherence can be defined in a way 
which does not involve reference to truth~~ 
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~nto £' such that £' is coherent with a and with the whole set 
a, b, c, ct ••• ~ Our decision will depend on many factors and 
there is no single crucial factor. It will depend, for instance, 
on what carries greater subjective convict~on, £ or ~' or what 
will happen to b, ~' and d, if we change a (it may be that there 
are ~nterconnexions and that if a is changed it becomes difficult 
to uphold some of the other ~terns; in that case the situation may 
blend into a situation of type (a)). If£ is incoherent with 
more than one item, then there is no precise number g such that 
we could say: 'If£ is incoherent with more than n items it must 
be regarded as false, whereas if it is incoherent with less than 
n items it must be regarded as true.' 
In all three cases no absolute certa~nty ~s ~nvolved. 
(But in cases (1) and (1) we can at least come to a decision, 
even if ~t is only a provisional one which holds until 'further 
notice', while in case (2) we cannot even arrive at such a 
prov~sional decision but have to suspend judgement altogether). 
Absolute certainty is not to be had ~n history, and the most we 
can expect is a high degree of probability. This, however, has 
been disputed, namely by no less a philosopher than Collingwood 
who writes that it is 'wholly untrue' because historical 
arguments can prove their 'point as conclus~vely as a 
demonstration ~n mathematics' and the historian's decision can 
'follow inevitably from the evidencet. 164 ) It seems that 
Collingwood is of this opin~on because he does not see the 
164) Coll1ngwood, The Idea ... , pp. 262, 268 (ital1cs supplied). 
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criterion of truth in coherence but believes that there is 
something else and something stronger, namely the feature of 
being the only way of accounting for evidence and known facts. 
Speaking in terms of accounting for evidence may seem at first 
s~ght just another way of speaking in terms of coherence but it is 
not quite the same. Let us see why by looking at four different 
forms of argument: 
(I) One could say that the facts expressed in 
statements a, b, c, d•··~ can only be accounted for if£ is 
assumed to be true, and th~s is what Collingwood seems to have 
;n . d 164a) ~ m~n • In other words, a, b, c, d•••x are true only if£ 
is true, or, to give the argument its complete form: 'If 
a, b, c, d•··X then E; but a, b, c, d .•• ; hence p.' Th~s 1s 
d1fferent from an argument (II) wh1ch is based on coherence for if 
we just say that a, b, c, d~ •.• are coherent with£ we can only 
argue: 'If a, b, c, d, .• ~ then£ may be true (need not be false); 
but a, b, c, d ••. ; hence£ may be true.• Here we have the weaker 
form of the two wh1ch 1s criticized by Collingwood. But 1f we 
now argue in negative terms, 1n terms of falsity and incoherence, 
then it makes no difference whether we use 'accounted fort or 
'coherent with•. We can either say (III) that a, b, c, d ..• 
cannot be accounted for if £, i.e. that a, b, c, d, •. ~ are only 
true if£ is false, wh~ch gives us: 1 If a, b, c, d ... then£ 1s 
false; but a, b, c, d, .. ~; hence E is false', or we could speak 
1n terms of coherence by saying (IV) that £ is 1ncoherent with 
l64a) I~ m1ght also be what Aron, 'De la verif~cation •.. ',p.373, 
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a, b, c, d, .. ~ wh~ch would allow the argument: 'If a, b, c, ct ••• ~ 
then E cannot be true (must be false); but a, b, c, ct ••• ~; hence 
E is false'. 
There is no difference between (III) and (IV) but there 
is a dec1s~ve difference between (I) and (II) ~n that in the first 
case ~t 1s concluded that E is true or must be true while ~n the 
second case ~t 1s only concluded that E may be true. But is the 
stronger argument the better one and can we say that the 
conclusions 1n th~s k1nd of argument are as certain as the 
conclusions of mathemat~cal arguments? This is not a problem of 
formal val~d~ty (the arguments are all valid) but a question of 
the truth of the prem~sses and of the knowledge of this truth. 
There ~s first the problem whether the second premise is true, ~.e. 
whether a, b, c, ct ••• ~ are really all true. These are empir1cal 
statements and we can never be absolutely certain (certain in the 
logico-mathemat~cal sense) about their truth. New evidence may 
prove any or all of them false. But if this is so, then we can 
never be absolutely certa~n about the truth of the conclus1on 
(and since the truth of a, b, c, d•··t is asserted ~n the premisses 
of each of the four arguments this holds for every one of them). 
However, let us waive th~s obJect~on and let us assume that we can 
be absolutely certain about the truth of the second premise. 
There st~ll remains the quest~on of the truth of the first one. 
has ~n mind when he writes that the ver~fication of a historical 
reconstruct~on cons1sts in showing, not only that it accords w~th 
the documents, but that ~t ~s the only reconstruct1on which so 
accords. 
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How can we be sure that a, b, c, ct ••• ~ are true only ~f E is true? 
The answer is, regrettable as th~s may be, that we cannot be 
completely sure about ~t. The fact that we cannot th~nk of any 
statement d~fferent from and ~ncompat~ble withE which accounts 
equally well for a, b, c, ct ••• x is no guarantee that there is no 
such statement. As we have said before, ~t depends very much on 
ingenuity and power of ~maginat~on whether one finds such a 
statement ~f there ~s one. An argument of type {II), however, ~s 
not dependent on acc~dental ~mag~nativeness. For whether 
statements are compat~ble or ~ncompatible with each other ~s a 
matter of logic. Therefore, {II), although ~tis weaker and much 
more modest, is better than {I); the conclusion that E may be true 
~s more tenable than the conclusion that £ must be true. 
We have come to this result by way of cr~t~c~sm of 
Collingwood. However, ~t m~ght be objected that we have 
misrepresented Collingwood's position. For while we talk about the 
certainty of historical conclusions he speaks about the 
conclus~veness of h~stor~cal arguments. His thesis is that there 
are deduct~ve or 'exact' sciences and induct~ve sc~ences or 
sciences of 'observation and experiment' and that h~story belongs 
to the former, not to the latter, in that historians( genuine 
historians, that is)reason deductively: 'Assum~ng that such and 
such is the case, then this must be the case too.' The 
conclus~on here follows w~th necessity from the premisses, although 
what is concluded may be false because what ~s assumed in the 
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premisses may be false. 165) 
Against this, however, several object1ons can be raised. 
One we have already mentioned when we criticized the dissolution 
of 'd1sagreements through relativizationt, 166 ) namely that 
historians normally proceed categorically and not hypothetically. 
But there is also the point that if any historian argues in this 
way he must dispose of certain laws or lawlike statements. 
Looking once more at our argument of type {I) what is asserted 
here is that if a, b, c, d, •• ~ are true then p must also be true 
and any other statement 1ncompatible with Ez e.g. ~' cannot be 
true. But such an assertion can confidently be made only on the 
strength of one or more universal statements. However, and that 
is the thesis here defended, we never have such statements at our 
disposal {and, therefore, we can never be sure that E and only E 
1s compatible with a, b, c, ct ••• x) while we do have universal 
statements on the strength of which we can assert that if 
a, b, c, d,. ·~are true, E need not be false. And this is why we 
think that Collingwood is mistaken. 
So it 1s out of the question that statements of history 
can have absolute certainty. But then this is not a feature of 
history alone but of all empirical disciplines. Nevertheless, 
there 1s a prevaUing opinion that h1storical statements are less 
certain and more subject to revision than statements of the 
165) See Coll1ngwood, The Idea •.. , pp. 253 ff•, 261 ff. 
----
166) See above, pp. 1'3~-138. 
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empirical sc1ences. 166a) Th1s, however, is a quest1onable thesis 
(and Collingwood aimed in the right direction w~th his criticism) 
which may be explained by the fact that historians as well as 
the more sophisticated public for whom they write are so fascinated 
by the points about which no agreement is reached, or which are 
liable to be 're-written' by different generations of historians, 
that they tend to forget the vast and steadily increasing field in 
which facts are not subject to dispute. One sometimes gets the 
impression that only uncertain historical facts are regarded as 
~nteresting and worthy of attention and that, as soon as a fact 
has been established with v~rtual certainty, it is so much taken 
for granted that one forgets its previous controversial and 
~nsecure character. In this way, historians are very much 
conscious of what they have not achieved while all they have 
achieved is apt to fall into oblivion. 
But in spite of all self-denigration there can be no 
doubt that there are +arge numbers of historical facts which are 
as certron as any empirical fact can be certain. There is even a 
good case for saying that many statements of history are more 
certain than many statements in the empirical sciences and that 
they approach the certainty found in mathematics, although they 
do not reach it. 167) And it is not true, as some writers have 
166a)One reason wh1ch 1s usually adduced here is that historical 
events are un1que and non-repeatable whereas the subJect matt~ 
of science lends itself to freely repeatable experiments. 
But this is certainly an oversimpl~fication. 
167) 
- 211 -
malntained768 ) that such a high degree of certalnty is bought at 
the prlce of trivlality, 168a) i.e. can only be reached in respect 
to very elementary and primitive facts, unless the decis1on of 
whether a fact is trlvlal or primitive lS analytically made 
dependent on whether historlans are sure about it, such that 
whenever something is known with a high degree of certalnty lt is 
lnslgniflcant. It lS not only statements such as 'Caesar 
ex1sted' or 'the battle of Waterloo took place in 1815' that are 
virtually certaln, but also more complex ones, e.g. the statement 
that 'France was the dom1nant power on the European Cont1nent 
in the second half of the seventeenth century' or that 
'technology has progressed enormously 1n the last three hundred 
years' (and thls holds even for some statements of causal or other 
dependencies, such as, for 1nstance, the statement that this 
progress ln technology was dependent on progress in sclence, so 
that it 1s also lncorrect to malntaln that only statements of 
facts can be v1rtually certaln, but never statements of connexions 
between facts 169 )). 
The degree of certalnty reached in respect to a certaln 
fact lS, of course, also dependent on the description we choose. 
168)Gottschalk, Understand1ng ..• , p. 140; Dovring, H1story ... ,p.7J. 
168a)W.O.Aydeloffe, 'Notes on the Problem of H1stor1cal 
General1zat1on 1 , L. Gottschal~ (Ed.), General1zat1on ~the 
Wr1t1gg of History, 2nd impr., Ch1cago, 1964. p.l61, speaks of 
an inverse relationship between certa1nty and s1gn1f1cance, 
and C.L.Becker, 'What are Histor1cal Facts?t ,E.Meyerhoff(Ed.), 
The Ph1losophy of History~ Onr T1me, Garden C1ty,N.Y. ,1959, 
p.l2J, makes a Slmllar po1nt. 
169)Aron, 'Evidence ..• ', p.J2, holds that 1 the Judgment that an 
event occurred 1s ind1sputable. The Judgment that 1t was the 
effect solely of a g1ven s1tuat1on 1s not 1nd1sputable. 1 
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By greater spec1f1cation we risk more, make our statement more 
l1able to be false and make it eas~er for our opponent to refute 
it. The same event can be described by saying'! died', 'X was 
assassinated', 1 X was shot dead', 'X was shot dead with a .22 
revolver', etc., and the greater the specificat~on the more we 
st1ck our neck out, 1.e. the more we expose our statement to 
falsif1cation.l?O) If we take only this feature into account, 
then 1t 1s ~ndeed true that the smaller the 1nformative content 
of a statement (and, in this sense, the more 'pr1mitive 1 the 
statement) the more l1kely ~t 1s to be true, i.e. the greater 1ts 
degree of certainty. But (apart from the fact that ~t 1s not th1s 
which ~nduces people to say that only elementary statements are 
certa1n in h1story) th1s 1s a formal feature wh1ch cannot be 
separated from other criter~a, e.g. from the cr1ter1a of ev1dence. 
Only 1f all other th1ngs are equal does it hold true that the 
greater the spec1f1cation the greater the l1kel1hood of fals1ty, 
and therefore 1t cannot be used as an argument 1n favour of the 
v1ew that we can only be certa1n 1n respect to alementary facts. 
170) 
F~nally, we should not forget that there 1s a d1fference 
(The second statement 1s false, at least 1f we om~t the word 
'solely'). For a s1m1lar op1n1on see G.M. Trevelyan, 1 Cl1o, 
a Muse', F. Stern (Ed.), The Variet1es of H1story, 11th 
pr1nt1ng, Cleveland & New York, 1964, p.2Jl. 
Jh 
Th1s holds for statements of indiv~al facts. As far as 
general statements are concerned, t~e position seems to be 
Just the other way roundo The less spec~fied and the more 
sweep~ng, the more likely to be false. In the ser1es 'all 
French officers were noblemen', 'all officers in the French 
navy were noblemen', 'all off1cers ~n the pre-revolutionary 
French navy were noblemen', etc. the l~kel~hood of fals~ty 
progress1vely decreases. 
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between certainty and certitude, between the obJective 
likelLhood of truth and the subJective conv1ct1on of truth. For 
1nstance, as we have seen before, in respect to a remote 
historLcal per1od for whLch we have little evidence our demands 
as far as stringency 1s concerned are less than in respect to a 
per1od for wh1ch ev1dence is abundant. Therefore, relatively 
few disputes arise in the one c_ase as to what actually happened 
while in the other case histor1ans may disagree persistently, and 
this gives rise to a feeling of uncertainty. For the less 
evidence and knowledge we have of a period or field the smaller 
the opportunity for a clash between this evidence and knowledge 
on the one hand and a statement asserting a fact on the other, 
whereas the more evidence there is the more opportunity for 
1ncompat1bility, incompat1bil1ty within the evidence, 
incompatib1lity between evidence, known historical facts and 
general presuppositions, and incompatibility of the statement made 
with all the rest. In this respect, statements about more recent 
periods for which we have a lot of evidence are subject to much 
more rLgorous 'tests' and a statement which surv1ves tnem can be 
awarded a higher degree of certa1nty or l1kelihood than a 
statement wh1ch is not subjected to them 1n the first place. 
Many statements, however, do not survive those tests at all while 
statements which are not exposed to tests of similar strictness 
survive in relatively greater numbers. Hence, our feel1ng of 
certa1nty 1s greater Ln respect to the latter than 1n respect 
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to the former. But this does not mean that objectively their 
certa1nty 1s also greater than (or even as great as) the 
certainty of statements relat1ng to more recent per1ods which are 
based on greater amounts of ev1dence and prev1ous knowledge.l7l) 
171) We have, for slmpllclty's sake, talked here only 1n terms of 
quant1ty of ev1dence and knowledge but 1t is obv1ous that 
qual1ty also lS 1mportant. 
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Chapter III: SELECTION AND IMPORTANCE 
1. The Problem of Select1on 
Truth 1s not the only standard for JUdg1ng works of 
h1story. The truth of a whole h1stor1cal account 1s not the only 
cr1terion for dec1d1ng on its value. We may have two historical 
works, A and B on the same subject, and everything asserted 1n 
each of them 1s equally true (or 1s cons1dered to be equally true 
because it 1s equally supported by ev1dence) but nevertheless we 
JUdge ! to be a better work than ~. in a way sim1lar to wh1ch one 
sc1ent1f1c theory may be JUdged to be better than another although 
both are equally regarded as true. 1 ) On what ground or grounds is 
such a JUdgement based? And are there any obJective, i.e. 
1ntersubJect1ve, grounds at all? 
Assumed that the works 1n quest1on are not chronicles 
and do not consist only of statements of ind1vidual facts but 
also of statements of connexions between facts, a rough list 
of the reasons why one is judged to be better than the other 
may be the following: (!) There is a greater proport1on of true 
statements of individual facts in A than there is in B. (2) There 
is a greater proportion of true statements of connexions between 
facts in !• But what, as we have assumed above, if there is no 
difference 1n respect to these two relationsh1ps between A and B, 
1) Th1s compar1son 1s made by M.G. Wh1te, Foundat1ons of 
H1stor1ca1 Knowledge, New York & London, 1965, p.11. 
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what, for instance, if both conta~n only true statements? In 
that case (and not ln that case alone) other criteria come ~nto 
play, e.g.: (3) The completeness of each work: if A ~s more 
complete than B and states more facts and connexions than B, then, 
other th~ngs being equal, A ~s better than B. 2 ) (4) What is 
~ncluded and what is omitted: if A lncludes ~terns wh~ch are 
important wh~le B leaves out those ~terns (although it may include 
other un~mportant or less important ones) then A lS g~ven 
preference to B. The emphasis (even if it is only an 
~mpl~cit emphasis by arrangement and allocat~on of space) put on 
certa~n facts and connex~ons: A and B may include exactly the same 
ltems but whereas A emphasizes the important, ~ emphasizes the 
unimportant or g~ves the same emphasis to lmportant and 
un~mportant ltems al~ke. Consequently, A is the better of the 
two. (~) The conceptual~zat~on and cholce of descr~ption of events, 
thlngs and situat~ons as well as of their connex~ons: how are they 
delimited and ldent~fied, what terms are chosen for the~r 
description, are these terms too speclf~c or too general or just 
r~ght? Glven the topic and context ~n questlon, A may be better 
than B in these respects. The aesthet~c qual~t~es: wh~ch 
of the two works is better as a work of l~terature? Which has the 
better style, the more pleaslng phrases? 
2) However, lt ~s lmportant to note that there lS a point of 
d~minishlng return as far as completeness ~s concerned. Many 
books of history are cr~tlc~zed because they are too bulky, 
because they lnclude too many details. 'The wr~ter's head' 
(this ~s a quotatlon from a recent book review) 'may be 
crammed full of facts and ~deas •.• but w~thout some select~vity, 
some effort to reduce it all to order, the result is bound to 
be disappolnting.' 
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Other po1nts could be added to th1s l1st, e.g. moral 
qual1t1es, but it 1s not necessary to go any further. What 1S 
important 1s that each o£ these cr1teria 1s decis1ve only 1f all 
other th1ngs are equal, i.e. that none of them can be applied 
1ndependently of the others. The order of our list 1s also not 
necessar1ly an order of 1mportance. Truth, of course, must have 
pride of place in any field of knowledge. But even then it may 
happen that A contains more false statements than B, 1.e. 1s 
inferior to B 1n respect to points (l) and (~), but that A is 
nevertheless preferred on the strength of some other po1nt or 
po1nts. Th1s, however, holds only w1th1n l1m1ts, and if a very 
large number of statements 1n A are false then the selection may 
be as appropr1ate as one can imag1ne and the style may be the 
mo~t beaut1ful possible, we shall st1ll prefer B to A as a work 
of h1story {although not as a work of literature). Of course, we 
usually do not make separate JUdgements for each of these po1nts; 
we do not g1ve 1nd1vidual marks, one for truth, one for emphasis, 
etc., but we make a compound JUdgement wh1ch takes all those 
factors 1nto account at once,J) Nevertheless, there 1s some 
justificat1on for v1ewing point (7), the aesthetic factor, as 
extra-theoretical and, therefore, as of no consequence 1n an 
account of h1storical knowledge, whereas the rema1ning factors 
have a d1rect bear1ng on th1s aspect. 
We then can say that the qual1ty of a historical account 
J) So also White, Foundat1ons •.. , pp. 265/66. 
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as a work of knowledge depends not only on tne truth of the 
statements contalned ln 1t but also on factors such as incluson, 
emphasis, conceptuallzation, etc. of the facts and connexions 
stated. Has the essent1al been included, has the inessential 
been e~uded, has every ltem been given its proper welght? The 
purpose of historical enquiry is not only to state facts of the 
past but also to make clear 'which are the big facts and which 
are the little onest 4 ) and any lndivldual historical statement 
should be 'significant' ln addition to being true, 5 ) i.e., the 
question to be asked is not only 'is it true?' but also 'should 
it, rather than another true statement, be included ln thls 
account?t 6 ) 
Thls 1nvolves discriminatlon and selection but 1n a 
rather wide sense which does not only 1nclude the selectlon of 
lndivldual facts7) but also the selectlon of connexions between 
facts and the selectlon of some facts for the 'foreground' and 
others for the 'background', 8 ) i.e. the allocation of emphas1s. 
4) G. Barraclough, H1story ~ ~ Chang1ng World, Repr., Oxford, 
1956, p. 28 (quot1ng J.R. Green). 
5) So S.P. Lamprecht, Nature and History, New York, 1950> p.64. 
6) S1milaj}Wh1te, Foundat1ons ..• , p.lJ. 
7) It is a weakness common to many wrlters that they only think of 
selection of lndividual facts. For 1nstance, when Whlte speaks 
oi the truth of a hlstorical account he has ln mind only the 
truth of the statements of indivldual facts contained in it 
or implied by it (the truth of the 'implied chronicle', as he 
calls it), not, however, also the truth of statements asserting 
connexions between facts. This leads him to the view that the 
only criterlon fur judging two equally true accounts consists 
ln ascertaining which of the 'implied chronlcles' is the better 
one, i.e. whlch of the two totals of lndlvidual fact statements 
is to be preferred. See Wh1te, Foundatlons ••• , pp. 225/26 
(although ln an earlier article~ he lists other cr~teria as 
well: M.G. Whlte, 'The Logic of Historical Narratlon', 
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What 1s more, 1t 1ncludes the cho1ce of the delimitation of the 
items concerned, i.e. the decision of what is to be regarded as 
an event, th1ng or situation, and it also 1ncludes the selection 
of aspects. The fact that a certain event E took place can be 
stated 1n many different ways 1n each of which a d1fferent aspect 
of E is emphasized, and there is no possibility of taking all 
aspects into account 1n one statement.sa) The number of facts, of 
connex1ons between facts and of aspects of any s1ngle fact or 
connex1on 1s infin1te9 ) whereas any historical account is finite 
Consequently select1on 1s inescapable. 
Even an eyewitness account is necessarily selective. A 
person participating in a battle cannot be everywhere all of the 
time. His contact with what happens is necessarily restr1cted. 
But qu1te apart from this phys1cal imposs1bility as far as large-
scale events are concerned, there is also the theo~ical 
imposs1bil1ty of describing or stating what happens or exists 
M 
8a) 
9) 
S. Hook (Ed.), Ph1losophy and History, New York, 1963, pP·7J/ft,.). 
The select1on of aspects already manifests 1tself in the 
cho1ce of terms. Someone who speaks of the Middle Ages 
as 'the age of fa1th' has opted for one aspect of this 
period, and he has done so because he regards th1s aspect 
as of part1cular importance. See also White, Foundations .•• , 
p.lO; and W.H. Dray, 'The H1stor1an's Problem of Selection', 
E. Nagel, P. Suppes & A. Tarski (Eds.), Logic, Methodology 
and Ph1losophy of Science, Stanford, Cal., 1962 p.601. 
SimilafJK.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
4th ed. (rev.), Vol. 2, London, 1962, p.259. 
This expression is used by W.B. Gallie, PhilosophY ~ Histor1-~ Understanding, London, 1964. p. 79. 
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exhaustively in all its details and all its aspects. What goes 
on can never be described completely 1n flnite time, and any 
event, thlng or Sltuation is richer in content than the account 
of 1t. 10 ) 
Now lt lS obvious, and it has often been pointed out, 
that ncionly hlstory but all knowledge (at least all empirlcal 
knowledge) is selective in character. It is selective for two 
reasons. The first is, as we have seen, that reality lS so 
manifold and varled that com1ng to grips Wlth it 1s only possible 
by discrlmlnating and concentratlng on certaln parts or aspects 
of this lnflnite var1ety. A non-select1ve representation of 
everythlng that happens or exists lS impossible. What is more, 
and this is the second reason, if it were possible it would not 
be called knowledge. It is not the task of any enquiry, 
scientlfic or otherwlse, to glve a symbolic reproductlon of its 
subJect matter, even if such a reproduction were possible.ll) 
But selectlon does not entail falsiflcation or distortion. A 
partial truth lS still a truth and one need not know everything 
about a certain subject matter in order to know somethlng about 
10) 
11) 
So also M.R. Cohen, 
Ill., 1947, p.24; and 
H1stor1cal Knowledge, 
~ 
The Mean1ng of Human History, La Salle, 
M. Mandelbaum, The Problem of 
New York, 1938, ~21. 
The same or s1mllar v1ew can be found in C. Frankel, 
'Ph1losophy4 and History', Pollt1cal Science quarterly, Vol.72, 
1957, p. 356; E. Nagel, 1 The Log1c of Historlcal Analys1s 1 , 
H.Felgl & M.Brodbeck (Eds. ), Readlngs ~the Phllosophy of 
Science, New York, 1953, p.693; E. Nagel, The Structure 
of Science, London, 1961Jpp. 484, 577; K.R. Popper, 
The Poverty of H1stor1c1sm, 2nd ed.,iepr., London, 1961, 
p.77; R.S. Rudner, Ph1losophy of Social Sclence, Englewood 
Cl1ffs, N.Y. ,1966, p.69. 
- 221 -
it. I mlght know that Jones is a cert1fied accountant without 
knowlng that he underwent an appendectomy and my ignorance of 
the second does not affect my knowledge of the first. 12 ) 
It is, therefore, not a defect of history, as it is not 
a defect of any other field of knowledge, that it is selective. 
In fact, incompleteness lS one of 1ts essential features as it 
is an essential feature of a map not to show everyth1ng. A map 
drawn to scale and om1ttlng nothing would serve no purpose, a 
p1cture of a landscape, life-s1ze and including every single 
item, would be without point. 13 ) As a real map and a real 
plcture need not be distortions of what they represent, in splte 
of the fact that they are on a smaller scale and leave out many 
thlngs, so a work of h1story need not be a distortion of 
historical reallty in sp1te of lts selectlve character. In fact, 
lt is a necessary precond1tion of the posslbll1ty of history 
that selection be possible without distortion. 14 ) 
However, the comparison between a p1cture or map on the 
one hand and a hlstorical account on the other is not quite 
adequate. For whereas it may be theoretically possible, though 
12) So also s. Hook, 'Object1v1ty and Reconstruction 1n History', 
S. Hook (Ed.), Philosophy and History, New York, 1963, 
p. 260; A.O. Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints and Past 
History', H. Meyerhoff (Ed.), The Ph1losophy of Hlstory in 
Our Time, Garden City, N.Y., 1959 p.l82; Mandelbaum, 
~ ~lem ••• , pp. 84/85, 189; Nagel, 1 The Logic •.. ' p.692; 
W.H.Walsh, 'The Lim1ts of Scientlfic Hlstory 1 , J.Hogan 
(Ed.), Historical Stud1es III, London & Cork, 1961, p.50. 
13) These comparisons are made by Nagel, The Structure .•. , p.577, 
and A.C.Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History, Cambridge, 
1965, p.ll4. E.Ber~eim, Lehrbuch der historischen Methode 
n --
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po2ntless, to produce a map or picture of a limited section of 
reality which is in scale and complete (complete as far as the 
v2sion of the normal person is concerned, not complete in respect 
to m2cro-phenomena), it is not possible to give an account even 
of a minute segment of history which is complete in any sense. 
This is already apparent from the fact that completeness here 
would involve the description of all the relations and a~l the 
aspects of an event, thing or situat2on, including relations and 
aspects which by their very nature can only be known in times to 
come, e.g. the relation between a historical event of the past 
and an event in the distant future. In th2s sense, one can say 
that our knowledge of the past 2s limited by our 2gnorance of the 
future and tnat a complete account of the past would presuppose 
a complete account o1 the future.l5) 
In short, it is theoretically impossible for a 
historian to know everyth2ng about the past, or even about a small 
segment of the past. It is, of course, also pract2cally 
impOSSlble. For instance, for many past events there 2s no 
evidence, either d2rect or circumstarrhlal. Many events have left 
no trace and so cannot be known to anyone. But a histor2an 
usually does not even include all he does know; he leaves items 
und der Gesch1chtsph1losoph1e, J. ~ 4. Aufl. ,Le1pz1g,1903, 
p.72~uses the example of a p2anoforte arrangement which is 
made to represent a whole orchestral work. 
14) So G.C.Field, 'Some Problems of the Ph2losophy of H2story 1 , 
Proceedings of the Brit2sh Academy, Vol.24, 1938, p.77. 
15) This 2s the formulation of Danto, Analyt2cal Ph2losophy ••• , 
pp. 16/17. There is another point. Since a complete 
descript2on of an event presupposes the knowledge of all its 
consequences it entails the knowledge of what would or would 
not have happened if the event had not taken place (so also 
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out of his account because he regards them as unimportant. In 
other words, we have to d1stinguish between the preselection of 
facts made for the historian and the selection of facts made £x 
him. The preselection is made for him, e.g. by the informants 
or witnesses who drew up the records. These people could not, 
and did not wish to, record everything. They selected what they 
thought worth recording, and their standards 1n this respect are 
not necessar1ly the h1stor1an's standards. 16 ) But not only is he 
dependent on preselection in this literal sense, he is also 
dependent on the preselection made for him as it were by fate. 
An event might have left direct or circumstant1al evidence behind 
it, but this m1ght have perished before 1t reached the historian. 
The survival of ev1dence is a matter of chance.l7) And it is 
also a matter of chance, at least to a certain degree, whether 
ev1dence which has been preserved is known to the historian. He 
may not have looked in this or that archive, he may have forgotten 
to dig 1n this or that locality. Or, if we think of 
16) 
17) 
Cohen, The Meaning ... , p.81) wh1ch in turn must rest on the 
knowledge of causal laws governing such counterfactuals. 
Needless to say we do not possess such knowledge. 
So also J. Dewey, 'Historical Judgments', H.Meyerhoff (Ed.), 
The Philosophy of History in Our T1me, Garden City, N.Y., 
1959,p. 168; J.R.M. Butler, The Present Need for History, 
Cambr1dge, 1949, p.25; E.H. Carr, What is History?, 
Harmondsworth, 1964, p.l4. 
So also W. Bauer, E1nfuhrung in das Stud1um der Gesch1chte, 
Tubingen, 1921, p.l4; and Field, 'Some Problems ••• •, p.80.-
But perhaps it is not entirely a matter of chance. For 
large-scale historical events tend to leave a large amount of 
evidence beh1nd (remains as well as records) and the more 
evidence there was orig1nally for an event the greater the 
likelihood that at least some of it has been preserved into 
present times. In short, events which are normally regarded 
as important tend to be better documented than those which 
are not. 
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circumstantial evidence alone, he may know of the existence of 
certain data but he may not be aware that they constitute 
evidence for a certain fact. Accident plays a role here as well, 
but so does experience and ingenu1ty. 
Therefore, his selection of 1tems 1s, properly 
speaking, not a selection from the items of the past as such, 
but a selection from the items of the past that have left some 
evidence, evidence which has moreover been preserved and which 
1s known to him. He selects certain facts from the totality of 
facts known to him for inclusion in h1s account. He knows much 
more about his subject than he mentions in his work but for one 
reason or other he does not put down everything he knows. For 
1nstance, he does not wish to make his work top-heavy with 
details wh1ch he judges to be of minor importance for his topic. 
Others may be so similar to each other that he thinks it 
sufficient to mention only a few examples or to make a general 
statement to the effect that circumstances in general were such 
and such.lS) 
But are there not situations where a historian does 
not select from what he knows but includes all he knows? If 
only a very small number of facts are known to him and he regards 
18) In say1ng all this we do not wish to imply that a historian 
f1rst 'collects' as many facts as he can and only afterwards 
starts weed1ng out the unimportant ones. Cr1teria of 
1mportance or relevance are, of course, applied right from 
the beginning, and if a historian is convinced of the 
1rrelevance of something he does not go to the trouble of 
establish1ng it as a fact or of supporting it by evidence. 
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them all as ~mportant enough to deserve inclusion, will he not 
mention every single one? This is possible, at least 
theoretically, but only in respect to recorded facts, and the 
total of recorded faXs is not equivalent to the total of known 
facts. For ~nstance, we know of every man what the physical 
sciences teach about bodies, but as historians we would not dream 
of including all this in our account. And if somebody were to 
reply that this is only so because a historian is not interested 
~n physical properties, we can make the same point in respect to 
historical features. A writer on the early Middle Ages can be 
qu~te certain that a person living in those days did not know 
anyth~ng about gunpowder or about printing with movable types 
but most probably he will not mention this in his account. So 
even in cases where there is very little evidence so that a 
historian knows too little of his subJect, he at the same time 
knows too much of it; he can never ~nclude all he knows but has 
to make a selection. 19 ) This is st~ll more obvious if we think 
not only of individual facts but also of connexions between 
facts, of the relative emphasis given to each item and of the 
aspects under which the items are described. It then becomes 
se~evident why two different accounts, even ~f their authors 
have knowledge of exactly the same recorded facts and have both 
included all o1 them, may still vary considerably so that one 
may be judged to be better than the other. 
19) Th1s point has already been made by H. R1ckert, Die 
Grenzen der naturw1ssenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung, 
5. Aufl.:--Tu~ingen, 1929, p.295. 
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2. Relevance and Importance 
If selection 2s inescapable the question arises as to 
what constitutes a good or a better selection. If it is true that 
the value of two competing works of history in respect to the 
knowledge conveyed by each of them can differ although both 
contain only true statements and that this difference is dependent 
on the selection made in each of them (selection in the wide sense 
we have explicated), then we have to ask why the select2on must 
be regarded as better in one case than in the other. A general 
answer 2n negative terms would be that a selection is a good 
selection if it is not mislead2ng (and that it 2s a better 
selection 2f it is less mislead2ng). It lS a generally known 
fact that because of omission and emphasis a description of what 
2s or was the case can be extremely inadequate although every 
statement contained in it is true. Th2s 2s one of the reasons 
why w2tnesses in courts of law have to swear not only to speak 
the truth and noth2ng but the truth but also to speak the whole 
truth. In the sphere of religion, of politics and of ideology 
some people are extremely skilful at the game of giv2ng misleading 
pictures favourable to their cause without actually saying 
anyth2ng false. Often, however, this is quite unintentional 
if not unconscious, and in this form it may even be regarded as 
a normal characteristic of human nature; the average person is 
apt to think well of himself and his causes and thus tends to 
overlook or to min2mize anything which could put them in an 
unfavourable lLght. It takes some self-discipline and mental 
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tra1n~ng to overcome b1as in this sense. But not all faulty 
and mislead1ng selection is a matter of b1as. A child who gives 
an account of something w1tnessed or experienced may easily 
relate the inessential and om1t the essential, and this is not due 
to bias but simply to not recognizing what ~s important and what 
is not. 
L~kewise in history. H~stor~ans, too, may select in a 
m1sleading way from recognized or unrecognized bias or from 
mental confusion and lack of experience. In effect, it does 
not matter what the reasons are; what 1s important ~s that the 
account given is inadequate. And there can be no doubt that some 
historical works are inadequate 1n th~s respect, e.g. when the 
author dwells on a few cases of miscarr~age of just~ce in a 
JUdicial system w1thout ment~oning the much more numerous cases 
where justice was done20 ) or when he wr1tes a h1story of Nazi 
Germany wfrhout saying anything about the persecution and 
exterminat~on of the Jews. In such cases we would not regard it 
as an excuse if he defends h~mself by saying 1 well, one can't 
1nclude everyth1ng 1 , 21 ) and we would not accept this because 
believe that any account of the top1cWh1ch leaves out or 
we 
underemphasizes such an item amounts to a falsification of the 
h1stor1cal picture 1n quest1on. It 1s a fals1f1cation 1n the 
20) Th1s example 1s taken from J.R. Strayer, 1 Introduct1on 1 , 
J.R. Strayer (Ed.), The Interpretat1on of History, Pr1nceton, 
1943, p.l2. 
21) So Dray, 1 The H~stor1an 1 s Problem .•. ' p.598, from whom the 
second exemple is taken. 
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sense that it 1s unrepresentative of the historical reality it is 
about. And here we come at last to a pos2t2ve description: no 
work of h2story can be complete, selection is unavoidable, but the 
selection should be such that the work is still representative of 
the totality of facts and relat2ons as far as it is known to the 
22) h2storian, that it 1s a 'true sample' of th1s reality. If we 
use the term 'sample', however, we must beware of thinking of 
something in the nature of a stat1st2cal sample. 23 ) For statistics 
1s a matter of quantitative d1stribut2on within a population, and 
if the sample chosen has the same distribut1on of properties as the 
whole populat1on it 2s a good sample. But selection in history 1s 
usually not a matter of f2nd2ng a sample with the same 
proport1onate quantit2es as the stretch of h1storical real1ty 2n 
quest2on. Histor1cal subJects are usually not quant2f2able so that 
no stat1stical sampling 1s poss1ble. Therefore, 1f we ins1st on 
us1ng an analogy that of a map or p1cture is better than that of a 
sample. A map 1s representat2ve of the area of which 1t 1s a map, 
but 1t 1s not a sample of th2s area. 
However, there are clear criteria for deciding whether a 
map is a good map, 1.e. whether it 1s truly representative of the 
area concerned and in how far it 1s so representative. One only 
needs to survey the area in quest1on 1n order to find this out. 
22) This phrase is used by I. Berlin, 'History and Theory - The 
Concept of Scientific H1storyr, H2story and Theory, Vol.l, 
23) This is exactly what White thinks when he says that 1960/6l,p.l1. 
a h1stor1an has to present a briefer list or sequence 
(briefer than the sequence of reality) which is representative 
of the complete list as a good stat2stical sample is 
representative of an 1nfinite population. See M.G.White, 
rcan History be Objective?', H. Meyerhoff (Ed.), !h£ 
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But are there simllar criteria for deciding whether a h1storical 
account is representative of 1ts subJect matter? In short, when 
ls a work of h1story representative? The usual answer is that 
it lS representatlve if it includes all the essentlal, 
Slgnificant, lmportant or relevant facts, aspects and relations 
and gives the right emphasis to each of them. But this leaves 
us where we were before, for now we have to ask how we can 
decide whether and to what degree somethlng is essentlal, 
significant, important or relevant. In short, the question is 
now whether there are any intersubJective crlteria of relevance 
or lmportance (to use only these two terms), and an answer would 
be at the same time a solution of the problem concern1ng the 
crlterla for decidlng on the adequacy of a selection, elther 
absolutely or relatlve to a competlng selectlon. 24 ) 
It is often maintalned that 'relevance' and 1 1mportance 1 
are relat1onal terms. As far as the flrst is concerned there can 
be l1ttle doubt that this does express a relat1on. Relevance 1s 
always relevance to something. Some wr1ters go further and say 
24) 
Ph1losophy of History~ Our Time, Garden Clty, N.Y., 1959, 
p. 195; and M.G. White, 1 Toward an Analytic Philosophy of 
History', M. Farber (Ed.), Phllosophio Thought in France and 
the Unlted States, Buffalo, N.Y., 1950, p.718. 
It has been sa1d that if there are no objective criteria for 
selection and importance then hlstory is subjectlve (J.A. 
Passmore, 'The Objectivity of History', Phlloso)hy, Vol.JJ, 
1958, p. 104; also Hook, 'ObJectivity ••• ', p.267 • But 
thls is an overstatement. For even if there exist no such 
criteria there are still criterla for the ascertalnment 
of truth ln history, and as long as that is the case 
history cannot be completely subjective. 
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that the relation 1n question is always a causal relation25 ) but 
it does not need much mental effort to see that this view is 
mistaken. We do not use 'relevance' and 'relevant' only when we 
want to state a causal connex1on (•Robespierre's death was 
relevant to the outcome of the French Revolut1on•) but we also 
say that someth1ng is relevant to a topic or subject ('Renais-
sance painting 1s relevant to the history of European art•) in 
the sense of being part of 1t or of properly belonging to it, and 
we also sometimes use the terms in order to indicate a log1cal 
connex1on or relat1on (' the fact that a triangle 1s equ1lateral 
is relevant to the fact that 1t 1s equiangular•). 26 ) Causal 
relevance, therefore, can be viewed only as a spec1al case or 
special k1nd of relevance. 2 7) 
25) F. Kaufmann, Methodology£! the Soc1al Sciences, London ... , 
1944, p. 194; M. Mandelbaum, 'Causal Analys1s in History', 
Journal of~ History£! Ideas, Vol. J, 1942, p.J9; 
Mandelbaum,~ Problem ••• , pp.221,241,260. The latter 
connects this with the thesis that a fact a is relevant to a 
fact b if a and b are so related that the mind cannot 
apprehend the nature of b without understanding the nature of 
a thus implying that all-understanding of facts is causal 
understanding (ibid., pp.J, 211, 213, 241). This, however, 
1s wrong for - as pointed out by L.J. Goldstein, 'A Note 
on the Status of Historical Reconstructions', The Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 55, 1958, p.477 - a fact~ ('Billy punched 
Johnny 1n the eye') may be (causally) relevant to a fact b 
('Johnny is crying') without it being in the least necess~ry 
to know or to apprehend ~ in order to know or to apprehend b. 
26) But 'relevance' does not always express a logical 
relationsh1p, as P.P. W1ener, tOn Methodology in the 
Philosophy of History', The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. JS, 
1941, p. JlJ, see~s to think when he says that one h1stor1cal 
fact is obJectively relevant to another 'only if the first 
logically implies the second'. (W1ener equates here 1 is 
object1vely relevant to' with 'explains'). 
27) One could say, of course, that 1t is only as ap~lied in 
history that ~relevance' (and 'importance•, too) is 
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What is usually understood by ·~ is causally relevant 
to b' lS that a and b are in fact causally related, i.e. that a is 
a cause or effect of b. But it is questionable whether we always 
want to commit ourselves so far when we use 'relevance' in its 
causal sense. Perhaps we sometimes wish to in.d..Lcate only that there 
is a possibillty of such a causal connexion, that it is not 
completely out of the question that ~ lS a cause or effect of b. 
So we may say that the family structure ln a society is relevant 
to its blrth rate, meaning thereby only that we can imagine the 
existence of a causal relationship between these two factors and 
that we would not be surprlsed if such a relationship were indeed 
established one day. 
However thls may be, these few remarks indicate 
sufficlently that the concept of relevance is not as clear as one 
could wish. The same lS true of 'importance' (and of 'slgnlficance 1 
although we shall not analyse this term here). 'Importance', 
as opposed to 'relevance', is not necessarily used in a 
relational sense. We can regard something as important in its own 
right, just as we can regard someth1ng as important for something 
else. Human life is usually viewed as of absolute importance, not 
as lmportant relative to someth1ng else, whereas the problem of 
whether truth-functional logic can be applied to counterfactual 
statements is important only in relation to some other problems of 
phllosophy such as the problem of what constitutes a sclentific 
law. (As this example shows, similar to relevance, importance 
excluslvely causal, whereas in other f1elds lt lS causal or non-
causal. But, as we shall see later, even in history 'relevance' is 
not always equ1valent to 'causal relevance' (and 'importance' does 
not always mean 'causal importance'). 
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in the relational sense need not be causal~2S) But whether 
relat~onal or absolute, this does not affect the comparative 
character. As we can say that someth~ng is more relevant than 
something else so we can say that an item is more important than 
another item, even where the importance ~s an absolute importance. 
I regard my own well-being as ~mportant ~n itself, not as 
important for something else, but I nevertheless think that it ~s 
less ~mportant than the well-being of the community of wh~ch I am 
a member. 
When 1 1mportance 1 1s used to express a relat1on 1t can 
be replaced by 'relevance' {and 'relevance' can be replaced by 
'importance') w1thout altering much 1n the meaning of the statement 
concerned. It does not matter whether we say that the 
_ assass1nat1on of SaraJevo was relevant to or that 1t was 1mportant 
for the outbreak of the F1rst World War {an example of a causal 
relation), that the problem of counterfactuals 1s relevant to or 
that 1t is 1mportant for the problem of sc1enf1f~c laws {a non-
causal relat~onsh1p). On the other hand, when express~ng the non-
28) This is why E.J. Tapp, 'Some Aspects of Causat~on ~n H1story', 
The Journal of Ph1losophy, Vol. 49, 1952, p.70, 1s wrong when 
he says that the importance of something is always measured 
by measuring its causal effects. R.M. Maciver, 'History and 
Social Causat~on', The Journal of Economic History, Vol.3, 
1943, Supp., p. 136; and J.H. Randall, 'Controlling 
Assumptions in the Practice of Americal Historians', Theor~ 
and Practice ~Historical Study, New York, 1946, p. 18, also 
seem to think that s~gn~ficance ~s always causal significance. 
Others, instead of speak~ng of a causal relat~onship, maintain 
that it ~s a relat1on which depends on counterfactuals. 'We 
can understand the signif1cance of what did happen only if we 
contrast 1 t with what might have happened.' (Cohen, ~ Mean~ng. .. 1 
p. 80; s1m~larl] L. Gottschalk, Understanding History, New York, 
1950, p.242}. But in practice this amounts to saying that 
importance {or significance) is a causal concept. 
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relational sense we can use 'importance' only. 'The importance 
of religion' is amb1guous 1n that it may refer to importance as 
such or to 1mportance for someth1ng, e.g. for art, whereas 'the 
relevance of rel1gion 1 , although 1t may be ambiguous in other 
respects, is unambiguous in that it can only refer to the relevance 
to someth1ng. 29 ) 
There is no established custom as to when one should 
use 'relevance' and when one should use 'importance' (and there 
lS also no f1rm d1st1nction between 'importance' and 
'sign1f1cancet) although some writers may establish a difference 
by means of a definit1onal fiat. This is the reason why we also 
will not introduce any distinction (although we will always 
regard 'relevance' as a relat1onal term) and will usually speak 
of 'relevance' and '1mportance' as if they were one and the same. 
To return to the problem of whether there are any 
intersubject1ve criteria 1n history for dec1d1ng on the relevance 
or importance of an item and thus on the quality of a historical 
select1on. There are two views which, if they were correct, 
would provide us "\vi th an easy solution (or would at least 
simplify matters cons1derably). According to the f1rst, 1t is 
the historian's task to regard as relevant or important that 
which was regarded so by the people of the period concerned, 
29) It 1s true that 'relevance' and 'relevant' are somet1mes 
used in the absolute sense. But then it can be argued that 
this usage 1s 1ncorrect by reference to a work such as 
The Conc1se Oxford Dict1onary where 1 relevant 1 is def1ned as 
'bearing upon, pert1nent to, the matter in hand'. 
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and to the same degree.30) If in a certain age people viewed a 
religious and dogmatic topic such as the inunaculate conception 
as important and as more important than, say, the constitutional 
struggles between monarch ru~d parliament, then a historian has 
to adopt the same position when he writes the history of that 
period. In this way it seems that no problem arises and that the 
principles of selection are given with the evidence on which an 
account is based. But there are strong objections. For not only 
would histor~ans make themselves completely dependent on what was 
recorded and preserved ~n their judgements of importance, they 
also would still have to decide fo-r themselves whether and in how 
far any or all records to the effect that something was important, 
or more impo-rtant than something else,are representative of the 
general view of tne age. After all, different persons may have 
regarded different items as important31 ) and there is no guarantee 
that what is contained in the records is not only a minority 
opinion. But even if it were possible to ascertain with 
certainty what was generallyviewed as important in the past, there 
is still the question of whether it is the task of history to do 
no more than to follow and to reproduce the opinions of dead 
people in this respect. As history is usually understood this is 
JO) Th~s ~s the view of Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints ••• •, p.l79, 
according to whom the intellectual histor1an 1 s selection 
'should be determ~ned, not by what seems important to him, 
but by what seemed important to other men; for it is 
prec1sely this that d~fferentiates historical from any other 
type of relevance and s~gnificance'. It is true that he is 
speaking of the 'intellectual historian', i.e. of the 
h1stor~an of ideas, but in the last part of the quoted 
sentence the application seems to be to h~story in general. 
31) Barraclough, History ••• , p.22. 
- 235 -
certainly not or not its only task. Historical knowledge has an 
element of h~ndsight and is thus essentially different from the 
knowledge and opin~ons of the contemporaries of the period under 
study. One respect in which it is different is ~n what is 
regarded as relevant and important, and if this difference is 
eliminated history loses one of its most telling characterist~cs. 
A h~storian writing on thirteenth century England who adopted the 
criteria of importance of the thirteenth century would have to 
give a recital of miracles, tempests, comets, pestilences and other 
'wonderful th~ngst32 ) and such a work would rightly be regarded as 
thoroughly unsatisfactory in the twentieth century, even if it 
contained only true statements and c~ted extensive evidence for 
the occurrence of all these events. 33 ) 
The other view ment~oned is the view that importance and 
relevance are obJective categories which can, so to speak, be 
read off historical reality. Histor~cal phenomena are relevant 
or important independent of all thinking about them, and when 
looking at the facts everything falls into pattern by itself; the 
relevant and important items sort themselves out from the 
irrelevant and unimportant ones of their own accord. If this view 
32) lbid. 
33) For a position s~milar to ours see W.H. Dray, Philosophy 
History, Englewood Cl~ffs, N.Y., 1964, pp. 37/38, who, 
however, does not seem to d~stinguish clearly between the 
quest~on of importance and the quest~on of truth; thus, in 
the context of importance, he points out that a historian 
does not only tell how th~ngs seemed to the protagonists 
but how they actually were. 
of 
0 
- 236 -
lS combined with the relational position according to which 
relevance and importance always refer to relations, relevance 
becomes an 'obJective relation between facts', not based on the 
mlnd but grounded in the phenomena themselves, and it is no 
longer necessary for a hlstor1an to select what is relevant; he 
only needs to follow where 'his material leads' hlm.3 4 ) The 
trouble here lS that we do not really gain anything if we call the 
relationship of relevance 'objective' or if we say that the 
importance of facts is gruunded in reality. It may very well be 
that objectively certa1n facts are more important or relevant 
than others but this does not help us as far as the criteria of 
relevance and importance are concerned. Even lf it is true that 
importance and relevance are objective properties or relations, 
the relevant and 1mportant facts do not therefore 'of their own 
account separate themselves from all the others, nor do they 
come Wlth all their significant characterlstics duly labelled 
for usr,35) and historlcal evidence cannot show that one item 
is more 1mportant and, therefore, more worthy of being selected 
than another item.36 ) In short, objective existence here does 
not entall the existence of criteria of recognition, i.e. the 
problem remains of how we can recognize the presence of such 
properties and relations. Therefore, the issue of whether 
historical relevance and importance are objective features of 
34) Mandelbaum, The Problem ••• , pp. 200, 207, 210, 241, 257/58. 
35) M.R.Cohen, Reason and Nature, 2nd ed., New York & London, 
1964, p. 76. ---
36) It also cannot show, as White, Foundations ••• , P• 263, poin~out, that one purpose in writing history is 
superior to another. 
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reality or are, in some way or other, dependent on our thinking 
about reality, or both37 ), does not affect the question of the 
criteria according to which something is JUdged to be important 
or relevant (or more important or relevant than something else). 
3. Consequentiality as a Criterion of Relevance 
One respect, and perhaps the most 1mportant one, 1n 
wh1ch historical knowledge differs from knowledge of the present, 
1s that 1t includes the knowledge of effects and consequences of 
events. The contemporary is usually not in a position to know 
what will happen in consequence of some occurrence which is just 
taking place (or which has just taken place) 3~) and there are 
no laws which would allow him to make predictions although he may 
have certain expectations which are based on experience and which 
are, therefore, something more than mere guesswork. As more and 
more time elapses after the occurrence of an event, more and more 
consequences become manifest, but there is no point in time where 
one could say that their number has been exhausted and that no 
further consequences will make their appearance. 39 ) Th1s means, 
37) That they are both seems to be the op1n1on of W.H. Walsh, 
An Introduction!£ the Philosophy of History, 7th impr., 
London, 1964, p. 99, who holds that the idea of importance is 
relative to what happened independently from present 
thinking ~ to the person who makes the judgement of 
importance. 
38) This, according to Randall, 'Controlling Assumptions ••• •, p.20, 
is the reason why present history cannot be fully understood 
by the actors. 
39) But see J.H. Hexter, Reappraisals ~History, London, 1961, 
p.l2, who thinks that some events have exhausted their 
consequences, e.g. the Treaty of Madrid of 1527. 
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at least in theory, that the later in time a historian writes 
his work, the more consequences can be known to h~m and can be 
taken into account, which is one reason why no work of history is 
ever final and why new accounts of the same subject become 
necessary as time goes on. 
This obvious feature of the gradual unfolding of the 
consequences of past events has been taken as the criterion of 
selection and importance. 'New consequences flowing from past 
events change the significance of the past ••• ,, 4o) and it is 
self-evident that for those who believe that all relevance is 
causal relevance it must be the only criterion. In this view, 
h~storians select for ~nclusion in their works those items which 
have turned out to be efficacious while anything which has 
rema~ned without consequences is rightly ignored or omitted. The 
matter then becomes relatively neat and simple in that the 
just1ficat~on of the inclus~on of an item in a historical account 
consists ln pointing out its effects or consequences (whereas 
lts explanat~on cons~sts in pointing out its causes or reasons). 
The trouble ~s that it is too simple and that a large 
number of obJections can be raised. Apart from the most obvious 
one, namely that historians actually do not proceed (or do not 
4o) Randall, 'Controll1ng Assumptions ... ', p.20; s1m~larly (from 
a Marxlst po1nt of v1ew) A. Schaff, 1 Why Histofrtv~s 
Constantly Rewr1tten', Dlogenes, No. 30, 1960~ has also 
been taken as prov1ding a characterlzation of history, so by 
the German h~storian E. Meyer ('historical is whatever is 
effective or has become effective', quoted in E. Cassirer, 
An Essay on Man, Jrd printing, New Haven, 1945, p. 196) and 
Dewey, 'Hist~cal Judgments', p.l71, who wr~tes that there 
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always proceed) in this way, there is first of all the point 
that this view presupposes that a historian can recognize and 
demonstrate without great difficulty that something is a cause 
or effect of something else, that it is easy to d~stinguish 
between post hoc and propter hoc, and that causal knowledge 
(in general, and ~n h~story in part~cular) does not raise any 
serious problems. 41 ) Historia~ it is assumed, are able to 
ascertain w~thout much trouble that an event ~happened in 
consequence of an event C and are so ~n a position to declare C 
to be ~mportant and worthy of select~on. This is a large claim 
but let us assume for the moment that it is justified. There 
still remain other difficulties. For instance, an event has 
numerous consequences and is itself the consequence of a large 
number of events (in both cases the numbers may even be 
infinite). On which of these do we base our judgement of 
relevance? To be more precise, an event C is said to be 
important because an event E happened in consequence of it. But, 
and this is the f~rst argument, ~ did not only happen in 
consequence of C but also in consequence of many other events, 
!, B, D, etc., at least some of which are known to the 
\· 
1s no h1story except 1n terms of movement towards some 
outcome. For a more recent op1n1on see L. Kr1eger, 
'Comments on H1storical Explanation', S. Hook (Ed.), 
Ph1losophy and H1story, New Yor~, 1963, p. 141. 
41) This can clearly be seen from Mandelbaum, The Problem ... , 
pp. 260/61 & passim. 
- 240 -
h . t . 42 ) Wh th k ~s or~an. y en p~c on C instead of any of the others? 
The answer can only be 'because C is more important than the 
-- 43) 
rest•. But it was just our purpose to f~nd a criterion of 
importance, and if in the course of this endeavour we are once 
more left with importance it is not of much use. The second 
argument goes in the other direction. C is said to be important 
because E happened as one of its consequences. But many other 
events, F, Q, H, etc., also took place in consequence of c. Why 
then lS the statement 1 C is important' supported by reference to 
C's consequence~ and not by reference to any of those other 
consequences? Again, we can only say 'because E ~s more important 
than any of the others'. In short, Q is selected because ~t is 
~mportant, and ~t ~s important because lt had a consequence E 
which ~s important. The ~mportance of C 
~mportance of ~' and all we have done ~s 
other. 44 ) 
turns out to rest on the 
-thv 
to reduce(one to the 
42) Here as elsewhere, we take for granted the conjunctive 
plurality of causes. But it ~s difficult to see how any other 
view could do ~n h~story. A mono-causal theory seems so 
improbable, not to say absurd, that it can safely be excluded. 
43) A similar point is made (if we understand the passage 
correctly) by F. Me~necke, 'Values and Causalities ~n 
H~story', F. Stern (Ed.),~ Varieties£! History, 11th 
printing, Cleveland and New York, 1964, p. 273. 
44) This is recognized by Danto, Analytical Philosophy ... , p.l34, 
when he wr~tes that an event has 'consequential significance' 
~f it has certain consequences to which a historian attaches 
lmportance and that calling an event insignificant does not 
mean here that it has no consequences but only that it has 
no important ones. A s~m~lar po~nt is made by Hook, 
'ObJectivity .•. ', p. 270.- There is a further and perhaps 
related question, ment~oned by R. Aron, Introduction to the 
Ph~losophy of History, 2nd impr. ,-London, 196~ p.l30, a~d 
~ndicated by Meinecke, 'Values ••. ', p.271, as to the po~nt 
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It seems that the protagon~sts of the causal view have 
been vaguely aware of these diff~cult~es for sometimes they 
~ntroduce a further criterion {or rather narrow down the existing 
one), e.g. that of soc~al or 'societal' eff~cacy. Only what has 
consequences in the social (or cultural) field 1s relevant or 
important. 45 ) This, however, w1ll not do either. For apart from 
the fact that historians actually do not only regard as 1mportant 
what has soc~al consequences, the criterion is st~ll far too w~de 
to serve the purpose it ~s intended to serve. Even if we restrict 
consequences to soc~al consequences their number for any 
h~storical event rema1ns very large. 46 ) Still, one could say that 
now we have at least got hold of a criterion to which quantitative 
terms can be applied. For 1nstance, we may take the number of 
people affected into account 4 7) and say that an event E is more 
important than an event F is E affects more people, and this 
1mportance can be transferred to an event C of which E is a 
in time, 1.e. the point in the causal cha1n, which is taken 
into account when judg1ng the efficacy and so the importance 
of an event. C might have had important consequences some 
hundred years ago but not today. Should we still regard it 
as worthy of being included in our account? 
45) Mandelbaum who, as we have seen, believes that relevance is 
always causal relevance does this by restricting historical 
facts to those facts which are seen in the light of their 
consequences for the social structure. See~Mandelbaum, 
~Problem ••• , pp. 10, 290. 
46) So also Dray, Philosophy of History, p.28, according to whom 
1t only excludes the private sphere. P.O. Kristeller, 'Some 
Problems of H~storical Knowledge', The Journal of 
Ph~losophy, Vol. 58, 1961, p.87, mak;s-a different criticism:AA 
'the term "social" 1s much more vague and ambiguous than 
most people seem to real~ze: ~f construed in a specific 
sense, ~t will be too narrow to characterize historical 
events; if taken more broadlY,it will mean the same as 
human ..• ' 
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consequence. But (forgett1ng now that it still would not 
explain why Just C lS selected and not !, B, Q, etc. wh1ch also 
have E as a consequence) this is completely inadequate in that 
it does not take lnto account the duration, intensity and 
quality or such influences. The. adopt1on of the use of the 
tooth-brush has probably affected many more people than, say, 
the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, but nobody in his senses would 
ascribe greater historical importance to it. And even if we 
narrow down the field still further, e.g. to political matters, 
the d1fficult1es rema1n. H1storians often regard some item wh1ch 
affects relat1vely few people, such as a soc1al or cu2tural 
elite, as of much greater 1mportance than one wh1ch affects 
m1llions. 
It is true, the grading of importance or relevance is 
possible; we can often say that one item is more important than 
another, even if the concept of importance adopted is an absolute 
and not a relational one. But this grading cannot be done 
according to the number of consequences, whether social, 
cultural or pol1tica1. 48 ) In fact, it cannot be done in any 
47) 
48) 
Th1s lS ment1oned as a poss1b1l1ty by Cohen, The Mean1ng ... , 
~.22 . 
D.C. W1lliams, 'Essentials in History', S.Hook (Ed.J, 
Philosophy and History, New York, 1963, pp. 385/86, is 
one of those who think that 'we can define the importance 
or essentlality of a character ••• obJectively, 1n terms of 
sheer number of factual consequences' forgett1ng that there 
are important and unimportant consequences, large and small 
ones, consequences of long and of short duration. Are all 
those to be treated on an equal footing? And the issue is 
not, as Williams th1nks, whether every kind of event has as 
many consequences as any other (wh1ch he denles) but whether 
these d1fferences 1n the 'quality' of consequences can be 
neglected. 
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numer1cal or quantitat~ve terms. We cannot assign a number to 
the importance or relevance of a historical event, e.g. a 
revolution, 49 ) in spite of the fact that 'importance' and 
'relevance' are what could be ca~led comparative concepts so that 
we can say that Barere was an unimportant f~gure 1n the French 
Revolution compared to Robespierre, Danton or St. Just,50) or 
that the Second World War was more important than the Korean 
War. The possibil~ty of comparative grad~ng (which, of course, 
does not exist 1n borderl1ne cases) does not entail the 
possibility of quant~f1cation and the assignat1on of num~erical 
values. 
It seems, therefore, that there is no way out of the 
diff~cult~es 1f relevance and importance are regarded as 
consequential relevance and consequential ~mportance5?a) There 
49) As at least one social sc1entist has done who is cr~tic1zed 
~n passing by G. Salvem1ni, H~stor~an and Scientist, 
Cambr1dge, Mass., 1939, p.l07. The possibility of 
quantificat~on of 1mportance is also den~ed by Lamprecht, 
Nature and History, p.69, and (at least in respect to 
absolute ~mportance) by W.H. Walsh, 'The L~mits .•• t p.53. 
50) Th~s example ~s taken from Hook, 'Objectiv~ty ••• ', p.273, 
who regards it as a statement wh1ch is 1 obv1ously true or 
false\~ 
50a) This also holds if we speak in terms of potential rather 
than actual consequences. Assum1~~that the atomic bomb 
had never been used. One could then very well say that the 
invention and construct~on of th~s weapon had very great 
consequences, but only potential consequences. For it 
could have been used, and if it had been used the course of 
twentieth century history would have been very different. 
Therefore, a h~stor1an of th1s period ~s justified, 1f not 
obliged, to mention 1ts ~nvent~on 1n his account. This, 
however, ~s only a different way of say~ng that the 
renunc1at~on of use had important actual consequences and so 
1s ~tself of importance. I.e., th~s type of case ~s not 
different, ~n principle, from the type of case we have 
discussed above. 
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rema1ns the quest1on of whether perhaps the causal concept1on as 
a whole can be saved if we take into account not only effects and 
consequences but also causes and reasons, in such a way that 
whether something 1s 1mportant and worthy of being selected 
depends not only on 1ts consequences but also on 1ts causes, not 
only on what 1t led to but also on what led to it. If a mountain 
gives birth to a mouse, importance may be attached to the mouse, 
not as a mouse or because it gives birth to another mouse or 
another mounta1n, but because of the d1sproportion of cause and 
effect, effect and ach1evement. Or, to give an example; where 
d1sproportion does not come in, that Nietzche was insane dur1ng 
the last years of h1s l1fe is not 1mportant because 1t had 
certain consequences, but because it helps our understanding of 
what went before, namely Nietzsche's last writ1ngs. 
W~out doubt, this more comprehensive view lS more 
acceptable than the narrower thesis according to which only the 
consequences provide a criterion of relevance or importance, But 
even if supplemented in this way the causal v1ew is still 
1nadequate, 1.e. it will still be false to say that the only 
cr1terion of relevance or 1mportance, and so the only cr1terion 
of select1on, is a causal criterion.5l) 
51) We have aeglected here certa1n var1at1ons of the causal v1ew 
wh1ch are all open to the same or to sim1lar obJeCtlons as 
the causal view pure and simple. To ment1on Just two of them, 
there is the thes1s that the cr1ter1on of relevance is 
suppl1ed not so much by the causal consequences as by the 
general1zat1on, law or theory on wh1ch the causal nexus in 
quest1on is based. The assertion that Q is relevant to E, it 
is sa1d, can only be justif1ed by reference to a general 
law which connects the two with each other. {See Goldstein£ 
'A Note •.. ', pp. 477/78; also e.G. Hempel, 'The Function o 
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4. Context as a Criter1on of Relevance 
The causal v1ew 1s very common but perhaps still more 
common 1s the thes1s accord1ng to wh1ch 1t is not, or not so 
much, the consequences of an item which provide a cr1terion of 
1ts relevance or importance but rather the context in which it 
appears, where 'context' may refer either to the topic, subject or 
f1eld a h1storian is deal1ng with (as well as the aspect under 
wh1ch he deals w1th it), or to the quest1on he wants to answer, 
the problem he wants to solve, the hypothesis he wants to test.5 2 ) 
In this view, too, relevance and importance are relational 
concepts; and to say that an 1tem is relevant or important means 
that it is relevant or important for the treatment of a subject 
or the solution of a problem. What is important to the history 
of bank1ng 1n England is un1mportant to the history of Engl1sh 
pa1nt1ng; what is relevant to the problem of the causes of the 
French Revolution may be irrelevant to the problem of the 
1nfluence of the Revolution on European history in the nineteenth 
century. It is not necessary to think only of instances where 
the topic or problem provides completely different cr1teria 
General Laws in History', H. Feigl & W.Sellars (Eds.), 
Read1ngs ~Philosophical Analts1s, New York, 1949,p.469, and 
Kaufmann, Methodology ... , p.l9 ; on the other hand, 1t 1s 
pointed out by Popper, The Open Society .•• , pp. 263/64, that in 
h1story there are no laws which provide selective principles). 
Since the generalizations in question are thought to be 
provided by the sciences, it follows that the criteria of 
historical selection change with scientific progress.(So L.von 
Mises, Human Action, London .•• , 1949, p.5J, who, however, 
th1nks that the selective principles are only partially 
provided in this way). Another poss1bility (considered but 
finally rejected by Cohen, The Meaning ••• , p. 227) is to 
regard those items as more 1mportant which are more fundamenuu 
1n explanation (and 'explanation' here usually means 
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for the selectlon of what lS important. The more normal cases 
are those where there lS a partial overlapping. For instanb; the 
soclal hlstorlan who has a wider 'frame of reference' will include 
items which are omltted by the hlstorlan of prlces, who has a 
narrower one, and vice versa, but there may be ltems which will be 
lncluded by.both.53) 
If this view lS correct then it seems that the problem of 
selection can be reduced to the problem of the initial cholce of a 
topic or problem. And this,if it is a problem at all,ls a soclolog-
ical or psychological problem, not a problem of the theory of hlst-
orical knowledge~4 )Whether a historian decldes to treat a subject a 
'causal explanation'). If C can explaln why E happened whlle 
B cannot explain this, then C lS more lmportant than~' and in 
general, the more numerous the phenomena that can be explained 
by reference to C, the greater C's lmportance. It is easy 
to see that thlS-lS only another-way of saylng that the degree 
of importance depends on the number of consequences. 
52) Of course, the causal thesls and the contextual thesls are by 
no means mutually excluslve and are often comblned wlth each 
other, as by Mandelbaum who generally defends the causal Vlew, 
but also holds that selection lS precondltloned by the context 
or subject. See Mandelbaum, The Problem ••• , pp.206,258; and 
M.Mandelbaum, 'Objectivism in History', S.Hook (Ed.), 
Philosophy and History, New York, 1963, p.50. 
53) Thls example is taken from S. Hook, •Problems of Terminology 
ln Hlstorical Wrltlng: Illustrations', Theory and Practice 
in Historical Study, New York, 1946, p.126. 
54) Of course, there would stlll be a problem as to the lmportance, 
absolute or relatlonal, of a subject itself, whether it lS 
worthwhlle to treat it and whether it lS more worthwhile to 
treat this rather than that subject. Hlstorians, e.g. J. 
HUlZlnga, 'The Idea of History', F. Stern (Ed.), The 
Varieties of History, 11th printing, Cleveland & New York,l964, 
p.JOO, often lnsist that the slze of a subject does not affect 
its importance and that the hlstory of a vlllage can be as 
important as that of a natlon. But it is doubtful whether 
thlS lS generally true. A historian who writes on a small 
subJect ln an excellent way is often regarded as havlng 
wasted his talents. 'How much better if he had applled his 
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lnstead of b, ~ or d depends on many factors. It depends on h1s 
general psychological make-up, on the social and cultural 
environment in whlch he lives, on the education he has received, 
etc. etc. Last not least it depends on chance. For instance, a 
hlstorian may select a field simply because so far nobody has 
cultivated lt or because he has discovered a heap of unused source 
materials (for Ph.D. candldates a real godsend). Having selected 
~ and havlng decided furthermore on the aspect of a which is to be 
treated, e.g. an economlc aspect, 55 ) and the scope or level, i.e. 
the degree of detail he wishes to include, there is no further 
problem as to the select1on of items which have to be mentioned 1n 
his account because of thelr lmportance.56 ) 
g1fts to someth1ng more deserving.' This 1s even more obvious 
where the scope lS small not only spatlally (v1llage instead of 
country) but also temporally (six months instead of sixty 
years). On the other hand, it cannot be put down as a general 
rule that the larger the subject the greater lts 1mportance. 
55) The aspect of the toplc is emphasized by L. Gottschalk, 'The 
Hlstorlan and the Historlcal Document', L. Gottschalk, c. 
Kluckhohn & R. Angell, The Use of Personal Documents in Risto~ 
Anthropology, and SocloTOgy:-New-York, 1945, pp. 49/5~ 
accordlng to whom what is selected is what is relevant to such 
an aspect (biographlcal, geographical, etc.). 
56) The view that importance and selection depend (and, by 
impllcatlon, depend alone) on the topic or problem or questlon 
or hypothesis a historian is concerned with, is expressed 
by many writers, e.g. by Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints ••• ', 
p.l76 (the lnitial selectlon of a quest1on determines the 
selection of the material relevant to it); F. Dovring, History 
as a Social Sclence, The Hague, 1960, p.SO (once a problem has 
been selected everything that is essential for an answer is 
relevant); Passmore, ,The Objectivity ••• ', p.lOJ (those facts 
are relevant whlch assist the historian to test a hypothesis); 
E.W. Strong, 'The Materials of Historical Knowledge', Y.H. 
Krikorian (Ed.), Natural1sm and the Human Spirit, 2nd printing, 
New York, 1945, p.l64 (a h1storian starts with a query, l.e. a 
hypothesls, and the criterion of relevance is origlnally 
supplied by thls bypothesis; but Strong is one of the few who 
make an expllClt distlnctlon between the selection of a field 
of study and the selectlon of the questions or problems 
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This, in a very simplified vers1on, is the view under 
discussion. Several cr1tical remarks are 1n place here. The 
f1rst is that undoubtedly the cho1ce of a subJect determines the 
selection of the items 1ncluded in the account and so prov1des 
a cr1terion of relevance or importance, but only to a limited 
degree. By confin1ng history to a 'history of something' a 
select1ve principle is indeed provided, but only to a certain 
extent. 5 7) A man who wr1tes on the history of bank1ng need not 
include parts of the history of painting. But this criterion is 
still too w1de, for even within the restricted field selection 1s 
necessary. Although there 1s some justificat1on for the belief 
that the narrower the subject the more it supplies us with 
criteria of relevance and importance, it is very questionable 
whether we can ever restrict it so far that selection becomes 
completely determined by the topic. Even if someone wrote a 
history of banking in, say, Bristol on April 4th, 1780, he would 
still have to select and so make Judgements of 1mportance {we can 
here refer back to what we said about cases where only very few 
recorded facts are available to the histor1an), not to mention 
that such an atomization would be an un1nterest1ng enterprise. 
When 1t comes to a non-special1zed work where a historian does not 
wh1ch are to be 1nvest1gated with1n th1s field; see E.W. 
Strong, 'How 1s Pract1ce of History T1ed to Theory?', The 
Journal of Ph1losophy, Vol. 46, 1949, p.640f For similar 
v1ews compare also Randall, 'Controlling Assumptions ••• •,p.22; 
Gottschalk, Understanding History, p. 143; Gottschalk, 'The 
Historian ••• ', p.J6; Hook, 'Objectiv1ty ••. 1 , p.268; F.A. 
von Hayek, The Co~r-Revolut1on of Science, Glencoe, Ill., 
1952, p.69.--- --
57) So Popper, The Open Soc1ety ••• , p.265; see also Dray, 
Philosophy of H1story, pp.Jl ff. 
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write about the pa1nt1ng or the banking or the fore1gn policy of 
a per1od but about the period 1n general (or, 1f we think of 
world history, about all periods 1n general), the matter is still 
more obvious. He w1ll then have to decide on questions such as 
whether the invention of the wheel should be 1ncluded and the 
1nvention of tragedy excluded, or ~ versa, or, 1f both are to 
1ncluded, whether both should receive the same or different 
emphas1s. 58 ) In short, spec1alized or general, 'the need to 
select arises in the course of, not JUst in the choice of' the 
h1stor1an's 1nqu1ry.59) 
However, the proponent of the contextual view may grant 
that some select1on 1s necessary over and above the selection of 
the topic or problem, but he may say that th1s select1on is 
irrelevant as far as any JUdgement on the quality of a historical 
work as a work of knowledge is concerned, espec1ally 1n relat1on 
to another work on the same top1c in which a different select1on 
has been made. 60 ) In other words, if there are two competing 
58) The example 1s taken from Walsh, 'The Lim1ts ••• •, p.54. This, 
inc1dentally, is one of the reasons why some writers are 
hostile towards general history, e.g. Passmore, 'The 
Objectivity ••• ', pp. 103/04, who regards a topic such as 
The History of England as a 'fraud'. 
59) Dray, Philosophy of History, p.Jl (#ee also Dray,'The 
Histor1ants Problem ••• ', p.598). But Dray seems to bel1eve 
that th1s 1s a feature pecul1ar to h1story and not to be 
found elsewhere, and here he is certainly wrong. 
60) There 1s also the v1ew, ind1cated by Mandelbaum,'Objectiv1sm 
1n History', p.51, that as soon as two authors writ1ng on 
the same subJect select different 1tems for inclusion in 
the1r accounts they do not really have the same subject at 
all. Th1s, of course, tran~orms the assertion that 
select1on 1s completely determined by the choice of topic 
into an analytic statement. 
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accounts of the same subJect which are both true or false to the 
same extent and in each of wh~ch only 1tems which are relevant to 
the topic have been ~ncluded, although these items are not 
completely the same, then there remains nothing to choose by; 
there ~s no reason left for preferring one to the other as far as 
~ts value ~n respect to the conveyance of knowledge is concerned 
(~n non-theoretical, e.g. aesthetic respects it may be a different 
matter, but this is irrelevant here). Of course, neither of the 
two 1s complete, but then no account can ever be complete, and 
th~s ~s no d~sadvantage. Both can be viewed as complementary to 
each other, as contribut~ons to the topic or problem ~n quest~on. 
But even ~n this rev1sed form the thes~s ~s untenable. 
It denies, ~n effect, that there is a problem of importance and 
select~on at all. It den~es that any judgement of preference is 
possible or is JUst~fied. But s1nce as a matter of fact such 
judgements are being made ~t amounts to their proscription. It 
amounts to the demand that we should not choose at all if two 
competing accounts are equally true and ~f everything contained in 
them ~s relevant to the topic or problem ~n question and that if 
we choose nevertheless our choice is subjective and non-theoret-
ical. But 1s it? Is 1t true that if we judge an account of Nazi 
Germany as inadequate because it does not mention the persecution 
of minor~ties (although everyth~ng ~t does mention is relevant to 
the subJect), and if we JUdge it as more inadequate than another 
account wh~ch does ment1on ~t, ~s it true that this judgement has 
noth1ng to do with knowledge but is 'extra-theoretical', is, for 
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1nstance, a purely moral judgement? Is it not rather that such 
an account gives us a wrong picture of the subJect and that 
hav1ng a r1ght or wrong picture 1s a matter of hav1ng adequate or 
inadequate knowledge? These are rhetor1cal questions and the 
answer is obvious. Even if we regard every true acco~mt all parts 
of which are relevant to the subject in quest1on as a 
contribut1on to the history of this subject, the fact remains 
that there are good and bad contribut1ons, better and worse ones, 
and 1 good 1 and 1 bad 1 , 1 better' and 'worse' refer here to the 
property of conveying knowledge, not to aesthetic or moral or any 
other practical matters. 
However, this is not all. There 1s the phrase 
'relevant to the subJect (or top1c)' and th1s raises the quest1on 
of how we dec1de on th1s relevance. How do we dec1de that 
e1ghteenth century Engl1sh pa1nting is 1rrelevant to the h1story 
of e1ghteenth century Engl1sh bank1ng? One might say at a first 
attempt that there 1s no d1ff1culty here 1n that 1t follows 
already .from the subject's name ('the h1story of banking') that 
1t excludes everything wh1ch is not bank1ng. 
bank1ng; therefore paint1ng must be excluded. 
Painting is not 
But this 
presupposes that a h1stor1cal work only ment1ons items which, by 
defin1tion, belong to or are part of its subject, so that a 
h1story of bank1ng only mentions facts of banking (and connex1ons 
between such facts), and although it may happen that, so to 
speak, by acc1dent a fact of bank1ng is at the same time also a 
fact of, say, pol1t1cs, any fact which is not at least in part a 
fact of banking has no place in such a work. Th1s, however, 
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amounts to an untenable departmentalization to which nobody 
adheres (or could adhere even lf he wished to). For there are 
facts from other fields wh1ch are certainly not facts of the 
subject in hand but whlch have a decisive influence on lt. The 
colonizatlon of an overseas terrltory is most probably not a fact 
of banking but it may profoundly affect banking, and 1f lt does, 
then it is relevant to the subject of banking. 
In short, when we speak of the relevance or 1mportance 
of an item to a subject or problem we cannot simply adopt a 
str1ctly departmental Vlew and exclude causal relevance. An item 
is relevant to a toplc not only if by deflnltion it lS part of 
this toplc. Therefore, it would be a mlstake if one were to 
thlnk that by saying •relevance is relevance to a topic' one has 
sald something completely different from saying 'relevance is 
causal relevance' and has avoided the difficulties assoclated with 
the causal vlew. 
Our crlticism can be further supplemented if we consider 
ln particular the thesis according to which it ls the problem 
(or questlon) a hlstorian wants to solve or the hyPothesis 
{or theory) he wishes to confirm wh1ch supplies the criterion of 
importance and selection. As we have pointed out in another 
chapter, lt is quest1onable whether the hlstorian 1 s work can be 
adequately described in terms of the answering of question, the 
solving of problems or the testing of hypotheses6~a) Not only is 
6oa) There is an 1nfluentlal school in present-day philosophy 
which sees ln problem-solv1ng a defining characteristic of 
knowledge. For instance, Nagel,~ Structure ••• , p.577, 
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the 1llustration or conf1rmat1on of a general theory, e.g. of a 
theory about revolutions, a non-historlcal task, 61 ) but the 
solutlon of a special problem or the confirmatlon of a special 
hypothesls can also be Vlewed as external or ancillary to the 
historian's proper pu~pose of glving an account of 'how things 
really were'. (Of course, every task or purpose can be formulated 
in terms of a problem. A h1storian may make it his 'problem' 
to glve a true and adequate account of the l1v1ng conditions 1n 
th1rteenth century rural England and to answer the question 
'how dld the peasants l1ve in those days?' But this 1s a trivial 
sense of the thesis that all hlstory answers questlons and 
solves problems~~ And if relevant is everything whlch helps to 
solve a problem or to conflrm a hypothes1s, there is always the 
danger of those items being p1cked out wh1ch are su1table for 
solv1ng or conflrming 1t 1n one way rather than in another, wh1le 
what 1s unsu1table for th1s task is ignored. History 1s sometlmes 
compared w1th technology in that both,the hlstorian and the 
technolog1st, are said to be interested not in the establishment of 
general laws but in the solutlon of spec1flC problems, and that 
both select what 1s relevant to such solutlons. 62 ) But this 1s a 
wr1tes, when he d1scusses hlstory, that 'all discursive 
knowledge is the product of research instituted for the sake of 
resolvlng determlnate (and hence dellmited) questlons'. But 
unless 'd1scursive knowledge' is g1ven a very peculiar meanlng, 
it is not true that it is always the product of research, and, 
if h1story is to count as a branch of dlscurs1ve knowledge, 1t 
1s even less true that determlnate quest1ons are needed in order 
to acqulre such knowledge. 
61) So Danto, Analytlcal Philosophy ••. , p.lJ8. 
62) So Passmore, 'The Object1v1ty ••• •, p.105. Agalnst this it has 
been asserted (Dray, 'The H1storian 1 s Problem •.• ', p.596; and 
Dray, Philosophy of History, p.JO) that the important point ln 
history (as opposed to the natural sc1ences) is the 
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misleading comparison. The problem of a technologist is a 
practical task, e.g. the construction of a machine wh~ch is 
capable of a certain performance, and as such it can be compared 
only with other pract1cal tasks. An analogous case in history 
would be the practical task of writing a work which ~s suitable 
to boast the self-conf~dence of a class or nation. But then we 
would accuse a histor1an who had such a purpose of engag~ng in 
propaganda instead of writ~ng history. It may very well be that 
even in such cases the 'hypothes~s' put forward can be 'testedt, 6 J) 
i.e. that we have the means of f~nding out whether and to what 
extent such an account 1s biased due to inadequate selection 
(assum~ng now that in respect to the truth of each statement it 
1s perfectly adequate). But this JUst shows that we need another 
criterion of importance and selection 1n add1t1on to that 
prov1ded by the 'problem' or 'hypothes~s', and aga1n we have to 
conclude that ~t 1s not the case that once a problem is formulated 
the question of whether something is important or not depends on 
th1s problem and on this problem alone. 64 ) 
selection of what is to count as the solut~on roblem 
rather than the selection of a problem 1tself and thereby the 
selection of what is relevant to its solution). But th~s 1s 
likewise ~nadequate for not only has the critic taken over the 
terminology of problem-solv1ng, it is also unclear what sense 
can be assigned to the phrase 'selecting what 1s to count as 
the solut1on of a problem'. After all, problems are solved, 
solutions to problems are found, but nobody, and least of all 
a historian, 'selects' a solution, i.e. takes his pick from a 
number of available poss1bilities. Of course, disagreements 
can ar~se as to whether something does or does not const~tute 
a solution of a certa~n problem, and it may very well be that 
(as Dray ins1sts) the decis~on here is sometimes influenced 
by value-judgements. But it is difficult to see what this 
has to do with the topic of selection in history. 
6J) As maintained by Hook, 'Problems ••• ', p.l26. 
64) As maintained by Hook, 1 0bjectiv~ty •.• ', p.268. 
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There is a further view which can be seen as a spec~al 
version either of the causal or the contextual thesis. Th~s starts 
with the assumpt~on that the typical form of historical 
presentat~on and organization is nanative, that history, in short, 
is always 'story'. This is then made Lnto a criter~on of 
historical relevance: what is selected ~s what belongs to the 
story in quest~on. But the story of a subject is its portrayal 
over t~me, the descript~on of how ~t developed from earlier stages 
~nto later states. Therefore, ~t is the ~nfluence of an earlier 
item C on a later ~tern E wh~ch confers h~stor1cal relevance, 
~mportance or sign~ficance on C and 'the identical event will have 
different signif~cance in accordance with the story 1n wh~ch 1t is 
located'. Stories are thus the 'natural context' ln wh~ch events 
acquire historical s1gnif1cance and '~f an earller event lS not 
s1gnificant w~th regard to a later event 1n a story, it does not 
belong in that storyr. 6 5) 
Th~s v~ew, too, in unacceptable. For, first of all, it 
~s not true that all h1story lS narrative ln character. Whoever 
says so leaves many important works in the wilderness, works in 
wh~ch past states of human affa~rs are described without any 
considerat~on of the~r change in time and wh~ch certainly are not 
works of sociology or any other social sc~ence because the1r 
authors are not interested in un1versal general1zations but in 
65) Danto, Analyt1cal Ph1losophy ... , pp.l0/11, 134, lJ8.Accord~ng 
to Gottschalk, Understanding History, p.l96, those items are 
relevant which are relevant to a 'un~fy~ng narrative'. See also 
Mandelbaum, The Problem ••• , p.258; and G.J.Renier, History.r 
~Purpose and Method, London, 1950, p.95. 
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historical indivldualities. But even if we assume for argument's 
sake that history cannot be anything but narration, this does not 
provide a sufficient crlterion of importance and selection. Here 
our criticism of the causal Vlew comes into force again. It is 
poss1ble for two historians to write the 'story' of the same subject 
but to select ln very different ways. Whereas one regards certain 
items as belonging to the story, the other thlnks they are outside 
it; while one holds that C has influenced a later item E 
sufflciently to be worthy of inclusion, the other believes that 
this lnfluence is not strong enough, or that E ltself is 
unimportant within the framework of the story as a whole. 66 ) Of 
course, one can reply here that if the selection is different in 
two accounts, they do not really 'tell the same story' but two 
different stories, and so can save one's assertlon that what is 
CY,t~r·o~ 
selected depends on what story one lS telllng. 67 ) But then the~ 
66) To be just, 1t must be ment1oned that Danto 1s not unaware of 
these po1nts, as when he wr1tes that an event to be slgn1f1cant 
must have certain consequences to wh1ch the historian attaches 
s1gn1ficance 1n turn, 1.e. that the concept of s1gn1flcance 
here is connected Wlth an 1ndependent concept, w1th 'intrinsic' 
sign1ficance (Danto, Analyt1cal Philosophy ... , pp. 10,15,134). 
But, one may well ask, what is the point of introducing the 
story-element at all as a criterion of significance if it turns 
out in the end that the concept of significance gained in this 
way is dependent on a different concept of significance which 
is quite lndependent of the narrative character? And why call 
the one historical and the other non-hlstorical significance, 
implying thereby that in history the first is the only 
appropriate concept of signiflcance? 
67) Such a Vlew lS at least indicated by Danto (ibid., p.lJ6) when 
he says that if two historians write the same story and dis-
agree with each other, the dispute can only be a factual 
dispute, i.e. a dispute about what really happened. For if 
they agree about the facts but disagree about anything else 
(e.g., so we can add, about the selection of facts) they are 
really writlng about different thlngs and their disagreement 
is no longer histor1cally relevant. A simllar point, although 
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of whether two accounts represent d1fferent stories is made to 
consist in whether they make the same selection, and the whole 
matter becomes analytic. 
5. 'Intrinsic Importance' 
The ma1n opponents of the two vLews discussed, the 
causal and the contextual v1ews, are those who hold that selection 
lS a matter of evaluation and that judgements as to the relevance 
or importance of an item are value-judgements. The vahes in 
question are the histor1an's own values; he Lncludes in hLs 
account what he th1nks lS valuable, i.e. what he thinks is worth 
LncludLng and what ought to be Lncluded. The matter is frequently 
gLven a pragmat1c twist 1n that the values are assoc1ated wLth 
present problems, wLth questLons which Ln the hLstorLan 1 s own time 
are felt to be Ln need of an answer, and selectLon is sa1d to grow 
out of such problems. 68 ) The problems concern the future; they 
are problems of what is going to be the case and whether one thing 
ought to be the case rather than another. It Ls, therefore, the 
without reference to the story-aspect, is made by E. Nagel, 
'Problems of Concept and Theory Format1on in the Social 
Sciences', M. Natanson (Ed.), Philosophy£!~ Social 
Se1ences, New York, 1963, pp. 198/99, who writes that once 
the meanings of terms have been established and a principle 
of selection has been adopted, questions of importance can be 
settled by empirical investigation. But, we may say to this, 
the snag is just that there are better and worse principles 
of selection and that there are no empirical criteria for 
deciding in this matter. 
68) So B.J. Loewenberg, 'Some Problems Raised by Historical 
Relativlsm', The Journal of Modern History, Vol.21, 1949,p.l9. 
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future (or rather the picture a historian makes for himself of the 
future) which affects selection and judgements of ~mportance. 
Selection, it is said, involves an 'act of fa~th' ~n one k~nd of 
future rather than another, and it changes w1th the emergence of 
new goals wh~ch are dependent on presently adopted values. 6 9) 
But stated in those terms the view expresses hardly 
more than a tr~v1al~ty. There can be no doubt that selection 
involves evaluation, i.e. that a h1storian ~ncludes in his account 
what he thinks ~s worth includ~ng, and, in most general terms, he 
thinks it worth includ1ng because he believes ~t to be 1nterest~ng 
in one way or another. 'Interest~ngness' (or memorab1l1ty) 1s 
certainly a category of value but a very wide and a very general 
category, 70 ) and any attempt to narrow it down will be doomed to 
fa~lure. It is usually taken for granted that the values in 
question are moral values. But it is easy to see that what is 
selected by a historian is not always ~nteresting to him in a 
moral respect. There are people who leave out of account whether 
something is morally good or bad, better or worse, but who are 
interested in an event because it is bizarre and unusual, in an 
action because it shows intelligence or efficiency (or, for that 
matter, stupidity or inefficiency). There are, of course, ways 
of bringing all this under a moral category, but then there are 
ways of bringing almost everyth1ng under a moral category. In 
69) 
70) 
Randall, 'Controll~ng Assumptions ... 1 , p.21; Carr, What 
H1story?, p.l24. 
So also Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints ... 1 , p.176. 
is 
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short, if someone regards something as interesting and worth 
recording it does not necessarily mean that he attaches positive 
or negative moral value to it, that he th~nks it to be morally 
good or morally bad.?l) And on the other hand, it is also not the 
case that a difference in moral evaluat~on must always lead to a 
difference in selection and judgement of importance. After all, 
historians may morally Judge an event or person quite differently 
but may agree that it is so important that it cannot be omitted 
from any account of the subject in question. 72 ) And this may 
happen not only because such an event or person had consequences 
about whose importance there ~s agreement but also because there 
is agreement on their importance in a non-causal sense. 
our 
71) 
72) 
So the assertion that our standards of importance are 
standards of value73) or, more generally, that all judgements 
Th~s is why C. Frankel, 'Explanation and Interpretation in 
History', Ph~losophy of Science, Vol. 24, 1957,p. 151, is 
mistaken when he writes that interestingness is dependent on 
values which ought to be held implying thereby that it is a 
moral category. There are, as I. Berlin, Historical 
Inevitability, 2nd impr., London, 1955, pp. 56/57, points out, 
'non-moral categories of value' which as far as selection 
is concerned are on the same level as moral categories. 
Another question is whether interestingness squares w~th 
representativeness. A historian may select the bizarre 
features of a period but may be aware (and may even explicitly 
say so) that what he has selected is not representative. 
However, if he is a historian in the proper sense he will 
still believe that these bizarreries are somehow necessary in 
order to give us the right picture of the period (and not 
necessarily for moral reasons), and he may regard his account 
as complementing or correct~ng other works in which these 
features have been omitted. One can, therefore not follow 
White, 'Toward an Analytic Philosophy ••• ', p.720, who implies 
the existence of an opposition between what is representative 
and what is ~nteresting, although it is true that in history 
representativeness is the more fundamental notion. 
So also von Mises, Human Action, p.4. 
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dealing with facts rest on generalizat~ons of value74 ) is only 
true if 'value' is not equated w~th any specific kinds of value, 
e.g. with moral values. But then by making this assertion we do 
not really say very much. And even if we adopt the pragmatist 
vers~on and speak in terms of present problems, if what we say 
is true we hardly say more than something which is trivial. It 
is certainly not true that present problems determine the 
historian's judgement of importance if this means that all 
(.; 
h~storial work, and therefore all historical selection, is done 
J,. 
in order to determine a present programme of action or in order 
to answer present religious, philosophical or scient~fic 
questions. Relevance does not imply usefulness,75) at least not 
usefulness in the normal sense of the word. History, if it is 
proper history and not something else in a historical garb, is 
distingu~shed from certain other disciplines just by the fact 
that the interest here is in the past for its own sake and not 
because a knowledge of the past may assist in solving present 
problems. Of course, we can give the expression 'present 
problems' such a wide meaning that it can truly be said that 
73) Renier, History, p.l74. See also B. Russell, Understanding 
History~ Other Essays, New York, 1957, p. 41, according to 
whom 'selection must be gu~ded, at least in part, by a sense 
of values'. 
74) Berlin, Historica;l' Inevi tabil±ty, p. 53. 
75) As is mainta~ned by Renier, History, p.l74.- It is also 
questionable whether Barraclough, History ••• , p.lJ, is right 
when he holds that some phases of the past are mo~t important 
than others because we find in them certain affinities or 
similarities in c~rcumstance with the present. What is implied 
here is not only the old view that history can teach us 
lessons (which may be true),(but also that ~tis the task or 
purpose of h~story to do so which is wrong). 
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selection is dependent on present problems. But then the matter 
again becomes trivial, for now it means no more than that the 
historian's interest is a present interest and that what he thinks 
is important, either as a subject to be treated or as an item to 
be included in the treatment of a subject, is dependent on this 
present interest, an interest which, as everyone knows, is 
determined by all kinds of contingent factors. It amounts only 
to the plat~tude that subJects of the past are treated because 
somebody in the present has an interest in treating them and that 
certain items are included in such accounts because somebody thinks 
that they should be included. The fact that somebody has such 
interests and makes such judgements of importance 'is no doubt a 
fact about "the culture of the period"; but this statement is 
little more than another way of saying that in the period certain 
histories do in fact get written and read•, and the insistence 
on the role of present value-Judgements is 'so all-comprehensive 
that it exclu~es no specific principle of selection whatever' . 76 ) 
Th~s treatment of the problem of select~on in terms of 
values and value-judgements is often assoc~ated with a 
distinct~on between intrinsic (or inherent) and instrumental 
(or extrinsic) importance,77) a distinction which at a first 
76) Lovejoy, 'Present Standpoints •.. ', pp. 176, 181. 
77) This is a very common distinction which is made, for instance, 
by Dray, 'The Historian'.sProblem ... ', p.599; L. Re1s & 
P.O. Kristeller, 'Some Remarks on the Method of History', 
The Journal of Ph~losophy, Vol. 40, 1943, p.24J; Walsh, 
'The Limits ... ', p.51; White, 'The Log~c ... ', p.25. 
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glance seems to correspond to our distinction between absolute 
and relational importance. The importance of an item C' is 
instrumental if C is important to some other item~' it is 
intrinsic if it is important in itself. But the gist of our 
analysis of the causal and contextual views was that relations 
cannot supply a final criterion and that the second item E must 
itself be of importance. Nobody would bother to include C in his 
account because C is important to E, if he regards E as 
unimportant. If E in turn is of ~nstrumental importance, then 
there must be another item F to which ~t is important and which, 
therefore, must have importance itself, etc., etc. In other 
words, it very much seems that if an infinite regress is to be 
avoided any instrumental importance must sooner or later, at 
some po~nt or other, lead to an intrins~c importance. 
On the other hand, if we analyse in greater detail 
what is usually regarded as intrinsic we find that it is always 
possible to push the locus of importance further back so that 
what seems intrinsic becomes relational and instrumental 
(although not necessarily causally instrumental). To show this 
let us look at some cases of apparently intrinsic importance (we 
do not claim that our list is exhaustive). 
(!) Say we include the item 'extermination of the Jews' in 
our account of Nazi Germany, and we do not do so because it had 
important consequences or important causes.7S) In that case one 
78) Dray, 'The Historian's Problem ... ', p.599, from whom this 
example is taken, seems to think that this fact is of 
intrinsic importance-only because it cannot be said to have 
had important historical consequences. This, however, does 
not follow for one can easily imagine that a historian selects 
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will say that 1t has been included because of its intrinsic 
importance. But then somebody may ask why it is ~ntrinsically 
important. Now in a case of genuine intrinsic importance one 
would expect that no answer to tliB can be given, or rather that 
the only possible answer would be 1 because ~t Just~ ~mportant'. 
But as a matter of fact this is not the only possible answer. 
For instance, we could say that we have included tlis item because 
it is a 'monument of human depravity•. 79 ) But if so, then the 
mass-murder itself is not the important th~ng. It is only used 
as a manifestation of human depravity, and one could imagine that 
some other and equally striking case, 1f such a case can be 
found, would do just as well. For instance, if we think for a 
moment not of a history of Nazi Germany but of a history of 
twentieth century Europe, the destruction of the kulaks in Russia 
could be said to serve equally well as a monument of depravity, 
and there would be no need to cite the destruction of the Jews 
as a second case. But there can be no doubt that a h~storical 
account which omitted either of the two cases would be regarded as 
~nadequate. Consequently, it cannot be the property of being a 
man~festation of depravity alone which obl~ges us to mention these 
facts. On the other hand, there ~s the further point that any 
historical phenomenon can in one way or another be-seen as an 
79) 
it because ~t had important causes, e.g. the fact that a whole 
people embraced an antisemitic and racialist ideology. 
So ~bid., p.599. Walsh, 'The Lim1ts ... 1 , p.51, uses the 
example of the French Revolution but makes a similar point 
when he says that th1s event is of intrinsic importance if 
it ~s regarded as, say, 'marking a significant manifestation 
of the free spirit of man 1 • 
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expression or manifestation of something, which would mean that 
every one of them had to be included as an item which possesses 
~ntrinsic importance. Not only is the murder of a whole people 
a manifestation of human depravity, but also the murder of a 
single person. Are we therefore obliged to list every single 
case? And if not why are we obliged to include the 'big' cases 
and are allowed to om~t the 'small' ones? 
No, the fact that we have to use expression such as 
'a monument of 1 , 1 a manifestat~on oft, 'an example of', 'an 
express~on of 1 , 'an 1nd~cat~on of' whenever we want to explain 
why a historical phenomenon is of intrinsic ~mportance shows 
that the importance here ~s after all not intrinsic but relational. 
One could object by say~ng that this is just a play with words and 
that ~f B is intrinsically important and ~ is an expression or 
manifestation of~ then a_ 1tself ~s intr~nsically important. 
But this would force us to regard any expression, manifestation, 
indication, etc. as being of the same ~mportance as that of which it 
is an expression, manifestation or indication. The frown on a 
man's face indicates that he is annoyed. Few people (perhaps not 
even philosophical behaviourists) will ~nsist that the ~mportance 
of the frown is identical with the importance of the state of mind 
of which it is an expression. Why then should we think that 
whoever sees in the mass-murder of the Jews an expression of human 
depravity ~s bound to bel~eve that the ~mportance in both cases 
is the same and identical importance? 
Another poss~ble objection against our view would be 
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that the importance here lS nevertheless lntrinsic in the sense 
that lt is not instrumental in respect to any other historical 
item. Depravity is an eternal characteristic ofmarls nature, not 
a historical feature, and if we view the genocide of the Jews 
as important we, so to speak, step outside the field of history. 
There is something in this but it will not do in the present 
context. For it is possible for a historian not to regard the 
exterminatlon as important because it is a manifestation of 
human depravity but because he sees in it a striking expression 
of, say, the twentieth century revolt against the spirit of 
humanitarianlsm, rationalism and tolerance, and tnis revolt is 
certalnly a historical phenomenon. (Nevertheless, as we shall 
point out later, it lS true that at some point or other the chain 
of importance Wlll lead out of tne field of history). 
Finally, there would be the possibility of taking a 
purely formal position by saying that the term 1 lntrinsic 
lmportance' (or •lntrinsic significance') was coined to designate 
non-causal (or even non-consequential) importance, not, however, 
non-relational importance, and that, therefore, our remarks are 
beside the point. But then we could shift our criticism and 
reply that in that case the matter has been overslmplified and 
the wrong impresslon created that the dichotomy of causal and 
non-causal is equlvalent to the dichotomy of relational and non-
relational and that lt is the latter which is the important 
dichotomy. However this may be, the crucial point is that what is 
usually regarded as intrinsic is relational in character, and 
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this can be made still clearer if we look at some other cases 
which are sometimes l~sted under the head~ng of intrinsic 
importance. 
(2) An item may be selected because it is exemplary of the 
subject in question in the sense that it is a specimen of a 
whole series of items which have many properties in common. 
Since they are all similar, only one of them is selected, and 
in this way one avoids cluttering up one's account with 
repetitions. It does not matter very-much which item is chosen, 
and theoretically any would do (although perhaps not every one 
is well enough documented to serve the purpose). For instance, 
a Greek city in the first century A.D. can be made to represent 
all other Gree~ cities of that time. 80 ) It is a 'typical' 
city because it constitutes an average. Even an event such as 
the killing of a large number of people may after all be c~ted 
only as an example in this sense, namely when in the period 
concerned such atrocities were more or less regular occurrences. 
(J) An item may be selected because it is typical, not in 
the sense of representing an average but typical in the sense of 
being highly characteristic, a kind of summary which focuses 
the features of a subject in one sharp point. 81 ) For instan~e, 
82) which is t k th' 11 a person's remark no a remar ~s person usua y 
80) This example ~s taken from Bauer, Einfuhrung ••• , p.l5. 
81) White, Foundations ••• , p.255, speaks here of a 'coll~gation' 
of features. 
82) Bauer, Einfuhrung ..• , p.l5; and Cassirer, An Essay .•• , p.l96, 
both mention this case but they do not seem to distinguish 
between typicality in this sense and in the sense of 
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makes (and which, moreover, may in itself be rather trivial and 
may not have had any percept~ble consequences) may at one stroke 
elucidate the general character of this person, Similarly for 
other facts. A histor~cal event, in spite of being ~ypical 
in the sense that no other events of essentially the same kj_no 
happened in the period concerned, may be highly characteristic 
of that period and may be included in a historical ac~ount 
for this reason alone. 
(4) But something may gain importance also just because it 
is neither average nor characteristic, because it is exceptional 
~n both these respects. Assuming a manuscript of the eleventh 
century is discovered in wh~ch the author clearly and intellig-
ently propounds an epistemological theory very similar to that of 
Kant, and assuming further that it contains a preamble to the 
effect that the work has not been shown to anybody (which allows 
us to exclude consequential importance from the start). 83 ) It 
is very probable that this work would have to be mentioned in any 
good history of mediaeval philosophy as well as in any 
comprehensive account of the mediaeval history of ideas, although 
it is neither exemplary nor typical of mediaeval thinking. But 
this, the fact that it is an except~on to the rule, is just the 
reason why it would have to be included. For its inclusion would 
cause us to modify or supplement, at least to a certain degree, 
const1tut1ng an average. Neither does Bernheim, Lehbuch ••. , 
pp. 729 ff, who however points out that the end of making 
one ~tern stand for a whole ser~es can also be achieved by the 
use of general terms. 
83) An example of this kind is ~ndicated by Meinecke, 
'Values .. ·', p.272. 
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our general picture of the Middle Ages (or at least our picture 
of the eleventh century). While so far we had assumed a very 
homogeneous intellectual climate we would see now that it was not 
quite so much of one piece as we thought it was. Although it may 
seem at first that what is typical or exemplary is ident1cal 
with what is representative, this example show that there is a 
difference. In order to give an adequate account, i.e. a 
representative picture, of a piece of historical reality, it is 
sometimes necessary to 1nclude items which are exceptional and 
atypical. 
One could object that the importance involved here is 
after all of the causal type in that we are interested in such 
a work only because it 1s a product of mediaeval circumstances. 
Only because it is a consequence which throws light on the energies 
from which is arose can it be of any interest. 84 ) This, however, 
would widen the bounds of what can be regarded as a cause or 
reason beyond all acceptable limits. In a trivial sense alone 
is it true that an event or thing which takes place or exists in 
a historical period is the result, product, consequence or effect 
of this period. Therefore, it can also be only in a tr1vial 
sense that a work written in the Middle Ages is important because 
it was 1 caused 1 by the Middle Ages. There are, of course, cases 
where an item 1s legitimately regarded as important because it is 
84) The same objection 1s considered 1bid., p.27J, but Meinecke 
rejects it with the remark that only by virtue of the work's 
intrinsic value is this causal consideration at all possible. 
But it is not necessary to have recourse to values in order 
to reJect the causal cla1m in this case. 
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an effect or consequence of another item, but th~s is not one of 
them. 
The cases discussed would usually be regarded as 
exemplifying intrins~c ~mportance. But although they doubtlessly 
are cases of non-causal importance they are, strictly speaking, 
not cases of 1ntr1nsic ~mportance. For the ~ter usually means 
as much as ~mportance ~n itself without any reference being 
necessary to the importance of another th1ng. But such a 
reference is necessary in each of the four cases, and this is why 
we cannot speak here of intrinsic ~mportance. If an item is 
selected because ~t illustrates or manifests a human 
character~stic such as deprav~ty (or goodness or ~ntelligence or 
whatever one can think of) it ~s selected because it is su1table 
for such an illustration, not because it is important in ~tself. 
If an 1tem is selected because it is an example of a whole set 
of s~milar items 1t is selected because it can be made to stand 
for, or to represent, thoseocher ~terns, not because 1t is 
important as such. If an item 1s selected because it concentrates 
or colligates the features of the s~ect it is selected because 
~t 1s su~table for mak~ng a general point about this subject, 
not because it is intrinsically ~mportant. And if an item is 
selected because ~t ~s atypical and exceptional it 1s selected 
because ~t, as it were, contrad~cts the general character of the 
subject, and so provides a reason for qualify1ng a general 
statement about ~t, not because it is important in its own right 
(a work express~ng thoughts of a Kantian type but written, not in 
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the eleventh but in the nineteenth century, would hardly raise 
an eyebrow). 
u Are we th~n left Wlth an lnfinlte regress after all, 
wlth a positlon where every ltem is important to something else 
but nothing is important in itself? The answer to this is that 
in history we shall indeed not meet with anything that is of 
absolute importance. But lf we follow the regress far enough 
we shall find some Archimedean point outside history that is 
absolutely important. 84a) The chain may be short or it may be 
prolonged so that a hlstorlcal phenomenon A 1s important 
relat1ve to a hlstorical phenomenon B wh1ch in turn is important 
relat1ve to a h1storical phenomenon C etc., etc., and even when 
at some point, say F, the chain leaves the field of history lt 
may not come to an end yet, for 1f F 1s 1mportant relat1ve to a 
non-hlstorlcal item G, Q may 1n turn be 1mportant relative to 
some other non-hlstorical 1tem H. Be that as it may, at the end 
there will be a non-historlcal item Z wh1ch constitutes the 
l1mit beyond which we cannot go and wnich we have to view as 
84a) It lS obvlous that whether an item ls regarded as histor1cal 
or non~historical may depend on metaphysical or other 
assumptions. The depravity of man which we have used as 
an example of a general disposition (which, although in 
itself non-historical, becomes manifest in history), is 
under certain eschatological or messianic points of view 
a purely historlcal phenomenon. This however, does not 
affect our argument. For it does not matter where 
one has to step outside history as long as one has to do it 
somewhere. A person who views human depravlty as historical 
w1ll have to relate it, directly or indirectly, to some 
other ltem if he wlshes to ascribe importance to it, some 
item which he cannot regard as historical. This even holds 
for an extreme historiclst. Try as he may, he cannot 
consistently hold that everything lS historlcal in 
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important in itself, an ~tern such as the feature of depravity in 
human nature. 
That there is a streak of moral evil in man can be 
regarded as a non-historical fact which is important in its own 
right, not important relative to something else, e.g. to 
happiness or unhappiness. (If ~t should be possible to define 
good and evil in terms of happiness and unhappiness, then, of 
course, it would be happiness and unhappiness wh±h are of 
absolute importance). 
We can say, although with restrictions to be mentioned 
shortly, that the greater the extent to which a historical 
phenomenon, directly or 1ndirectly, can be v~ewed as an ind~cation 
of such a non-h~storical fact of absolute importance (and, as we 
have said before, there is no need to think here only of moral 
facts such as human depravity), the greater 1ts relational 
importance and the more worthy it is of being included in a 
historical account. The cruelty or ruthlessness shown by one man 
towards another is usually not as good an indicator of depravity 
~5 
t~ that shown by a whole society towards a minority of millions. 
And this is why the former is not as important as the latter. 
But ~n say~ng all this are we not adopting after all 
the view we have previously criticized, i.e. the view that the 
notion of importance or relevance is in the end a notion of value 
and that selection in history is in the last resort based on 
character for this would leave him without any bas1s for 
ascrib1ng 1mportance to anything. 
- 272 -
value-Judgements? By way of an answer we can only repeat what 
we have sa1d already. The thesis according to which what has 
1ntrinsic importance is what 1s of positive or negat1ve value 
is a tr1vial thesis. (It may even be tautological for 1t is 
possible to define what is intr1nsically 1mportant ~n terms of 
values). Further, there is a difference between saying that all 
or some h1storical 1tems are selected because they are 
intrinsically important and say1ng that no historical 1tem is ever 
selected for this reason, but that every one of them is selected 
because 1t 1s d1rectly or indirectly important to some non-
histor1cal item wh1ch 1s of intrinsic or absolute 1mportance. It 
1s the latter thes1s wh1ch we have defended here. 
6. Representativeness 
All this may help towards the solut1on of our problem 
as to the cr1ter1a of select1on but it does not in itself 
constitute such a solut1on. For even 1f we were to assume that 
there is complete clarity about what is of non-historical 
1ntrins1c importance (e.g., that we know this by 1ntu1tion) and 
that there 1s general agreement about what is and what is not, we 
would st1ll be left with many quest1ons; can there, for 1nstance, 
be equal agreement as to whether and in how far a given 
h1storical phenomenon 1s relevant to such an 1tem of intrinsic 
1mportance (whether, for instance, it is indeed a man1festation 
of an eternal human characteristic), or about whether one item 
is more relevant to it than another and so more worthy of being 
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~ncluded! 
But still more fundamental is the problem posed by 
the fact that it cannot simply be a matter of select~ng 
historical phenomena wh~ch are relevant to non-historical items 
of intrinsic importance and of ordering them according to the 
degree of their relevance. For th~s alone does not guarantee the 
representativeness of an account. In other words, a historian 
may select according to these principles but his work may still 
be far from adequate in that it gives a distorted picture of the 
subject. Whatever he includes may be true and may be relevant 
to some item of intrinsic importance, and he may have his 
priorities of values completely right, but what he writes may 
still amount to a distortion of historical real~ty. This means 
that we cannot simply say that an account is representative, and 
therefore adequate, if, apart from being true, it includes what 
is important (or relevant or significant), although it is 
certainly the case that an account which omits one or more 
important items ~s not representative, i.e. not completely 
representative. The selection of the important is not a sufficient 
condition for the representativeness of an account. 
Representativeness85 ) ~s a complex notion which comprises 
several elements, and the best way of analysing it is perhaps 
by means of our old analogy, that of a map. To make things 
85) This term, although it can be used of individual statements, 
~s applied here only to whole accounts of a subject. 
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simpler we ignore the differences between specialized maps 
(geographical, political, etc.), d~fferences which would 
correspond to the differences between specialized histories 
(social, economic, etc.), and conf~ne ourselves to general maps 
wh~ch attempt to show something of all these spec~alities (as 
general history seeks to take into account items of the most 
diverse f~elds). We can safely do this because the problem of 
representativeness is not the problem of whether and in how far 
a subject is representative but whether and in how far an account 
of a subject is representative of this subJect, and the latter 
is not affected at all by its specialized character. A 
geographical map of a country should be representat~ve of the 
country's geography, not of ~ts political features. An economic 
history of nineteenth century England should be representative 
of the Engl~sh economy in the nineteenth century, not of English 
art and literature dur~ng that period. 
it hardly needs stating. 86 ) 
This is so obvious that 
We can say, then, that a map is representative of the 
area of which it purports to be a map only ~f the follow~ng 
condit~ons are sat~sfied: 
(1) Any details shown on the map should correspond to some 
feature in reality. If there ~s a river ind~cated on the map of 
86) There 1s the further point that many works of history are 
del1berately unrepresentat~ve because their authors only 
1ntend to make a contr1bution to a topic and to supplement 
previous accounts or to correct their balance. With this 
we are not concerned here. 
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an area there should be a river ~n the area itself, i.e. the map 
should not show a r~ver if there is none. This, of course, is a 
condition of truth and ~s analogous to the demand that every 
statement of fact in a work of history should be true. If a 
historian asserts that a certain event occurred it is demanded 
of him that this should really have occurred. From this we 
can already see that conditions of truth are included in 
conditions of representativeness and are not something separate. 
A historical account may be true without being representative 
but it cannot be representat~ve without being true. 
(2) Having stated the first cond~tion we are now tempted 
to formulate its complement: (~) Any feature of reality should be 
shown on the map. This, however, is to demand the ~mpossible, 
and even ~f it were possible to produce a map which sat~sfied 
~t, this map would be so f~lled with deta~ls that our ability to 
read and understand it would be seriously impaired. Therefore, 
we must modify our demand. It is obvious that the amount of 
detail shown on a map depends on ~ts scale. We do not expect to 
f1nd v~llages and small streams represented on a large-scale 
map, just as we do not expect to find certain events, persons or 
~nstitutions mentioned in a history of the world in three hundred 
pages. If we think of the pilot of a man-made satellite flying 
over an area of the globe at such a height that everything he 
sees is reduced ~n size by 100,000, then, roughly speaking a map 
~n the scale 1:100,000 of this area should show everything the 
p~lot ~s able to not1ce (forgetting now about invisible features 
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such as political frontiers). If we refer to what he can notice 
as 1 falllng within scale' we can say (b) any feature of reality 
which falls within the map's scale should be shown on the map. 
But this is still not good enough. For our pilot 
would probably see many things which do not appear even on the 
best of maps (while many things he does not or cannot see Wlll 
appear on it). He mlght see part of the country streaked or 
shaded in a certain way because the soil there lS clay or because 
there are large areas where wheat is grown. But a map, unless 
it is a speciallzed one, does not show the kind of soil or the 
crops grown in an area, even if such features do fall within its 
scale. The reason is that geographically such properties do not 
pull much Welght. The growing of wheat is a transient feature 
which can vanlsh almost overnight (whereas a river or mountaln 
is much more permanent) and the character of the soil, although 
this is a stable trait which might even determine geographical 
features proper (e.g. the course of a river), is in itself not 
a geographical but a geologlcal property in which the map-maker 
as well as the map-reader is not interested (again forgettlng 
about speciallzed maps). An analogy from history would be the 
example of the adoption of the tooth-brush which is certainly 
a large-scale phenomenon (and so ~alls Wlthin scale) in that it 
has affected many people, and there may even be a case for 
arguing that, as part of the general improvement in conditions 
of health, it has influenced the course of history. Nevertheless, 
it is not a fact which would be included in a representative 
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histor1cal account (again except~ng specialized histories). 
Returning to the pilot's picture, it is probable that 
the mark~ngs he sees where the soil is clay or where wheat is 
grown are not as pronounced as the markings he observes where 
there is a large river or mountain or where land borders on to 
sea. In other words, there are differences in the intens~ty of 
the markings and if we adopt this term we can say at last: 
(c) Any feature of reality which falls within the map's scale 
and which reaches a certain degree of ~ntensity should be shown 
on the map. The phrase 'a certa1n degree of' cannot be avoided, 
wh~ch means that there will always be Inarginal cases of 
unresolvable disagreements as to whether someth~ng should be shown 
on a map, as there will always be unresolvable conflicts of 
opinion as to whether something should be included in a work of 
history. But, here as anywhere, the ex~stence of borderline 
situations does not imply that everything is borderline and that 
we can never say with certainty that an item should be included 
or should be excluded. 
(J) But the answers to the questions of what should be 
shown on a map and what should not be shown are not sufficient 
for deciding whether a map is representative or not (or in how 
far it is representative). After all, a map may satisfy the 
first two conditions but may still give us a distorted picture 
because the relations between the rightly included items may not 
accord with the relat~ons between the corresponding features of 
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the landscape. Where according to the map the distance between 
two po~nts is fifty miles ~t may actually be sixty miles; where 
the map marks a town as being NE of another town in reality it 
may be NW of it. In such cases the map, although it does not 
show anything which is not there and although it shows everything 
it should show, would still be unrepresentative. Consequently, 
we have to add as a further condi~~on: the relations shown 
between the 1tems marked on the map should correspond to the 
relations between the respective items in reality. For h1story 
th~s amounts to the demand that statements of connexions between 
facts should be true. In other words, we have here another 
condit~on of truth which supplements the first condition under 
(1J. If in a work of history ~t is stated that an event C took 
place after an event ~' whereas actually E took place after £ 
or both took place simultaneously, or if it is asserted that a 
phenomenon E was influenced by a phenomenon C, although in reality 
there was no influence at all between C and E or the influence 
went in the other direction, then the historian has made a false 
statement and his account is not representative. 
(4) However, relations of this type are not the only 
relations which are relevant to representativeness. There is at 
least one further condition which could be called a condition of 
relative size or emphasis. Let us assume that there are two 
rivers, A and B, and both are shown on the map exactly in the 
localit~es where they can be found in reality. But B is marked 
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with a th~cker line or in blacker ink than A thus implying 
that B is the larger of the two, whereas ~n the landscape it ~s 
B which is smaller, or A and B are of the same size. Again we 
would regard the map as misleading for it gives a wrong 
relative emphasis. So we have to put down as a last condition: 
the relative emphasis given to items shown on the map should 
correspond to the relations holding between these items in 
reality. 8 7) Again, it is not difficult to find analogies ln 
h~story. If a h~storian makes a mountain out of a molehilL, 
if he emphasizes one feature at the expense of another, e.g. by 
allocating much more space to it and be describ~ng it in much 
greater detail, then his account is not representative. He may 
dwell at length on a few cases of the miscarriage of justice and 
only mention very briefly that in many other cases there was 
no miscarriage, so making his account lop-sided. 
Th~s is as far as our comparison of a work of history 
with a map will carry us. The analogy is, of course, 
inadequate in many respects. For instance, whereas in the 
m~ng of a map only the dimension of space and spatial 
relat~onships have to be considered, ~n the writ~ng of a 
histor~cal account time and temporal relations as well as 
relat~ons of dependence and influence have to be taken into 
87) This could also be called the condition of consistency of 
scale and intensity for, in effect, it amounts to the,demand 
that the criteria as to what is to be regarded as falling-
within scale and as having the necessary degree of intensity 
should remain stable throughout the work Qf drawing the 
map (or of writing the historical account). 
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account. This is why on a map relations between items need not 
be made explicit but can be read off, whereas in history they 
very often have to be stated explicitly. With the correct 
positioning of marks on a map the correct relations between the 
marks, and so between the phenomena of real~ty they represent, are 
g~ven automatically. But ~n h~story this holds at the most for 
certain relations, e.g. those of t~me, while others, e.g. 
connexions of dependence, have to be stated (or have to be 
implied) separately. This means (since the number of those 
relations which can be stated is very large, if not infinite) 
that ~n history it is also a question of selecting the right 
connex~ons, not only the right facts, and of giv~ng them the r~ght 
emphasis, problems wh~ch do not arise in respect of maps. 
In spite of these and other l~mitations, our comparison 
elucidates some important points concerning the problem of 
select~on. It shows for one thing that the issue of selection and 
importance is only part of a wider issue, that of 
representativeness, and so cannot be completely divorced from the 
~ssue of truth. Further, it helps us to recognize that the 
problem of selection consists of two parts, the problem of how 
the condition under (~) and the problem of how the condition under 
(4) can be sat~sfied. 
The condition under (2) itself is a compound of two 
requirements, the requirement of scale and the requ~rement of 
The f~rst poses few problems in history. It is 
- 281 -
obvious that what is selected for ~nclusion is partly dependent, 
not only on the subject chosen (a history of England ~nstead of 
a h~story of France, a political h1story instead of an economic 
h1story, etc.), but also on how large and how detailed the 
historian wants his work to be {a pol~tical history of England 
in 200 or in 2000 pages). Scale does not necessarily affect the 
qual~ty or interest of a work (a book of 200 pages may be better 
history than a book of 2000 pages) and as we cannot say that the 
smaller the scale the better the map, so we cannot say that the 
more detailed the work of history the better it is. There is 
also no sharp line to be discovered which divides those items 
which fall w~thin the scale of a historical account from those 
which do not but, as we have ind1cated already, as we can 
normally dec~de without great trouble whether an item belongs to 
a subJect, so we do usually know very well whether something falls 
within the scale of a work. 
simple. 
In respect to ~ntensity the matter is not quite so 
Some phenomena which certa~nly fall within scale, e.g. 
because they d~rectly or ~nd~rectly affect many people or large 
terr~tor~es or because they last for many years, are not intense 
enough to be worthy of inclusion. Roughly speaking, while scale 
~s a matter of quantity, intensity is a matter of quality, and 
it is notoriously more difficult to dec~de on questions of qual~ty 
than to decide on questions of quant~ty. Let us take a fact such 
as the enclosures in eighteenth century England, a fact which 
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usually satisfies the requirement of scale. Is it worthy of 
inclusion in a history of eighteenth century England? The answer 
will be ~n the affirmative because the enclosures d~d not only 
affect many people and large areas but affected them in certain 
crucial respects which, directly or ind~rectly, are important 
to human l~fe ~n a way in which, say, the adoption of the tooth-
brush is not important. The judgement here rests on what ~n 
another chapter we have called general experience. We know from 
our own lives that whether we brush our teeth or not has not a 
very great bearing on the life we are leading and the thoughts 
we are thinking, whereas a fact l~ke the enclosures has very 
great bearing, either immed~ately or in the future or both. 
This can be viewed as a matter of evaluation in the sense that 
what affects human existence is loaded with positive or negative 
value. But one may very strongly disagree as to whether an item 
affects human life beneficially or detrimentally, while 
nevertheless agreeing that it does affect it. Only the latter 
agreement or disagreement is of importance here. 
S~milar cuns~derat~ons apply in respect of the 
condition listed under (4), the condition of emphasis. If we 
have decided that two or more historical phenomena satisfy the 
requirements of scale and intensity and so should be included in 
a historical account, there still remains the question of how far 
they satisfy them, i.e. of how much emphas~s they should be 
allocated in relation to each other. It is obvious that th~s 
cannot be settled ~n a mechanical way, e.g. by an equal 
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allocation of space to a t~me-span or field (5 pages for each 
year, 50 pages for politics and 50 pages for art). There are 
times in which nothing of ~mportance happens or which are poor in 
one field (e.g. art) but rich in another (e.g. politics). 
Therefore, anything which resembles an arithmetical distribution is 
out of the question. Instead we have to consider the degree of 
scale and intens~ty of each item ~n relation to all the others 
and have to distributespace and amount of detail accordingly. 
The decision that some items should be included does not entail 
any decision as to how they are to be balanced. Two h~storians 
may be in complete agreement as to the first, but in complete 
disagreement as to the second dec~sion. But the second, like the 
first, rests on general experience. 
We asked towards the beginning of this chapter whether 
there are any objective grounds for preferring as a work of 
knowledge one historical account A to another historical 
account B although A and B are equally true. To this we can give 
now an answer of sorts. We have seen previously that the 
decision as to whether an individual historical statement is to 
be regarded as true depends on general assumptions or 
. t . 88 ) 0 1 . f th . t . presuppos~ ~ons. n y ~n as ar as ose presuppos~ ~ons are 
shared by different people can there be agreement on whether 
something constitutes sufficient ev~dence for it. Similarly for 
the question of whether a whole historical account is, apart from 
88) A statement about an indiv~dual fact, that is, for we have 
not sa1d anything in this respect about statements asserting 
connexions between facts. 
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its truth, a good account or a better account than another one. 
The answer to this, too, depends on presuppositions, and the 
same answer will be given by different people 1n as far as 
these people share the same presuppos1t1ons. The presuppositions 
m 
are general ass/ft~uns about human ex1stence, not, as in the 
case of truth and ev1dence, assumpt1ons about regular1ties in 
nature and society. They are assumptions of value 1f th1s term 
is not conf1ned to moral values. They are presupposit1ons as to 
what non-h1storical items are absolutely important, or more 
absolutely 1mportant, 1nfue sense explicated before. And they 
rest on experience 1n the sense that they are developed with 
exper1ence. But th1s does not entail that they are arr1ved at 
by a process of induct1ve 1nference. Empir1cal knowledge is 
necessarily selective, and this means that principles of 
select1on are needed in order to acqu1re any empirical knowledge 
at all. But then these princ1ples cannot themselves be derived 
by 1nduction. On the other hand, by their very nature they 
cannot be of a formal and non-empirical character and so 
independent of experience. After all, they grow with experience, 
exper1ence of human ex1stence. In fact, they are the 
quintessence of this experience, and 1f x is the qu1ntessence 
of z, ~ cannot be 1nferred from z, even if we adopt a very w1de 
not1on of inference which allows us to speak, for instance, of 
'unconsc1ous lnference'. 89) 
89) Our position here is very s1milar to that of Berlin, 
'History and Theory', p. 26: ' ••• such knowledge .•. 1s not 
confirmable or corrig1ble by the normal empirical methods, 
to wh1ch 1t functions as a base ..• but neither, of course, 
is it a priori .•• if by that is meant that it is obtainable 
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However, when we deal with a historical account as a 
whole, as opposed to an individual hlstorical statement, we had 
better not forget the artificiality of separating truth from the 
other marks of adequacy which we have referred to as importance 
and emphasis. The adequacy of such a whole, i.e. its 
representativeness, is a whole itself, and a judgement of adequacy 
consists in one complex unlty in which the issues of truth and 
of the r1ght selection and emphasis are fused together. Making 
such a judgement can be sald to be dependent on two sets of 
presuppositions, presupposit1ons in respect to evidence and 
presuppositions in respect to importance and emphasis. 
The problem is 1n how far these presuppositions are in 
fact shared by all or at least by most men. What is usually 
called the 'obJectivity' of history 1s completely dependent on 
the existence of such common assumpt1ons, on a kind of 'uniformity 
of human nature' in at least some respects.90) As far as the 
presuppositions of evidence are concerned, i.e. the assumptions 
which allow us to infer from certain data that something was the 
case, we came to the conclus1on that by and large these are 
shared so that disagreements are relatively rare, although when 
they do occur they cannot be resolved by appeal to a 'logic of 
90) 
ln some special, non-naturalistic way. Recognition of the 
fundamental categor1es of human exper1ence differs from both 
empirlcal informatlon, and deductive reasoning; they underlie 
both; and are the least changeable elements in our knowledge.' 
(But Berlin writes this, not in the context of historical 
selectlon, but in respect to the recognition of historical 
succession). 
'Th1s common ground is what is correctly called objectlve ••• 1 , 
Berlln, Historical InevitabilitY, p. 66. 
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non-demonstrative reasoning'. The position is different only in 
degree in respect to the presuppos~tions of ~mportance and 
emphasis. It is certa~nly more difficult to come-to a consensus 
as to whether a fact expressed in a statement ~s an important 
fact (or is more important than another fact), than to agree on 
whether the statement expressing this fact is true or false (or 
to what degree it has to be regarded as true or false).90a) But 
this does not mean that there ~s no agreement at all (or that 
there cannot be any agreement) and that in respect to importance 
and emphasis history ~s a free-for-all, as many authors seem to 
think. 91 ) In fact, there ~s a large field where agreement does 
exist, ~.e. where the relevant presuppositions are shared. In 
cases far removed from the borderline area we can find a constant 
consensus unaffected by psycholog~cal d~spositions or cultural 
and social environments. Phenomena such as a great pestilence 
or a great war have always been viewed as important by historians, 
whether European or Chinese, whether in antiquity or in modern 
t~mes. 93 ) And where there is disagreement between historians 
l~ving at different times, this can often be put down to the 
90a) IliB'fieFH'lB:l IRevitalnlaty, tl 65 But it may be, as Hook, 
'Objectlvlty ... •, p.271, mainta1ns, that there is more 
disagreement on the truth of statements about connexions 
between facts than there is on importance and emphasis. 
91) For ~nstance, Ren~er, History, p.l73, according to whom 
relevance •~s and remains subjective'. 
93) But we have to take 1nto account the fact that in certain 
per1ods the sensitiv1ty towards such events may be blunted 
because offue frequency of the1r occurrence. A century 
in which a plague breaks out every five years or so will 
probably not think that each of these events lS ~mportant 
enough to be ~ncluded in a work of history. 
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gradual unfolding of the consequences of past events so that one 
could say 1 1f th1s histor~an of the past had known what came of 
this event, he would have attached to it the same ~mportance and 
would have given it the same emphasis as a h~storian of the 
presentx'. 
Nevertheless, ~t would mean closing one's eyes to 
reality if one were to ins~st that there is always consensus or, 
where there is none, that this can always be attr~buted to the 
fact that the consequences had not yet become obv~ous. It is 
s1mply a fact that frequently histor1ans (and maybe even one 
and the same histor~an at different times of his life) are in 
dispute with each other and change their opinions as to what is 
~mportant and unimportant or as to what needs to be more or less 
emphasized. Even for past periods which to all intents and 
purposes have exhausted their consequences, different selections 
will sometimes be made and different items will be emphas~zed. 
For the interests and outlooks of men change with the changes in 
their lives and env~ronments,and it would be a pity if they did 
not change ~n th~s way. Therefore, not only is 1t useless to 
deplore this fact, one can even turn the tables and demand that 
h~storians should constantly reassess their judgements of 
importance and emphasis instead of just taking over the JUdgements 
of their predecessors or holding on tightly to a position adopted 
the pr1me of the~r youth.9 4 ) 
94) A s1milar point is made by Dovring, History ••. , p.7.- In fact, 
historians even change their criteria of selection while 
they are engaged on one and the same work. See £arr, 
~ ~History?, pp.29/JO. 
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It is sometimes said that h1story can be 'obJectlve' 
as far as the establishment of facts is concerned, not however 
in respect to judgements of 1mportance and emphasis.95) But 
the difference here 1s at the most a d1fference of degree and 
should not be construed as an absolute opposition. It is still 
more m1staken to see in the lack of unanimity in respect to 
judgements of importance and emphasis a characterist1c confined 
to history and to contrast it with an alleged intersubjectivity 
1n other fields of knowledge. In science (and this for most 
people means the sc1ences of inanimate nature, if not phys1cs), 
we are given to understand, there 1s no problem as to importance 
and emphasis, and no disagreements arise in these respects, 
because the criter1a of relevance and importance are unambiguously 
suppl1ed by scientific theories. But th1s is an oversimplified 
view. Since a pure science 1s not concerned w1th descriptions 
of individual matters of fact and states of affairs, it is obvious 
that the problem of representativeness does not arise here in the 
way in which it arises in history (it arises, so to speak, within 
the theories themselves), and it is even questionable whether 
the term 'representativeness' in the sense in which we have used 
it 1s at all applicable in such a discipl1ne. For 1t can be 
doubted that it is really the aim of a modern physical science 
to prov1de a picture of physical reality which is representative 
of this reality, whereas 1t is certainly the a1m of history to 
prov1de such a p1cture of the human past. The basic interest of 
95) So m.w. StroDS;-·~~8iD8 Bisto~', Proceedings and ~ressea 
~ iDA American Philosophical Association, Vol. 26, 1952 53 1 
p. 48. 
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a physical science is after all, and has been for the last three 
hundred years, an interest in the computation and manipulation 
of natural phenomena. Such an overriding preoccupation 
concentrates the mind wonderfully and provides an admirable 
criterion of what is important or needs emphasizing. Even 
where it is a question of describing an individual piece of 
reality, e.g. a certain apparatus or machine, the question of 
what items have to be included in such a description and of 
what relative emphasis has to be given is settled by reference 
to this confined purpose, and variations can arise only if 
there ~s disagreement about what serves th~s purpose best. 
This confinement of interest explains why in the 
physical sciences problems of importance and emphasis do not 
arise, or hardly arise (some people will say that their 
'objectivity' in this respect 1s bought at a heavy price, the 
price of narrow-mindedness) and if history were equally 
restricted1 then here, too, there would be no difficulty 
(although then it would no longer be history either). However, 
~f we wish to make comparisons at all we must not forget that 
the alternative ~s not only between history and the physical 
sc~ences. After all, there are branches of knowledge apart 
from physics and chemistry. There are the biological sciences, 
there are the social sciences, there is ge~graphy, there is 
philology and there are many more disciplines which do not adhere, 
or do not exclusively adhere, to the model of physics. And if 
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we look at some of those we find that it is by no means certain 
that the position in respect to intersubjective criteria of 
importance and emphasis is so very different, and so much better, 
than it is in history. Would one really like to say that it is 
easier to decide whether and in how far the geographical 
description of an area is representative, or whether it is more 
adequate than a r~val description, than it is to make a 
comparable decision in h~story? The answer is 'no' and ~t cannot 
be otherwlse. For whenever ~t ~s a matter of ~traying a p~ece 
or stretch of reallty Wlthout a generally shared preselected 
purpose (the only purpose belng to give a representat~ve account), 
there will be quest~ons as to importance and emphasis and there 
will be disputes as to how these questions are to be answered. 
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